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INTRODUCTION
SCOPE OF WORK
At the request of the Criminal Justice Working Group–Title 12 Legal Competency
Subcommittee (the Competency Subcommittee), this report was funded by the Alaska Mental
Health Trust Authority (the Trust) and developed in partnership with the Competency
Subcommittee.1 In 2011, the Competency Subcommittee recommended that the Criminal
Justice Working Group “secure consultant services for review of the existing AS § 12.47
statute,” including a comparison of Alaska statutes to other state statutes, a review of the
connections between AS § 12.47 and Alaska’s civil commitment statutes, and a
recommendation for changes to the existing statutes. Following Request for Proposal 14067M, the UNLV Research Team (the UNLV Team) submitted a proposal to the Competency
Subcommittee. The Trust awarded the contract to the UNLV Team to conduct a
comprehensive study of AS § 12.47.010–AS § 12.47.130 (Insanity and Competency to Stand
Trial) and AS § 47.30.700–AS § 47.30.915 (Involuntary Admission for Treatment). In
addition, the Competency Subcommittee asked the UNLV Team to review statutes related to
mental competence evaluation and restoration for juvenile and misdemeanor offenders.

The report identifies key statutory provisions that we recommend be amended, a description
of our findings based on interviews with stakeholders, legislative history of the Alaska
statutes, reviews of national best practices and, where applicable, information about
emerging areas in national mental health law for Alaska to consider in creating new law.
Our recommendations are based in large part on significant advances in law and medicine in
the understanding and treatment of mental illness that have occurred in the years since
Alaska last made significant and substantive reforms to its criminal and civil mental health
statutes. It is important to note that proper implementation of many of the suggested
reforms will require significant allocation of resources and development of infrastructure
throughout the state and within local communities.
We have attempted to fully represent the views of the Competency Subcommittee members.
Each member was given the opportunity to review and provide input on this report, but the
members that reviewed the drafts of this document do not necessarily endorse all of the
recommendations made by the authors. The authors are solely responsible for the content of
this report and the report does not represent the opinions of the Competency Subcommittee
members or funding agency.
METHODOLOGY
In August 2014, the UNLV Team traveled to Anchorage to interview Competency
Subcommittee members and other key governmental and community stakeholders, to gain
insight and perspective into the current mental health system, and to visit relevant offices
and facilities. These stakeholders included representatives from the Alaska Court System,
the Department of Administration–Public Defender Agency and Office of Public Advocacy,
the Department of Health and Social Services, the Department of Law, the Department of
Corrections (DOC) and the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API). The UNLV Team also worked
See Memo from Steve Williams, Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, to Chief Justice Carpeneti and
Attorney General Burns, Criminal Justice Working Group, Summary and Recommendations from the AS 12.47 –
Competency subcommittee (Feb. 11, 2011), on file with authors.
1
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closely with an ad hoc Juvenile Subcommittee (Juvenile Subcommittee) to develop specific
recommendations for juvenile competency and restoration statutes.
Following the August 2014 interviews, the UNLV Team conducted extensive research of
Alaska case law and legislative history, national trends and best practices in all relevant
areas, and studies in peer reviewed literature. The UNLV Team drafted initial reports that
summarized those findings and provided analysis of laws and legislation relating to mental
health in Alaska. These reports were presented to the Competency Subcommittee and
Juvenile Subcommittee, which provided significant input and insights gathered from each
individual’s personal experience with the Alaska mental health law system. This feedback
allowed the UNLV Team to better tailor the final report to Alaska’s specific and unique legal
and mental health needs.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The body of this report addresses five categories of statutes: forensic evaluators and the use
of telebehavioral health; civil mental health law; criminal mental health law; misdemeanor
statutes; and juvenile statutes. Each category summarizes existing Alaska law, details
findings based on interviews with stakeholders and outside research, recommends specific
statutory amendments, and summarizes the Competency Subcommittee’s response to those
recommendations. The report then includes appendices with new statutory language
relating to outpatient commitment (Appendix 1), misdemeanor defendants (Appendix 2), and
juvenile competency and restoration (Appendix 3). Finally, the report concludes with the
original and revised versions of Title 12 and Title 47, which implement the recommended
revisions.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FORENSIC EXAMINERS & TELEBEHAVIORAL HEALTH: Qualified and neutral evaluators
should conduct all forensic evaluations (for purposes of insanity or negated mental state,
competence to stand trial, and civil commitment). Qualified evaluators should have
additional training and education in forensic evaluations, which should be coordinated by
the Division of Behavioral Health. Neutral evaluators should not otherwise be involved in
the defendant’s clinical or restorative treatment. Alaska should adopt the use of
telebehavioral health and reduce the number of required neutral and qualified evaluators in
order to reduce staffing burdens.
AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS: Responsible
agents should be designated throughout the statutes to assume responsibility for
implementing statutory obligations.
FINDING OF INCOMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL AND COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS: A finding of incompetence to stand trial should require that
defendants charged with felonies and misdemeanors be evaluated for civil commitment and
treatment upon dismissal of charges.
INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT: Alaska’s outpatient commitment laws should be
amended to include enforcement mechanisms, consequence for non-compliance, and
responsible agents. Suggested statutory language is attached in Appendix 1.
INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT COMMITMENT: Title 47 should be amended throughout to clarify
the standard for commitment, and to reflect that the respondents condition is required to “be
improved by the course of treatment” only in civil commitment based on grave disability.
Grave disability should be defined according to the Alaska Supreme Court’s definition in
Wetherhorn v. API. The definitions of “likely to cause serious harm” and “grave disability”
should be defined to include timeframes in which the relevant behavior must have occurred
or is likely to occur. The procedures for the initiation of civil commitment proceedings should
be revised and clarified.
NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY (NGRI) STATUTES: Alaska should re-institute a
functional insanity affirmative defense, with both the cognitive and moral incapacity prongs
of the full M’Naghten test. If Alaska chooses to re-institute a full M’Naghten test for legal
insanity, it should consider deleting the guilty but mentally ill verdicts from the statute.
GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL (GBMI) STATUTES: If Alaska retains the GBMI verdict, it
should consider limiting it for acquittal under AS § 12.47.020(c) and post-conviction GBMI
determination under AS § 12.47.060.
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY DEFINITIONS: Alaska should include
more explicit and current definitions of intellectual disability and developmental disability
within the text of its incompetence to stand trial statute.
COMPETENCY AND INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION: Alaska’s incompetence to stand trial
statute should be amended to include a provision allowing the use of medication to restore
competency. This amendment could include references to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Sell v. United States and Washington v. Harper.
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MISDEMEANOR STATUTES: Alaska should consider allocating more resources to creating
sentencing alternatives for mentally ill low-level misdemeanants and implementing a
statute that allows for diversion of incompetent misdemeanor defendants. Alaska should
amend various statutes to implement competency evaluation and restoration guidelines that
reduce the total amount of time defendants charged with misdemeanors spend in jail while
awaiting trial. AS § 12.47.110 should be amended to allow for varying time periods for
competency restoration, depending on the seriousness of the charged offense. Suggested
statutory language allowing for diversion of incompetent misdemeanor defendants is
attached in Appendix 2.
JUVENILE STATUTES: Alaska should implement a new statutory section within AS § 47.12,
Delinquent Minors, which includes detailed standards related to juvenile competency and
restoration and alternative approaches for juvenile delinquency adjudication. Suggested
statutory language is attached in Appendix 3.
GUARDIANSHIP: Although guardianship issues are outside of the scope of work of this
project, numerous stakeholders suggested that Alaska should revisit its guardianship
statutes and examine ways to give more authority to guardians and further maximize the
benefits of the guardianship system.
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A. FORENSIC EXAMINERS
1. Use of Forensic Examiners
Current law: Two Alaska statutes address forensic examination in the context of criminal
trials, and they contradict one another to some extent. First, AS § 12.47.070 addresses
psychiatric examination generally and encompasses situations where a defendant claims an
insanity defense, claims a mental disease that negates a culpable mental state, or where
there is reason to doubt the defendant’s fitness to proceed. AS § 12.47.070 then provides that
“the court shall appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists or two forensic psychologists
certified by the American Board of Forensic Psychology to examine and report upon the
mental condition of the defendant.”
AS § 12.47.100 more specifically governs incompetency to proceed, where a defendant who
“as a result of mental disease or defect, is incompetent because the defendant is unable to
understand the proceedings against the defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own
defense.” Although the requirements for forensic examiners are addressed in 12.47.070,
12.47.100 has different requirements for forensic examiners, providing that “the court shall
have the defendant examined by at least one qualified psychiatrist or psychologist, who shall
report to the court concerning the competency of the defendant.” Stakeholders report that
this discrepancy has caused courts to require two evaluations in cases involving criminal
responsibility, and one evaluation in cases involving competency. Moreover, as it relates to
psychiatrists and psychologists, the term “qualified” is not defined in either statute.
AS § 47.30.730 governs forensic assessment in the context of civil commitment. AS §
47.30.730 requires that a petition for commitment to a treatment facility must be “signed by
two mental health professionals who have examined the respondent, one of whom is a
physician.” “Mental health professional” is defined by AS § 47.30.915 as:
A psychiatrist or physician who is licensed by the State Medical Board to
practice in this state or is employed by the federal government; a clinical
psychologist licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological
Associate Examiners; a psychological associate trained in clinical psychology
and licensed by the Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate
Examiners; a registered nurse with a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing,
licensed by the State Board of Nursing; a marital and family therapist
licensed by the Board of Marital and Family Therapy; a professional
counselor licensed by the Board of Professional Counselors; a clinical social
worker licensed by the Board of Social Work Examiners; and a person who
(A) has a master’s degree in the field of mental health; (B) has at least 12
months of post-masters working experience in the field of mental illness; and
(C) is working under the supervision of a type of licensee listed in this
paragraph.
Finally, Alaska Statutes Title 8 governs the licensing and qualifications of professions in the
state. AS § 08.64 (Medicine) governs the practice of psychiatrists, while AS § 08.86
(Psychologists and Psychological Associates) governs the practice of psychologists.
Psychiatrists are medical doctors licensed by the State Medical Board; psychologists are
licensed by the Alaska Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners. In
order to be licensed as a Psychologist or Psychological Associate, the individual must have
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earned a doctorate degree (Psychologist) or master’s degree (Psychological Associate) from
an academic institution in clinical psychology, counseling psychology, or an equivalent field;
must have one year (Psychologist) or two years (Psychological Associate) of post doctoral
supervised experience; and must take and pass the objective examination developed or
approved by the Alaska Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners.2
Findings: Based on interviews with stakeholders, we learned that forensic assessment is
primarily done by API. API is responsible for the assessment of a defendant’s mental state
at the time of a crime (for purposes of insanity or negated mental state), the assessment of
competency to stand trial, and the assessment of whether a respondent meets the state
statutory criteria for civil commitment. Because API is also responsible for competency
restoration, several stakeholders expressed concern at the conflict of interest created by
using the same psychiatrists or psychologists who function in both evaluative and clinical
treatment roles with the same patient. We also learned that the requirements of AS §
12.47.070, specifically that the examination be conducted by two qualified psychiatrists or
two board certified forensic psychologists, have been difficult to implement due to mental
health workforce shortages in the state.
Although most states require only that competency and civil commitment evaluations be
conducted by a psychiatrist or psychologist, a few states do require that the evaluation be
done by a “qualified” psychologist or psychiatrist.3 During our interviews, stakeholders
expressed confusion about the necessary qualifications of evaluators in both the civil and
criminal settings, and repeatedly noted that the term “qualified” should be defined in the
criminal statutes. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the use of “qualified psychiatrists
and psychologists” in the criminal statutes and “mental health professionals” in the civil
statutes seems to be adding to this confusion.
It is best practice that all forensic evaluators be a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist with
forensic training and/or certification in performing competency, criminal responsibility or
civil commitment evaluations, including continuing education in forensic evaluations.
Psychiatrists should have education and training that includes a four-year residency in
general psychiatry and either board certification in forensic psychiatry or evidence of postresidency education and training specific to forensic psychiatry. Psychologists should have a
doctorate in clinical or counseling psychology from an accredited university, a license to
practice in the jurisdiction where the evaluation is performed, and evidence of specialized
education or training in performing forensic evaluations.4
Other statutes govern nurses (AS § 08.68), marital and family therapists (AS § 08.63), professional counselors
(AS § 08.29), and clinical social workers (AS § 08.95); because our recommendation below is that all forensic
evaluations be conducted according to best practices, by a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist, this report does
not outline those qualifications. All are available for review at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/statutes.asp#08.
3 Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to
Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S59–67 tbl (2007).
4 NAT’L JUDICIAL COLL., MENTAL COMPETENCY: BEST PRACTICES MODEL (2012), available at http://www.mentalcom
petency.org/model/model-sec-I.html. As this best practices guide notes:
Regardless of the clinical skills of the mental health professional, it is a best practice for the
mental health professional who performs the competency evaluation to be forensically trained
in performing competency evaluations. It is a best practice for such education and training to
include, for psychiatrists, a four-year residency in general psychiatry and either a one-year
fellowship in forensic psychiatry or board certification by the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology in the sub-specialty of forensic psychiatry. For psychologists, it is a best
practice for such education and training to include a doctorate in clinical or counseling
psychology from an accredited university; a license to practice in the jurisdiction; and evidence
2
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While the majority of Competency Subcommittee members generally felt that evaluations
should be conducted by neutral and qualified evaluators, API expressed concern about the
availability of neutral and qualified evaluators due to workforce shortages throughout the
state and suggested that civil commitment evaluations need not be conducted by a neutral
evaluator, as long as that evaluator was unbiased. Similarly, the Department of Law, Civil
Division, objected to the proposed recommendations for “qualified evaluators” throughout
the statutes.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. AS § 12.47.070 should be amended to remove references to a “defendant’s fitness to
proceed,” or “reason to believe a mental disease or defect of the defendant will
otherwise become an issue in the case.” Instead, the statute should simply refer to “a
defendant’s competence to proceed under AS § 12.47.100.”
2. Title 12 and Title 47 should be amended to require that all forensic evaluations be
conducted by neutral evaluators, and these terms should be defined in AS § 12.47.130
and AS § 47.30.915. Neutral evaluators should not be otherwise involved in either the
individual’s clinical treatment, or any subsequent restorative treatment. If a neutral
evaluator later becomes involved in the individual’s clinical treatment or restorative
treatment, the statutes should require that subsequent evaluations be conducted by
an additional, neutral evaluator.
3. Title 12 should be amended to require that forensic evaluations be performed by a
qualified evaluator and this term should be defined in AS § 12.47.130. Similarly, Title
47 should be amended to require that evaluations for 30-day, 90-day and 180-day
commitments be performed by a qualified evaluator and this term should be defined
in AS § 47.30.915. A qualified evaluator includes psychiatrists and psychologists. A
psychiatrist is a person who is licensed by the State Medical Board to practice in this
state or is employed by the federal government, who has received additional training
or certification in forensic psychiatry, and who is either board certified by the
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the subspecialty of forensic
psychiatry or has received post-residency education and training specific to forensic
psychiatry. A psychologist is a person who is licensed by the state Board of
Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners. Moreover, AS § 12.47.130 and
AS § 47.30.915 should require that any individual qualified to conduct a forensic
examination under these statutes have forensic training and/or certification in
performing competency or civil commitment evaluations, including continuing
education in forensic evaluations.
4. Title 12 and Title 47 should be amended to require forensic assessments be
performed by only one qualified evaluator. The requirement of more than one
of specialized education in the area of forensic psychology during an internship or post-doctoral
fellowship and/or board certification in forensic psychology by the American Board of
Professional Psychology. It is a best practice for the forensic training for both psychiatrists and
psychologists to specifically include training on how to perform forensic evaluations, including
competency evaluations. It is a best practice that such continuing educational requirements
include, at a minimum, six hours of training within the 24 months preceding the order
appointing the mental health professional to perform the evaluation.
Id. at 8.
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evaluator has created a staffing burden and the state may not have sufficient
resources to conduct two evaluations. Additionally, the statutes should allow for
parties to hire a private expert, or to request that a second evaluator be appointed at
that party’s cost, in the event that the party is not satisfied with the report of the
court-appointed evaluator.
5. The Division of Behavioral Health should be designated by statute to coordinate
continuing education in forensic evaluations that would be available to psychiatrists
and psychologists located in the state of Alaska. Continuing education in forensic
training should include, when possible, in-person supervision of the examiner’s
evaluation practices and reports.
6. Title 12 and Title 47 should be amended to require the Department of Health and
Social Services or its designee to assume responsibility for designating qualified and
neutral evaluators under the statutes.
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2. Use of Telebehavioral Health
Current Law: Alaska does not currently have statutory provisions permitting the use of
telemedicine, telehealth, or telebehavioral health. AS § 08.01.062 does provide for courtesy
licenses to non-residents who enter the state “so that on a temporary basis, they may
practice the occupation regulated by the board or the department.” The Alaska Department
of Commerce, Community and Economic Development, Division of Corporations, Business
and Professional Licensing creates regulations that apply to both physicians and
psychologists. Regulations relating to Psychiatrists, who are medical doctors licensed by the
State Medical Board, are located in Alaska Administrative Code Chapter 40 (AAC 40), and
regulations relating to psychologists, who are licensed by the Alaska Board of Psychologist
and Psychological Associate Examiners, are located in Alaska Administrative Code Chapter
60 (AAC 60). Because two different administrative code chapters govern psychiatrists and
psychologists, the ability of out-of-state mental health professionals to receive a courtesy
license to practice in Alaska varies depending on whether the professional is a psychiatrist
or psychologist.
AAC 60.035 applies to psychologists and provides for a courtesy license that allows the
licensee to practice psychology in Alaska for no more than 30 days in a 12-month period, and
prohibits an applicant from receiving more than one courtesy license in that person’s
lifetime. The individual must provide verification of a current license to practice psychology
in another jurisdiction for the scope of practice specified in the application, and provide
verification of having passed the EPPP examination.
AAC 40.045 applies to psychiatrists and has stricter requirements for physicians not
licensed in Alaska who wish to temporarily practice medicine in the state. AAC 40.045 only
allows for a courtesy license for the licensee to conduct a specialty clinic, accompany an outof-state sports team to a sporting event, provide emergency health or mental health services
in response to a disaster, work in a supervised fellowship, or accompany a patient who is
also the physician’s employer. Unlike AS § 60.035, there is no general provision allowing
medical doctors to receive a courtesy license to practice medicine, absent one of the above
conditions.
Findings: We learned that staffing burdens at API and mental health professional shortages
throughout the state often impact the availability of evaluators, as well as the time in which
evaluations are performed. Telemedicine and telebehavioral health is a developing field, but
the American Psychiatric Association has endorsed telemedicine as a way to provide mental
health care in underserved areas, especially those with provider shortages.5 Research has
found that “psychiatric consultation and short-term follow up provided by telepsychiatry can
produce clinical outcomes that are equivalent to those achievable when patients are seen
face to face.”6 Furthermore, recent studies suggest that the use of telepsychiatry is an
appropriate option in forensic and correctional settings.7

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Telepsychiatry, (last visited May 22, 2015), http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/pr
ofessional-interests/underserved-communities/telepsychiatry.
6 Richard O’Reilly et al., Is Telepsychiatry Equivalent to Face-to-Face Psychiatry? Results From a Randomized
Controlled Equivalence Trial, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 836, 842 (2007).
7 Diana J. Antonacci et al., Empirical Evidence on the Use and Effectiveness of Telepsychiatry via
Videoconferencing: Implications for Forensic and Correctional Psychiatry, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 253, 265–66 (2008).
5
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Most states with telebehavioral health statutes define telebehavioral health within the text
of a more comprehensive “telehealth” statute and rely on other statutes allowing for
temporary or guest practices—courtesy licenses—to permit for the use of telemedicine by
mental health professionals located outside of the state.8 A few states without
comprehensive telehealth statutes simply allow for courtesy licenses for mental health
professionals licensed out of state and define “psychological services” to include the provision
of all psychological services by those professionals, regardless of whether the professional is
temporarily located in the state or is providing services by electronic or telephonic means
from the state where the professional is licensed.9 States vary in their approach to licensing
requirements for professionals licensed out-of-state, but all require such practitioners to be
licensed to practice in their own state, in any state, or in any state where the state
requirements exceed those of the state in which they are providing services.
As a way to increase all medical services to Alaskans throughout the state and particularly
those in remote areas with physician shortages, Alaska should consider adopting statutes
that allow for the broad use of telehealth. If it were to do that, the state could define
“telehealth” or “telemedicine” as “the practice, by a licensed physician or other health care
provider acting within the scope of such provider’s practice, of health care delivery,
diagnosis, consultation, treatment, or transfer of medical data by means of audio, video, or
data communications which are used during a medical visit with a patient or which are used
to transfer medical data obtained during a medical visit with a patient.”10 If this definition
were adopted, the state could further define “telebehavioral health” or simply include
psychologists and psychiatrists under the definition of “health care providers” who may
practice telemedicine in the state. Because Alaska does not yet have a telehealth statute,
however, these recommendations will focus solely on “telebehavioral health” as it relates to
the remote practice of forensic evaluations.
The implementation of telebehavioral health for psychologists would require amendments to
the statutes to allow for telebehavioral health generally, but AAC 60.035 would seem to
permit, in its current form, forensic evaluation services performed by psychologists who are
located out of state if they first obtain a courtesy license. Because the availability of courtesy
licenses is more limited for psychiatrists under AAC 40.045, the use of telebehavioral health
by psychiatrists would require more significant changes to the courtesy license requirements
related to medicine. The state could include a provision allowing courtesy licenses to conduct
forensic examinations under Title 12 or 47 or it could expand the definition of “specialty
clinic” to allow psychiatrists to receive a courtesy license to conduct “forensic evaluation
clinics.” Either of these changes would permit psychiatrists to perform forensic evaluations
within the state after receiving a courtesy license.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Alaska should allow for the use of telebehavioral health and evaluation via
videoconferencing in AS § 12.47.070 and AS § 12.47.100, and throughout Title 47.
Each of these statutes should be amended to allow for the use of forensic evaluations
via telebehavioral health.

See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 50-STATE TELEPSYCHOLOGY REVIEW, available at http://www.apapracticecentral.org/
advocacy/state/telehealth-slides.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 455.03; Wis. Adm. Code Psy 2.14(1).
10 Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-56.4.
8
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2. Alaska should define “telebehavioral health” as “including “the performance of
forensic evaluations by secure electronic transmission using electronic
communication technology, including two-way, interactive, simultaneous audio and
video.” The statute should require that the providers of these evaluations must
otherwise meet the qualifications for forensic examiners outlined above, and that the
evaluations must meet the same legal and ethical standards as psychological services
provided in person. Finally, the statute should require the maintenance of
confidentiality of patient information, including electronic data.
3. Alaska Administrative Code 60.035 should be amended to allow an individual to
receive a courtesy license to practice psychology in Alaska for no more than 30 days
each calendar year without applying for a license to practice psychology in Alaska.
The Regulation should also be amended to remove the provision that allows for only
one courtesy license in that person’s lifetime. Changes to this regulation would allow
psychologists who are licensed in other states to practice psychology via
telebehavioral health in Alaska.
4. Alaska Administrative Code 40.045 should be amended to define “specialty clinic” to
include the practice of forensic psychiatry as a “specialty evaluation clinic.” This
amendment should specify that “specialty evaluation clinics” are to be conducted
solely for purposes of forensic evaluation, not for treatment or the prescription of
medication. Alternatively, the regulation could be amended to allow for a courtesy
license for purposes of forensic examinations under Title 12 and Title 47. Either of
these changes would allow psychiatrists to practice psychiatry via telebehavioral
health within the state after receiving a courtesy license.
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B. CIVIL MENTAL HEALTH LAW
1. Amendments to AS § 12.47.110(e) – Incompetence to Stand Trial and Civil
Commitment
Current law: AS § 12.47.110(e) provides that:
A defendant charged with a felony and found to be incompetent to proceed
under this section is rebuttably presumed to be mentally ill and to present a
likelihood of serious harm to self or others in proceedings under AS §
47.30.700–47.30.915. In evaluating whether a defendant is likely to cause
serious harm, the court may consider as recent behavior the conduct with
which the defendant was originally charged.
Findings: The Alaska legislature amended AS § 12.47.110 to add subsection (e) in 2008. The
legislative history of the statute,11 as well as our interviews with various stakeholders,
suggest that this amendment was intended to automatically initiate civil commitment
proceedings upon a finding that a criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial and nonrestorable. While the legislative intent as reflected in the House Finance Committee
Minutes seems clear, that intent is not reflected in the current statutory language and
stakeholders report that subsection (e) is infrequently used.
Other states have adopted similar approaches to divert incompetent defendants to civil
commitment. For example, Georgia requires the court, upon a finding that the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial and that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant
will attain competency in the foreseeable future, to direct the Department of Behavioral
Health to petition for civil commitment of the defendant.12 Similarly, Washington requires
that courts, upon a finding that a defendant charged with a felony or misdemeanor is
incompetent and is not likely to regain competency, dismiss the proceedings without
prejudice and refer the defendant for a civil commitment evaluation.13

The legislative history of Senate Bill 265, which amended AS § 12.47.110 in 2008, reflects comments from
senators suggesting that a finding of incompetence will automatically trigger a commitment hearing. For
example, Senator McGuire noted that the bill would
[H]elp avoid potentially dangerous situations where a person is charged with a crime, but
found incompetent to be tried for it, and then is released back into a community without
adequate consideration of the danger the individual may present and without notice of release
to the prosecution. It would require a person charged with a felony and found incompetent to
be evaluated for commitment and treatment. The bill adopts a rebuttable presumption that a
person charged with a felony but found incompetent to proceed is mentally ill and likely to
present a danger to themselves or others. It allows the court to consider the conduct with
which the person has been charged in making that determination.
Similarly, Ms. Carpeneti explained that:
[T]hose sections address a problem that has arisen in how to deal with people that are not
competent to be tried. The language requires that the persons charged with the felony to be
referred for an evaluation by a mental health professional. It would then adopt the
presumption that is rebuttable that the person sent for evaluation presumption that person is
mentally ill and is likely to commit serious harm to them self or another individual. Later
sections of the bill require that before a release of a person found to be incompetent, a
professional must notify the prosecution before the release, allowing time to notify the law
enforcement.
12 Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-130 (2014).
13 Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.084 (2014).
11

12

However, neither of these states provide that a finding of incompetence to stand trial creates
a rebuttable presumption that a defendant meets civil commitment criteria. The statutory
criteria for a finding of incompetence to stand trial and a finding that the individual meets
the statutory criteria for civil commitment are distinct and a rebuttable presumption is
inappropriate. Should Alaska choose to keep subsection (e), it should provide that when a
defendant’s criminal case is dismissed due to a finding that he is incompetent to stand trial,
a separate civil commitment proceeding should be initiated. The initiation of civil
commitment proceedings upon a finding of incompetence to stand trial should occur in both
misdemeanor and felony cases when those criminal charges are dismissed. If after an
evaluation for civil commitment under AS § 47.30.730, the court finds that the defendant
does not meet the criteria for civil commitment, the defendant should be released. Finally,
the statutes should allow the court to designate the Department of Health and Social
Services or its designee to initiate civil commitment proceedings upon a finding of
incompetence in a criminal case.
The members of the Competency Subcommittee had varying responses to possible changes to
this section. Members disagreed with how often subsection (e) was used in practice, and
whether it should be removed entirely. Some members felt that subsection (e) should be
removed from the statute altogether because a finding of incompetence to stand trial does
not reflect the same mental state as the civil commitment statutes require. Other members
felt this discrepancy in the two standards could be addressed by removing the language
requiring that a finding of incompetence to stand trial creates a “rebuttable presumption”
that the defendant meets the criteria for civil commitment. The Department of Law,
Criminal Division, felt the rebuttable presumption could be kept for felonies, but not be
applied to misdemeanors, should those be added to subsection (e). Several members of the
Competency Subcommittee felt that the rebuttable presumption should be removed and that
the statute should encompass defendants found incompetent to stand trial on misdemeanor
charges. Should subsection (e) be kept, the Competency Subcommittee generally agreed that
a responsible agent should be designated by statute to initiate proceedings
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. AS § 12.47.110(e) should be amended to provide that when an individual is found to
be incompetent and unrestorable in misdemeanor or felony cases, the individual
should be evaluated for inpatient or outpatient civil commitment and treatment if
charges are dismissed due to incompetency. The statute should not state that a
finding of incompetence to stand trial creates a rebuttable presumption that the
individual meets the statutory criteria for civil commitment and should instead
trigger a civil commitment hearing under AS § 47.30.700.
2. The Department of Health and Social Services or its designee should be designated
by statute to assume responsibility for initiating inpatient or outpatient civil
commitment proceedings, if indicated, upon a finding that a criminal defendant is
incompetent to stand trial and unrestorable in both felony and misdemeanor
proceedings. The statute should require that the court provide a notice of intent to
dismiss the charges against the defendant and that the Department of Health and
Social Services or its designee shall have 24 hours to initiate inpatient or outpatient
civil commitment proceedings, if indicated, or to create a discharge plan for the
individual.
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2. Amendments to AS § 47.30.700 – AS § 47.30.715 – Procedures for Initiating Civil
Commitment
Current Law: AS § 47.30.700, AS § 47.30.705, AS § 47.30.710, and AS § 47.30.715 govern the
timing and procedures surrounding the initiation of evaluation for civil commitment. AS §
47.30.700 governs “Initial Involuntary Commitment Procedures” and requires judges, upon
the petition of any adult, to conduct a screening evaluation of a person alleged to meet civil
commitment criteria. If the judge finds there is probable cause to believe the individual is
mentally ill and, as a result, is a danger to himself or others, or is gravely disabled, the court
may issue an ex parte order for the individual’s emergency examination and treatment.
Specifically, AS § 47.30.700 provides the following:
(a) Upon petition of any adult, a judge shall immediately conduct a screening
investigation or direct a local mental health professional employed by the
department or by a local mental health program that receives money from
the department under AS § 47.30.520–47.30.620 or another mental health
professional designated by the judge, to conduct a screening investigation of
the person alleged to be mentally ill and, as a result of that condition, alleged
to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or
others. Within 48 hours after the completion of the screening investigation, a
judge may issue an ex parte order orally or in writing, stating that there is
probable cause to believe the respondent is mentally ill and that condition
causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of
serious harm to self or others. The court shall provide findings on which the
conclusion is based, appoint an attorney to represent the respondent, and
may direct that a peace officer take the respondent into custody and deliver
the respondent to the nearest appropriate facility for emergency examination
or treatment. The ex parte order shall be provided to the respondent and
made a part of the respondent’s clinical record. The court shall confirm an
oral order in writing within 24 hours after it is issued.
(b) The petition required in (a) of this section must allege that the respondent
is reasonably believed to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others
or is gravely disabled as a result of mental illness and must specify the
factual information on which that belief is based including the names and
addresses of all persons known to the petitioner who have knowledge of those
facts through personal observation.
AS § 47.30.705 further regulates “Emergency Detention for Evaluation,” under which peace
officers, psychiatrists, physicians, and clinical psychologists “may cause the person to be
taken into custody and delivered to the nearest evaluation facility.” This section is
distinguished from AS § 47.30.700 by its requirement that there be probable cause that the
individual is mentally ill and, as a result, is a danger to himself or others, or is gravely
disabled, and that the harm or grave disability is of “such immediate nature that
considerations of safety” preclude the use of AS § 47.30.700. Specifically, AS § 47.30.705(a)
provides that:
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A peace officer, a psychiatrist or physician who is licensed to practice in this
state or employed by the federal government, or a clinical psychologist
licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate
Examiners who has probable cause to believe that a person is gravely
disabled or is suffering from mental illness and is likely to cause serious
harm to self or others of such immediate nature that considerations of safety
do not allow initiation of involuntary commitment procedures set out in AS §
47.30.700, may cause the person to be taken into custody and delivered to the
nearest evaluation facility. A person taken into custody for emergency
evaluation may not be placed in a jail or other correctional facility except for
protective custody purposes and only while awaiting transportation to a
treatment facility. However, emergency protective custody under this section
may not include placement of a minor in a jail or secure facility. The peace
officer or mental health professional shall complete an application for
examination of the person in custody and be interviewed by a mental health
professional at the facility.
AS § 47.30.710’s coverage is somewhat unclear as drafted, but in conjunction with AS §
47.30.715, it appears to govern the 72-hour examination of individuals delivered to
evaluation facilities under AS § 47.30.700 and AS § 47.30.705:
(a) A respondent who is delivered under AS § 47.30.700–47.30.705 to an
evaluation facility for emergency examination and treatment shall be
examined and evaluated as to mental and physical condition by a mental
health professional and by a physician within 24 hours after arrival at the
facility.
(b) If the mental health professional who performs the emergency
examination has reason to believe that the respondent is (1) mentally ill and
that condition causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a
likelihood of serious harm to self or others, and (2) is in need of care or
treatment, the mental health professional may hospitalize the respondent, or
arrange for hospitalization, on an emergency basis. If a judicial order has not
been obtained under AS § 47.30.700, the mental health professional shall
apply for an ex parte order authorizing hospitalization for evaluation.
Finally, AS § 47.30.715 governs “Procedure After Order,” and further outlines the
requirements of the 72-hour hold and the scheduling of a 30-day commitment hearing:
When a facility receives a proper order for evaluation, it shall accept the
order and the respondent for an evaluation period not to exceed 72 hours. The
facility shall promptly notify the court of the date and time of the
respondent’s arrival. The court shall set a date, time, and place for a 30-day
commitment hearing, to be held if needed within 72 hours after the
respondent’s arrival, and the court shall notify the facility, the respondent,
the respondent’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney of the hearing
arrangements. Evaluation personnel, when used, shall similarly notify the
court of the date and time when they first met with the respondent.
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Findings: Stakeholders noted various issues with AS § 47.30.700 through AS § 47.30.715.
Stakeholders expressed confusion and concern about the stages of the commitment process,
as well as the required locations and timeframes of the detention, evaluation, and
hospitalization of individuals.
A. Lack of Clarity in the Commitment Process: The statutes seem to contemplate two
stages of detention and evaluation, though this process is not clearly articulated.
First, an initial evaluation occurs under AS § 47.30.700. This evaluation is triggered in one
of two ways. First, if an individual is not already in custody, any adult can petition the court
to initiate civil commitment proceedings. When an individual petitions for commitment
under AS § 47.30.700, the statute requires that the judge conduct a screening investigation
or direct a local mental health professional to conduct a screening investigation. Upon
completion of the screening investigation, the judge may issue an ex parte order within 48
hours. This order authorizes the 72-hour hold for hospitalization and evaluation under AS §
47.30.710 and AS § 47.30.715.
Although screening investigation is defined in AS § 47.30.915,14 the statute does not
otherwise specify the procedures for implementing such an investigation.15 Stakeholders
report that screening investigators are typically used when a family member initiates a
petition under AS § 47.30.700. Because family members often do not allege sufficient facts to
allow a judge to make a finding about whether there is probable cause to allow for a 72-hour
hold, the screening investigation allows a mental health professional designated by the court
to compile that information. In contrast, when a person is held for emergency detention
under AS § 47.30.705 and the petition is filed by a mental health professional at the facility
where the individual is detained, screening investigators are not typically used and the
judge often relies solely on information contained in the petition in deciding whether to issue
an ex parte order. Stakeholders expressed concern that the statute directs judges to conduct
these investigations and noted that judges do not typically have the mental health expertise
to adequately conduct such an investigation.
Second, under AS § 47.30.705, if safety considerations require the individual’s immediate
detention, an individual may be detained by a peace officer, psychiatrist, physician, or
clinical psychologist and taken into custody. The person is often held at a local jail,
community behavioral health center, or local hospital while the decision about whether to
file a petition under AS § 47.30.700 is made. Sometimes, however, the person may already
be at an evaluation facility, or at a designated evaluation and treatment (DET) facility.
Regardless of the person’s location, an ex parte petition must still be filed under AS §
47.30.700 in order to authorize a 72-hour hold under AS § 47.30.710 and AS § 47.30.715. The
placement of this requirement, in AS § 47.30.710, can also lead to confusion, because AS §
47.30.710 applies to petitions originating under both AS § 47.30.700 and AS § 47.30.705.

“Screening investigation” means the investigation and review of facts that have been alleged to warrant
emergency examination or treatment, including interviews with the persons making the allegations, any other
significant witnesses who can readily be contacted for interviews, and, if possible, the respondent, and an
investigation and evaluation of the reliability and credibility of persons providing information or making
allegations.
15 Stakeholders reported that the court system has contracts in place with “screening investigators” who
sometimes conduct screening investigations, but that the system and procedures are not consistent.
14
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The second stage of evaluation—the 72-hour evaluation—occurs under AS § 47.30.710 and
AS § 47.30.715. If a judge issues an ex parte order under AS § 47.30.700, or if an individual
is taken into custody under AS § 47.30.705 and an ex parte petition is later filed under AS §
47.30.700, the individual is then transferred to a DET facility where AS § 47.30.710 requires
that they must be evaluated within 24 hours after their arrival at the facility. Although the
Alaska Supreme Court in In re Daniel G. described AS § 47.30.710 as requiring an “initial
evaluation” to determine if further evaluation is necessary,16 stakeholders report that the
statute has not been interpreted in this manner. Instead, AS § 47.30.710 has been
interpreted only to require that the individual is seen by a mental health professional and a
physician within 24 hours after arrival at the facility. In practice, stakeholders report that
AS § 47.30.710 simply allows for the 72-hour hold, not an additional interim stage or
evaluation as described by the Alaska Supreme Court.
Finally, the interplay between AS § 47.30.710 and AS § 47.30.715 is somewhat unclear and
is non-chronological. Irrespective of whether an individual’s commitment proceedings are
initiated under AS § 47.30.700 or AS § 47.30.705, the process should coalesce at the point
that the individual is hospitalized for the 72-hour hold under AS § 47.30.710 and AS §
47.30.715; therefore, AS § 47.30.710’s requirement that an ex parte order be obtained for
individuals detained under AS § 47.30.705 is somewhat confusing. Moreover, because AS §
47.30.715 is titled “Procedure After Order,” it seems to generally apply to the ex parte order
that would be issued in response to a petition under AS § 47.30.700, or an ex parte order
issued following detention under AS § 47.30.705. However, both AS § 47.30.710 and AS §
47.30.715 have some relation to the 72-hour hold. AS § 47.30.710 describes the civil
commitment standard and requires that the mental health professional has reason to
believe the person being held meets that standard. AS § 47.30.710 does not, however, refer
to a 72-hour period, which is the likely source of confusion in In re Daniel G. In contrast, AS
§ 47.30.715 refers to the 72-hour hold, but does not describe the commitment standard, and
its location in the code after AS § 47.30.710 suggests that there is some intermediate
evaluation that occurs in AS § 47.30.710, while our interviews with stakeholders suggests
this is not the case.
B. Location and Timeframes for Detention, Hospitalization, and Evaluation
The location where detention, evaluation, and hospitalization are meant to occur under each
statute is unclear because of the inconsistent use of terms, including “evaluation facility,”
“treatment facility,” and “designated treatment facility.” Numerous stakeholders noted that
when an individual is detained under AS § 47.30.705 and an ex parte order for
hospitalization and evaluation is issued, individuals are often held in local jails, community
behavioral health centers, or community hospitals, where they are not receiving a mental
health evaluation.17 Moreover, although the statutes do not specify where hospitalization for
the 72-hour evaluation must occur, stakeholders report that they almost always occur in a
In re Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 270 (Alaska 2014) (“The result of this statutory framework is that a person in
Daniel’s position is given an initial evaluation within 24 hours. If the mental health professional determines that
further evaluation is necessary, the statutory structure then ensures that a judicial officer will review the
probable cause justifying the initial emergency detention as well as the justification for additional emergency
hospitalization and evaluation. This second evaluation must be completed within 72 hours and followed by the
release of the respondent or a 30-day commitment hearing with extensive procedural protections.”).
17 An ex parte order issued under AS § 47.30.700 requires that notice be given every 24 hours to the magistrate
or judge who issued the order as to the time of the respondent’s actual arrival at a DET facility; this is a rolling
requirement that continues until the respondent arrives at the facility for the formal evaluation.
16
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DET location, of which there are three in Alaska: API DET in Anchorage, Bartlett Regional
in Juneau, and Fairbanks Memorial in Fairbanks. There are also two facilities—Ketchikan
PeaceHealth Medical Center in Ketchikan and Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta Regional Hospital
in Bethel, which sometimes have the available staff to perform 72-hour evaluations, but
stakeholders report that this coverage is not consistent. Stakeholders report that the
majority of 72-hour evaluations are performed at API in Anchorage. Finally, stakeholders
report that although most evaluations do occur at DET facilities, there are other evaluation
facilities throughout the state that are equipped to perform evaluations for civil
commitment, and in some cases these other facilities may be much closer to the individual’s
home or community. If evaluations at these facilities were permitted under the statutes, this
would reduce some of the delay and expense associated with transporting individuals to
DET facilities for the 72-hour evaluation.
Moreover, the statutes generally lack specific timeframes in which the various stages
contemplated by the statutes must occur. If an ex parte order is ultimately issued following
a petition under AS § 47.30.700, the statute does not require that the individual be taken
into custody within a certain period of time. Stakeholders report that there is often a delay
between when the order is issued and when the individual is taken into custody for delivery
to a DET facility, during which time the individual’s mental status can change. Similarly,
AS § 47.30.705 is also silent about how long the person may be held before a petition for an
ex parte order is filed, but stakeholders report that this typically occurs fairly quickly, and
usually within 24 hours.
Most significantly, stakeholders stressed that the statutes should include timeframes by
which an individual in custody and subject to an ex parte order must be transferred to a
DET facility for the 72-hour evaluation and the scheduling of the 30-day commitment
hearing, if needed. Stakeholders report that the transportation of individuals to a DET
facility is often delayed for a variety of reasons including bed capacity, weather, limited
availability of airline flights, and limited availability of secure transport escort staff.
Notwithstanding these logistical considerations, stakeholders expressed great concern that
individuals detained under AS § 47.30.705 are often held for several days after the issuance
of the ex parte order and without receiving mental health care while awaiting transfer to a
DET facility to undergo the 72-hour evaluation.18
Finally, stakeholders generally expressed a desire that a custodial agent be designated for
individuals detained pursuant to the statutes. Most members agreed that the Department of
Health and Social Services should be designated as the custodial agent.
The Department of Law, Civil Division, opposed several of these recommendations and
provided extensive written feedback to the UNLV Team. Specifically, the Department of
Law, Civil Division, objected to the following recommendations: (1) that an ex parte order
issued under AS § 47.30.700 should expire if not executed within 72 hours; (2) that the
Department of Health and Social Services or its designee be designated as the custodial
agent of any individual detained under AS § 47.30.705; (3) that the Department of Health
Stakeholders report that there is ongoing litigation on this matter and The Disability Law Center recently
filed an amended complaint against the State of Alaska on behalf of individuals detained “awaiting psychiatric
evaluation pursuant to the state civil commitment statutes in jails or other locations unable to provide prompt
evaluation and treatment in violation of constitutional due process and statutory protections.” Second Amended
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Disability Law Ctr., Inc., v. State of Alaska Dep’t of Health and
Soc. Serv. et al., No. 3AN-11-07724CI (Mar. 6, 2015).
18
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and Social Services or its designee should be required to petition for an ex parte order
authorizing evaluation under AS § 47.30.710(a) within 24 hours of an individual’s detention
under AS § 47.30.705; and (4) that AS § 47.30.710 and AS § 47.30.715 be amended to clarify
the stages of the 72-hour hold, the five-day tolling period following the issuance of the ex
parte order, and the scheduling of the 30-day commitment hearing. Finally, the Department
of Law, Civil Division, noted that the allowance of telebehavioral health for screening
investigations was not necessary as such a practice is not currently prohibited.
R ECOMMENDATIONS : We recommend extensive revisions to AS § 47.30.700 through AS §
47.30.715. These revisions are summarized here and the full text of the revisions is included
in the revised statutes at the end of this report.
1. The titles of each section should be amended for further clarification about the
purpose of each section. These titles should be AS § 47.30.700 Petition for
Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour Period; AS § 47.30.705 Emergency
Protective Custody; § 47.30.710 Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour Period;
and § 47.30.715 Procedure after Notice of Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour
Period. These titles are also consistent with the Alaska Supreme Court’s discussion
in In re Daniel G.19
2. AS § 47.30.700 should be amended to allow the judge, when determining whether
probable cause exists to issue an ex parte order, to either direct a local mental health
professional to conduct a screening investigation, or to rely solely on the allegations
stated in the petition. Because screening investigations typically only occur when
petitions are made by family members, and because most other petitions are filed by
mental health professionals who have had contact with individuals who are already
detained, this amendment will better capture current practices and preserve limited
mental health resources.
3. AS § 47.30.700 should include a timeframe in which ex parte orders issued against a
person who is not already detained must be implemented and the person must be
delivered to an appropriate evaluation facility for further evaluation under AS §
47.30.710. Because an individual’s mental health status can change if the ex parte
order is not enforced in a timely manner, these ex parte orders should expire if not
implemented within 72 hours after issuance.
4. AS § 47.30.700 should explicitly authorize the use of telebehavioral health for
screening investigations. This allowance would reduce the number of individuals who
are transported out of their communities for evaluation.
5. AS § 47.30.705 should be amended to identify the Department of Health and Social
Services or its designee as the custodial agent for individuals detained pursuant to
the statute. The statute should require that the facility detaining a person pursuant
to AS § 47.30.705 shall immediately notify the Department or its designee that the
person is being detained. Finally, the statute should require that the Department or
320 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2014) (“Because hospitalization for evaluation does not constitute an ‘involuntary
commitment,’ the titles of the court system’s MC-100 and MC-305 forms have been changed during the pendency
of this appeal to accurately reflect the statutory language of AS § 47.30.710. Form MC-100 is now titled ‘Petition
for Hospitalization for Evaluation.’ Form MC-305 is now titled ‘Order Authorizing Hospitalization for
Evaluation.’”).
19

19

its designee petition for an ex parte order authorizing evaluation under AS §
47.30.710(a) within 24 hours. This will more clearly trigger the provisions of AS §
47.30.710 and begin to toll the 72-hour period contemplated by AS § 47.30.710 and
AS § 47.30.715.
6. AS § 47.30.710 and AS § 47.30.715 should be amended to reflect that the 72-hour
evaluation may occur in an appropriate evaluation facility and that evaluations need
not occur only at DET facilities. Although we anticipate that the majority of 72-hour
evaluations will continue to occur at DET facilities, when there is an appropriate
evaluation facility that is closer to the individual’s home or community, the statutes
should allow for evaluations to occur in those evaluation facilities. If evaluations at
these facilities were permitted under the statutes, this would reduce some of the
delay and expense associated with transporting individuals to DET facilities for the
72-hour evaluation.
7. AS § 47.30.710 and AS § 47.30.715 should be amended to clarify the stages of the 72hour hold and the scheduling of the 30-day commitment hearing, if needed. AS §
47.30.710, Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour Period, should refer to the 72hour hold and include a description of the civil commitment criteria. AS § 47.30.715,
Procedure After Notice of Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour Period, in
contrast, should include timeframes in which the 72-hour evaluation must occur and
the 30-day commitment hearing must be scheduled.
8. AS § 47.30.710 should be amended to clarify that the 72-hour evaluation period
begins when the respondent meets with evaluation personnel at the evaluation
facility, but that the total time of detention is not to exceed five days (120 total
hours). This five-day period should begin tolling upon the issuance of the ex parte
order under AS § 47.30.700 if the respondent is already detained under AS §
47.30.705, or upon the execution of the ex parte order under AS § 47.30.700 if the
respondent is not already detained under AS § 47.30.705.
9. AS §47.30.725(b) should be amended to remove references to the respondent’s right to
a hearing within 72 hours after admission to the designated treatment facility upon
issuance of an ex parte order. This language is duplicative of the rights guaranteed to
the respondent under the revised AS §47.30.715.
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3. Amendments to AS § 47.30.730 – Civil Commitment
We identified three main areas in need of revision in the involuntary inpatient commitment
statutes. First, there is uncertainty in the text of the statutes as to whether the respondent,
in addition to being mentally ill and likely to cause harm to self or others must also be in
need of treatment. Second, there is ambiguity as to the timeframes of when past and future
harm to self or others or grave disability must exist under the statutes. Finally, there is
confusion as to the definition of grave disability and whether the statutory definition
complies with existing case law.
A. Condition Improved by the Course of Treatment
Current law: AS § 47.30.730 provides the grounds for an initial 30-day involuntary
commitment. AS § 47.30.730(a) requires that the petition for a 30-day involuntary treatment
order must allege the following with regards to the respondent’s mental state and the
requirement that it would improve with treatment:
(1) allege that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause
harm to self or others or is gravely disabled;…
(3) allege with respect to a gravely disabled respondent that there is reason
to believe that the respondent’s mental condition could be improved by the
course of treatment sought;
This statutory language therefore only requires a finding that the respondent’s mental
condition would be improved by treatment in the case of civil commitment based on grave
disability. The same requirement is not included in (1) which applies to commitments based
on danger to self or others. However, 47.30.710(b), which governs the initial evaluation,
states the rule differently, and applies “in need of care or treatment” to respondents who are
either gravely disabled or dangerous to self or others:
(b) If the mental health professional who performs the emergency
examination has reason to believe that the respondent is (1) mentally ill and
that condition causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a
likelihood of serious harm to self or others, and (2) is in need of care or
treatment, the mental health professional may hospitalize the respondent, or
arrange for hospitalization, on an emergency basis.
Finally, 47.30.655(6), which details the purposes of the revisions to Title 47, provides that
“persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to others be committed only if there is a
reasonable expectation of improving their mental condition.” This seems to support an
interpretation that a finding that treatment would improve the respondent’s condition
should be required for commitment on grounds of danger to self (but not to others).
Alaska’s statutes, therefore, provide for two explicit grounds for adult civil commitment:
substantial risk of harm to self or others, and gravely disabled. It seems clear that in
committing a respondent due to grave disability, 47.30.730(a)(3) requires that the state must
also show that the respondent’s mental condition could be improved with treatment, and
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Alaska Supreme Court decisions support this result.20 Furthermore, while the text of AS §
47.30.730 does not require a finding that the respondent’s mental condition would be
improved by treatment in the case of civil commitment based danger to self or others, such a
requirement does seem to be contemplated by 47.30.710(b), governing evaluation (treatment
criteria in danger to self or others), as well as 47.30.655(6), which details the purposes of the
revisions to Title 47 (treatment criteria in danger to self).
While the Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the discrepancy in 47.30.710(b), it has
addressed the discrepancy between the purposes listed in 47.30.655(6) and the “substantive
statute,” AS § 47.30.730. In E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., the court noted that the
statement of purpose in 47.30.655(6), conflicts with the substantive statute “and that the
substantive statute controls.”21 In other words, the statutes that require a showing that
treatment will lead to improvements only apply to respondents who are gravely disabled,
and not to those who are dangerous to themselves or others. In emphasizing that the
additional finding does not apply to either commitment based on harm to self or harm to
others, the Court noted that “the legislature's specific requirement that the state allege that
a gravely disabled person's condition will improve indicates that no such requirement exists
in the case of mentally ill persons likely to harm themselves or others.”22
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Title 47 should be clarified in various places to reflect the two grounds, in addition to
the predicate finding of mental illness, upon which an individual may be civilly
committed. Those include (a) a likelihood of serious harm to self or others, and (2)
grave disability and there is reason to believe the respondent’s condition could be
improved by the course of treatment sought. This is not a substantive change, but
will instead make the language consistent throughout the code.
2. 47.30.655(6), which states the purposes of the 1981 revisions, should be removed from
the statute to reflect the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in E.P. v. Alaska
Psychiatric Inst., and to clarify that the state is only required to show that the
respondent’s condition could be improved by the course of treatment proposed in
commitment based on grave disability.
3. 47.30.710(b), which governs the initial evaluation, should be amended to reflect that
the state is only required to show that the respondent’s condition could be improved
by the course of treatment proposed in commitment based on grave disability.
4. 47.30.710(b)(2)’s language should be amended. The phrase “is in need of care or
treatment” should be replaced with “there is reason to believe that the respondent’s
mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought.” This change
will make this section consistent with AS § 47.30.730(a)(3) and is consistent with the
Alaska Supreme Court’s language in various decisions.

See, e.g., E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1109 (Alaska 2009).
Id. at 1108–09 (Alaska 2009) (“We conclude that the statutory requirements of a showing that treatment will
lead to improvement apply only to gravely disabled persons.”).
22 Id. at 1108.
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B. Imminence & Grave Disability
AS § 47.30.730 does not define either “harm to self or others,” or “gravely disabled.” Both
terms are defined in AS § 47.30.915, though there is a discrepancy between AS § 47.30.915
and 47.30.730. AS § 47.30.915(10) defines “likely to cause serious harm,” while 47.30.730
does not refer to “serious” harm. AS § 47.30.915 defines “likely to cause serious harm” as a
person who:
(a) poses a substantial risk of bodily harm to that person’s self, as manifested
by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening that harm;
(b) poses a substantial risk of harm to others as manifested by recent behavior
causing, attempting, or threatening harm, and is likely in the near future to
cause physical injury, physical abuse, or substantial property damage to
another person; or
(c) manifests a current intent to carry out plans of serious harm to that
person’s self or another.
Subsection (7) defines “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person as a result of
mental illness”:
(a) is in danger of physical harm arising from such complete neglect of basic
needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety as to render serious
accident, illness, or death highly probable if care by another is not taken; or
(b) will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal
mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated with
significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial
deterioration of the person’s previous ability to function independently.
Finally, AS § 47.30.730(7) requires that a petition for civil commitment “list the facts and
specific behavior of the respondent supporting the allegation” that respondent is likely to
cause harm to self or others or is gravely disabled.
Our interviews with stakeholders suggested practitioners in the state are mainly applying
the first ground of substantial risk of harm to self or others. Our interviews also suggested
that practitioners are interpreting the statute to require imminent (and immediate)
dangerousness to self or others in order to satisfy the commitment standards and many
stakeholders expressed frustration about the statute’s lack of specificity in regards to the
timing requirements of “recent” behavior and “current” intent. Finally, we learned that there
was a lack of clarity over who held a duty to initiate civil commitment proceedings in the
community.
In 2007, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the addition of subsection (b) to the gravely
disabled definition in Wetherhorn v. API, where it noted that the amendment was intended
to broaden commitment standards and allow API to hold people who needed help but had
not yet shown violent tendencies.23 The Court noted that subsection (b) of the gravely
23

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Alaska 2007).
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disabled provision was constitutional if interpreted to mean that the distress noted in the
statute was of such intensity that the individual is unable to live safely outside of a
controlled environment.”24 This holding suggests that practitioners should interpret this
ground more broadly, to allow for commitment when a person cannot live safely in the
community, but is not yet imminently dangerous to himself or others.
Moreover, in analyzing the imminence required by the “passive nature of harm reflected” in
gravely disabled grounds for commitment, the Wetherhorn Court noted that “the United
States Supreme Court has not made imminence a requirement,” but that because the
behavior at issue had occurred during the past three months, it was “drawn from the recent
past” and would therefore be “sufficient to meet the evidentiary standards established by
those states that have addressed the question of imminence.”25 This decision does not
address imminence in terms of the predictability of future behavior, nor does it discuss the
concept of recent behavior or future imminence in the context of dangerousness grounds for
commitment.
Other Alaska Supreme Court decisions have addressed recent and future behavior. For
example, in In re Tracy C., the Court noted in determining whether a patient is mentally ill
and likely to harm herself or others or is gravely disabled, the court must consider the
patient’s condition at the time of the hearing, but may also consider “the patient’s recent
behavior and symptoms.”26 The Court, in In re Jeffrey E., restated this holding, and also
added that “the statutory definition of gravely disabled is forward-looking—even if [the
respondent] were not suffering from distress at the exact time of the hearing, he still could
be gravely disabled at that time if he would suffer distress in the near future as a result of
his mental illness.”27 Again, this decision did not discuss imminence in the context of danger
to self or others, though both decisions do more generally discuss the two commitment
grounds in tandem.
Unlike the Court’s description in Wetherhorn of “recent behavior” as that which had
occurred in the previous three months, there is no similar discussion in the case law of how
to define “near future” in the context of harm or distress that is likely to occur due to mental
illness. Most states do not define specific time limits in which behavior meeting civil
commitment must have occurred in the past or must occur in the future. The majority of
states continue to use terms like “recent past” and “near future.” However, a few states have
included timeframes of 30 or 40 days in regards to past behavior28 and one state—Nevada—
allows for behavior that is “likely to occur within the next following 30 days.”29 Stakeholders
generally agreed that the statutes should include a specific timeframe of 30 days when
defining recent behavior and likelihood of future behavior. The Department of Law, Civil
Division, objected to this recommendation and felt the timeframe for recent behavior should
be three months, as discussed in Wetherhorn.
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Id.
Id. at 379.
In re Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085, 1093 (Alaska 2011) (citing Wetherhorn).
In re Jeffrey E., 281 P.3d 84, 88 (Alaska 2012).
Nevada (30 days); New Hampshire (40 days); Pennsylvania (30 days).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.115(2)(a).
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. AS § 47.30.730 should be amended to refer to “serious harm” in order to make it
consistent with AS § 47.30.915.
2. The definition of grave disability in AS § 47.730.915(7)(b) should be amended to
reflect the court’s interpretation of grave disability in Wetherhorn v. API. This
definition should note that a person is gravely disabled if, as a result of a mental
illness, the person “will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and
abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is of such
intensity that the individual is unable to live safely outside of a controlled
environment.”
3. The definitions of “likely to cause serious harm” and “gravely disabled” in AS §
47.30.915 should include timeframes, rather than vague descriptions like “current
intent” and “recent behavior.” Although Wetherhorn allows for “recent behavior” to
include behavior in the previous three months, no other court has allowed for such a
broad interpretation of recent behavior. For this reason, we recommend that the
statutes define “recent behavior” to provide for behavior that has occurred in the
previous 30 days. Similarly, because the Court has not defined “near future,” the
statutes should include a timeframe of 30 days; if any of the conditions noted in the
statute is likely to arise in the next 30 days without treatment, commitment is
appropriate.
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4. Amendments to AS § 47.30.780 – Early Discharge from Civil Commitment
Current law: AS § 47.30.780 governs early discharge after involuntary inpatient
commitment upon a finding by the professional person in charge that the respondent no
longer meets civil commitment criteria. The statute provides that:
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, the professional person in charge
shall at any time discharge a respondent on the ground that the respondent
is no longer gravely disabled or likely to cause serious harm as a result of
mental illness. A certificate to this effect shall be sent to the court, which
shall enter an order officially terminating the involuntary commitment.
(b) The professional person in charge shall give the prosecuting authority 10
days’ notice before discharging a respondent who was committed after having
been found incompetent to proceed under AS § 12.47.110.
Findings: Stakeholders reported that this section has been confused with AS § 47.30.720,
which allows for release before expiration of the 72-hour period of hospitalization under AS §
47.30.715 and AS § 47.30.720 pending a 30-day commitment hearing. More importantly, the
inclusion of subsection (b) within this statute is contrary to the purpose of commitment
under AS § 12.47.110. AS § 47.30.780 allows for a mental health professional to release an
individual who no longer meets civil commitment criteria. A person who has been committed
after being found incompetent to proceed under AS § 12.47.110 has been committed for
restoration of competence, not because they independently meet civil commitment criteria.
Moreover, because charges are pending against an individual who is committed under AS §
12.47.110, the release of the individual under AS § 47.30.780 would violate the procedural
requirements of AS § 12.47.110, which direct both the commitment of the individual pending
restoration, and the disposition of charges when a defendant is not restorable.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. The title of AS § 47.30.780 should be changed from “Early Discharge” to “Early
Discharge from Civil Commitment.” This change will more clearly distinguish this
section from AS § 47.30.720, which governs “Release Before Expiration of 72-hour
Period.”
2. Subsection (b) should be removed from AS § 47.30.780. Because individuals
committed under AS § 12.47.110 are committed for restorative treatment, and not
because they independently meet civil commitment criteria, the inclusion of
subsection (b) in the statute is inappropriate. Moreover, because criminal charges are
pending against defendants committed under AS § 12.47.110, the defendant’s release
by a mental health professional under this section would violate the requirements of
AS § 12.47.110.
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5. Involuntary Outpatient Commitment
Current law: AS § 47.30.735 governs civil commitment generally in the state of Alaska. Like
almost every other state, Alaska does have statutory provisions that allow for involuntary
outpatient commitment, or assisted outpatient treatment. 47.30.735(d) allows for outpatient
treatment as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient commitment at the initial 30-day
commitment hearing:
If the court finds that there is a viable less restrictive alternative available
and that the respondent has been advised of and refused voluntary treatment
through the alternative, the court may order the less restrictive alternative
treatment for not more than 30 days if the program accepts the respondent.
47.30.755(b) also seems to allow for outpatient commitment at the additional 90-day
commitment hearing:
If the court finds that there is a less restrictive alternative available and that
the respondent has been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through
the alternative, the court may order the less restrictive alternative treatment
after acceptance by the program of the respondent for a period not to exceed
90 days.
Other Alaska statutes address involuntary outpatient commitment indirectly. AS §
47.30.795 allows for people involuntarily committed to inpatient treatment under 47.30.735
to be released to involuntary outpatient commitment if they do not pose a risk of harm to
themselves or others and there is reason to believe they would benefit from outpatient
commitment. Similarly, AS § 47.30.800 allows the court to convert an outpatient treatment
order to an inpatient commitment order when the provider of outpatient care finds that:
(1) the respondent is mentally ill and is likely to cause serious harm to self or
others or is still gravely disabled; (2) the respondent’s behavior since the
hearing resulting in court-ordered treatment indicates that the respondent
now needs inpatient treatment to protect self or others; (3) there is reason to
believe that the respondent’s mental condition will improve as a result of
inpatient treatment; and (4) there is an inpatient facility appropriate to the
respondent’s need that will accept the respondent as a patient. Treatment for
these respondents shall be available at state-operated hospitals at all times.
Finally, AS § 47.30.915 defines “provider of outpatient care” as
a mental health professional or hospital, clinic, institution, center, or other
health care facility designated by the department to accept for treatment
patients who are ordered to undergo involuntary outpatient treatment by the
court or who are released early from inpatient commitments on condition that
they undergo outpatient treatment.
Findings: In various interviews with stakeholders, we learned that involuntary outpatient
commitment is rarely used in the state of Alaska. Stakeholders report that outpatient
community providers were typically not comfortable with perceived liability or risk. Others
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expressed concern that this type of commitment was not “recovery oriented,” and is
underused because the statute does not require it, but instead makes it elective.
Furthermore, the unique geography of Alaska makes treatment in some communities
difficult.
Furthermore, all of the existing statutes related to involuntary outpatient commitment seem
to rely on the requirement that treatment take place in the least restrictive setting, so while
they authorize outpatient treatment generally as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient
commitment, the statutes do not provide specific criteria for outpatient commitment, nor do
they include procedures to follow when outpatient commitment is ordered by the court.
A review of the literature, as well as results of New York’s successful outpatient
commitment legislation—Kendra’s Law—suggests that properly implemented outpatient
commitment laws are effective in improving compliance, reducing hospitalization and
incarceration rates, and decreasing violent behavior among individuals with serious mental
illness.30 These laws are most effective when they are not reserved exclusively for patients
who would otherwise meet inpatient commitment criteria, but are instead focused on
individuals who are not currently dangerous to themselves or others or gravely disabled, but
who are likely to relapse or deteriorate to the point that they will predictably become so.
Furthermore, involuntary outpatient commitment is most effective when it requires and
provides for intensive services for individuals subject to outpatient commitment. Should
Alaska choose to adopt a more robust outpatient commitment scheme, it must assure that
adequate resources are available to provide effective outpatient treatment. Finally,
outpatient commitment orders are most successful when the mandated initial treatment
period is at least 180 days; many states have initial treatment periods of 180 or 360 days,
with extensions of 180 or 360 days.31
The Competency Subcommittee generally felt it was appropriate that the state create a more
robust and detailed outpatient commitment scheme. While some stakeholders expressed
concern about the extensive community resources that would be necessary to support this
form of commitment, the Competency Subcommittee felt that overall, the outpatient
commitment statutes should be overhauled and strengthened.
RECOMMENDATION: Alaska should adopt a more thorough and detailed outpatient
commitment statute, one that includes enforcement mechanisms, consequences for noncompliance, and agents responsible for administration of community-based resources and
programs related to outpatient commitment. A model involuntary outpatient commitment
statutory scheme for the state of Alaska is attached in Appendix 1

See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, KENDRA’S LAW: FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (2005), available at https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/kendra_web/finalreport/.
31 THE COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, MANDATORY OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (1999), available at http://www.ps
ychiatry.org/File%20Library/Learn/Archives/rd1999_MandatoryOutpatient.pdf.
.
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C. CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH LAW
1. Amendments to Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Statutes
Current law: Three statutes govern Alaska law related to verdicts based on “mental disease
or defect.”
AS § 12.47.010 governs the “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI) defense and provides
that:
(a) In a prosecution for a crime, it is an affirmative defense that when the
defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the defendant was unable, as a
result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of
that conduct.
Moreover, AS § 12.47.020 creates a diminished capacity defense, allowing for evidence of a
mental disease or defect that negates the mental state required for the offense:
(a) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not
have a culpable mental state which is an element of the crime.
(b) When the trier of fact finds that all other elements of the crime have been
proved but, as a result of mental disease or defect, there is a reasonable doubt
as to the existence of a culpable mental state that is an element of the crime,
it shall enter a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. A defendant
acquitted under this subsection, and not found guilty of a lesser included
offense, shall automatically be considered to have established the affirmative
defense of insanity under AS § 12.47.010.
(c) If a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is reached under (b) of this
section, the trier of fact shall also consider whether the defendant is guilty of
any lesser included offense. If the defendant is convicted of a lesser included
offense, the defendant shall be sentenced for that offense and shall
automatically be considered guilty but mentally ill under AS § 12.47.030 and
12.47.050.
Finally, AS § 12.47.030 allows for a finding of “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI) when:
(a) The defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the defendant lacked, as
a result of a mental disease or defect, the substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the
requirements of law. A defendant found guilty but mentally ill is not relieved
of criminal responsibility for criminal conduct and is subject to the provisions
of AS § 12.47.050.
Findings: Like the majority of United States jurisdictions, Alaska offers two avenues by
which a defendant may introduce evidence of mental disease or defect: a M’Naghten-style
affirmative defense and a diminished capacity defense. The traditional M’Naghten test
includes two prongs. The first is cognitive incapacity and examines whether the defendant
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knew “the nature and quality of the act.” In other words, the test asks whether a mental
disease or defect left the defendant unable to understand what he was doing when he
committed an unlawful action.32 M’Naghten’s second prong is moral incapacity. In this
mental state, the defendant understands what he is doing at the time of the crime, but
nonetheless has an “inability to understand that his action was wrong.”33
Before 1982, Alaska used the Model Penal Code test for insanity. This test, which is
commonly known as the “irresistible impulses test,” extended the traditional M’Naghten test
to a defendant who understands what he is doing and that the law prohibits his actions, but
nonetheless has a mental disease or illness that results in him “so lacking in volition . . .
that he could not have controlled his actions.”34 Additionally, the test also reduced
M’Naghten’s requirement of complete incapacity to a lack of “substantial capacity.”
Following the Meach case and the resulting 1982 statutory reforms, Alaska changed its
insanity defense from a Model Penal Code test to a modified M’Naghten test, with only a
cognitive incapacity prong. AS § 12.47.010 therefore creates a M’Naghten-style affirmative
defense whereby a defendant is not culpable for his criminal actions if he “was unable, as a
result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct” at
the time of the crime. As an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of proving
these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Importantly, Alaska is the only state
that limits its insanity defense to the cognitive incapacity prong.
Additionally, AS § 12.47.020 creates a separate, diminished capacity defense, whereby a
defendant can introduce evidence of mental disease or defect to prove that at the time of the
crime, he “did not have a culpable mental state which is an element of the crime.” However,
unlike AS § 12.47.010, this statute is not an affirmative defense and relies on the
prosecution’s inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime,
including “the existence of a culpable mental state.”
Despite the availability of both an insanity defense and a diminished capacity defense,
Alaska’s narrow insanity defense—the cognitive incapacity prong of M’Naghten—merely
duplicates the diminished capacity statute’s effect. If a defendant’s mental disease or defect
is severe enough to satisfy M’Naghten’s cognitive incapacity prong, the defendant will
necessarily be able to demonstrate diminished capacity. Because diminished capacity relies
on the prosecution’s inability to establish the elements of the offense, the diminished
capacity defense is less burdensome for defendants than the insanity defense. Thus, by
making the insanity defense essentially duplicative of the diminished capacity defense,
Alaska constructively abolished its insanity defense when it reformed the statutes in 1982.
Almost all stakeholders agreed that Alaska’s 1982 statutory reforms constructively
eliminated the insanity affirmative defense. The fact that only two defendants post-reform
have been acquitted as NGRI supports this conclusion. Additionally, our interviews revealed
that this lack of a functional insanity defense has resulted in large numbers of mentally ill
defendants continuously entering the criminal justice system and having charges deferred
for competency restoration or being deemed “unrestorable.” Furthermore, stakeholders
indicated that charges are not filed for approximately one-third of cases involving
32
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Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 736 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 749.
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defendants charged with misdemeanors who have been previously found incompetent to
stand trial. Stakeholders also reported that the 1982 reforms have ultimately shifted many
mentally ill offenders into the Department of Corrections, which provides a significantly less
therapeutic environment than might be afforded if these individuals instead pled insanity
and were held in a state psychiatric facility.
The Department of Law, Criminal Division, opposed these recommendations and provided
extensive written feedback to the UNLV Team. The Office of Public Advocacy and the Public
Defender Agency supported these recommendations and also provided written feedback to
the UNLV Team.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Alaska should re-institute a functional insanity affirmative defense, with both the
cognitive and moral incapacity prongs of the full M’Naghten test. Alaska is the only
state that limits its insanity defense to the cognitive incapacity prong of M’Naghten
and this limitation deprives defendants of a true insanity affirmative defense.
2. If the state chooses to re-institute a full M’Naghten test for legal insanity, it should
also consider removing the GBMI verdict from the statute.
3. If the state chooses to re-institute a full M’Naghten test for legal insanity, it should
revisit and consider revisions to the procedures upon a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity under AS § 12.47.090, and the procedures after raising a defense of
insanity under AS § 12.47.090.
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2. Amendments to Guilty But Mentally Ill Statutes
Current Law: AS § 12.47.030 governs GBMI verdicts in Alaska:
(a) A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, when the defendant engaged in
the criminal conduct, the defendant lacked, as a result of a mental disease or
defect, the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of that
conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law. A defendant
found guilty but mentally ill is not relieved of criminal responsibility for
criminal conduct and is subject to the provisions of AS § 12.47.050.
(b) Evidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated
criminal or antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish that the defendant
was guilty but mentally ill under (a) of this section.
Findings:
A. Guilty But Mental Ill Verdict
The GBMI verdict is a supplement to, and not a replacement for, a jurisdiction’s insanity
defense. States began adopting it out of concerns for public safety and a desire to mitigate
the number of NGRI acquittees.35 News stories of NGRI murderers, such as Charlie Meach
in Alaska, resulted in a public perception that mentally ill offenders who received a NGRI
verdict were quickly and easily granted release from mental hospitals, resulting in violent
recidivism.
In Alaska, a defendant is deemed GBMI if he “lacked, as a result of a mental disease or
defect, the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to
conform that conduct to the requirements of law.”36 Unlike the insanity or diminished
capacity defenses, a GBMI verdict does not eliminate or mitigate criminal culpability. A
defendant who is found GBMI will receive a sentence comparable to what he would have
received under a standard guilty verdict. Unlike a normal guilty verdict, however, a GBMI
verdict carries the expectation that the state will provide the mentally ill defendant with
treatment, and AS § 12.47.050(c) requires the DOC to provide this treatment.
Published studies suggest that defendants who are found GBMI receive significantly longer
prison sentences than defendants who pled NGRI and were found guilty.37 Furthermore, the
actual time spent in confinement for GBMI defendants convicted of violent crimes was
significantly greater than defendants found guilty or NGRI for comparable crimes.38 In
Alaska, for example, our interviews with the DOC revealed that no GBMI inmate has ever

Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded in Its Own Right
and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 972 (1987).
36 This definition is the Model Penal Code’s insanity test, which Alaska formerly used. It now serves as a defined
mental state more cognitive than NGRI that still results in criminal culpability.
37 STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 119 (1993). For a
recent critique of Alaska’s GBMI verdict, see Lauren G. Johansen Guilty But Mentally Ill: the Ethical Dilemma of
Mental Illness as a Tool of the Prosecution, 32 ALASKA L.R. 1, 1 (2015).
(noting that “Alaska has transformed the status into a prosecutorial tool to keep mentally ill defendants
incarcerated for longer than their mentally sane counterparts through denial of “good time” credit”).
38 Id. at 117–20.
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received parole.39 Stakeholders report that the automatic nature of AS § 12.47.030, coupled
with the likelihood of a significantly longer confinement under a GBMI verdict, has deterred
defendants from pleading insanity out of concern that they will instead be found GBMI.
Furthermore, the availability of the GBMI verdict does not appear to affect the treatment
mentally ill prisoners receive in Alaska, and its deterrence effect may ultimately pose a risk
public safety. AS § 12.47.055 enables the Alaska DOC to provide mental health treatment
for both GBMI and non-GBMI inmates, and our interviews with DOC staff indicate that the
Department treats all mentally ill inmates, notwithstanding the final disposition of their
charges. Moreover, stakeholders report that the automatic nature of the GMBI verdict
deters most defendants from pleading NGRI when they face less than a life sentence. In
cases involving less than a life sentence, most mentally ill defendants will therefore choose
to plead guilty and receive a standard sentence. Upon release, these mentally ill defendants
will be released back into the community with far fewer procedural safeguards than would
have been available under a NGRI acquittal.
Finally, though less significantly, a criticism in the research literature is that the GBMI
verdict has a potential of increasing jury confusion.40 Studies have found that juries
comprehend only a minority of instructions and the insanity plea already poses jurors with
the difficult tasks of determining a defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime and
understanding the legal standard for insanity. Asking jurors to further distinguish between
the mental states for NGRI and GBMI poses a risk of improper verdicts. Alaskan jurors
must understand the highly nuanced difference between concepts such as “appreciate the
nature and quality” of conduct for NGRI and to lack “substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct” for GBMI. The resulting risk of improper
verdicts only adds to the complications of maintaining a GBMI verdict.
B.

Limiting the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict

The above discussion applies to GBMI verdicts rendered through 12.47.040(a)(4), which
automatically raises the verdict when a defendant relies on the NGRI affirmative defense
under AS § 12.47.010 or when evidence of diminished capacity is admissible under AS §
12.47.020. It is this tie between mental disease or defect evidence and the GBMI verdict that
results in the deterrence effect and potential jury confusion. Two other uses of GBMI within
AS § 12.47, however, do not suffer from these problems and might have continued value in
limited circumstances.
The first such use is found in AS § 12.47.020(c). This subsection automatically applies the
GBMI verdict to defendants convicted of a lesser offense after the diminished capacity
defense results in acquittal under the more serious offense. Because the successful use of the
defense would mitigate a defendant’s sentence, this subsection would not likely deter him
from introducing evidence of mental disease or defect. Furthermore, the verdict’s automatic
application in this subsection completely avoids the potential for jury confusion.
Automatically deeming defendants GBMI is also likely warranted in this context, because
AS § 12.47.050 prevents a GBMI defendant from being released on parole only during the course of treatment.
The statute, however, does not prevent parole for such a defendant when he “no longer suffers from a mental
disease or defect that causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public peace or safety.”
40 See, e.g., John D. Melville & David Naimark, Punishing the Insane: The Verdict of Guilty but Mentally Ill, 30
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 553, 553 (2002) (citing Alaska’s GMBI statute as “an illustrative example of
potential confusion”).
39
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such defendants have demonstrated that they have a serious mental disease or defect and
have committed a crime. Ensuring that these defendants receive mental health treatment
while preventing them from gaining parole is therefore appropriate.
The second potentially beneficial use of GBMI is found in AS § 12.47.060. This subsection
allows either party to seek a post-conviction determination of GBMI when the defendant did
not raise the insanity affirmative defense or the diminished capacity defense. If neither
defense is raised and the defendant is found guilty, then a separate hearing is held to
determine whether the defendant is GBMI. Unlike 12.47.040(a)(4), this procedure does not
deter defendants from pleading insanity or diminished capacity, because a party may only
use the procedure if such evidence is not introduced. Furthermore, the statute creates a
bifurcated hearing, first determining the defendant’s guilt and then the issue of GBMI.
Because the defendant is not raising the question of insanity and the fact finder is
considering the GBMI standard independently from the question of culpability, this
procedure eliminates the potential for jury confusion. Finally, because the prosecution is the
party most likely to apply this procedure, it would give the state discretion to seek GBMI
verdicts for defendants who should receive mental health treatment and be prevented from
gaining parole.
The majority of Competency Subcommittee members were neutral or positive in their
response to this recommendation. The Department of Law, Criminal Division, opposed these
recommendations and provided extensive written feedback to the UNLV Team. The Office of
Public Advocacy and the Public Defender Agency supported these recommendations and also
provided written feedback to the UNLV Team.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Alaska should abolish the GBMI verdict. This verdict is not needed to ensure that
incarcerated mentally ill offenders receive appropriate mental health treatment and
may compromise public safety by deterring mentally ill defendants from pleading
NGRI.
2. If Alaska retains the GBMI verdict, it should limit it for acquittal under AS §
12.47.020(c) or post-conviction GBMI determination under AS § 12.47.060.
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3. Diminished Capacity Statutes
Current Law: AS § 12.47.020 (a) allows for evidence of diminished capacity due to a mental
disease or defect:
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not
have a culpable mental state which is an element of the crime.
Findings: While the majority of jurisdictions allow for evidence of diminished capacity due to
mental disease or defect, Alaska is one of only a few jurisdictions that codify the defense.
Under AS § 12.47.020, Alaska allows for evidence of diminished capacity and specifies two
potential outcomes for defendants who offer such evidence. If the defendant is found guilty of
a lesser offense, he is automatically deemed GBMI and at the end of his sentence and
undergoes the same commitment proceedings as a defendant acquitted as NGRI.41 Similarly,
a defendant who is acquitted under the diminished capacity defense and not found guilty of
a lesser crime has the same legal status as a defendant acquitted under the insanity
affirmative defense and undergoes the same commitment proceedings.
While some states that codify diminished capacity place the defense under the same statute
as the insanity affirmative defense, Alaska statutes situate diminished capacity and the
insanity defense in different sections. This approach helps distinguish between the
important differences between an affirmative defense, which a defendant must prove, to a
diminished capacity defense, which affects the prosecution’s ability to meet its burden of
proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, this stratified
approach enhances clarity when other statutes or court opinions discuss these different
concepts.42
Finally, while some states that permit a diminished capacity defense limit its scope to
“specific intent” crimes, which require the offender to intend a specific outcome through his
conduct, AS § 12.47.020(a) allows defendants to introduce diminished capacity evidence to
negate any culpable mental state. Alaska’s approach is appropriate because if a defendant’s
mental disease or defect is severe enough to eliminate the intentionality required for specific
intent crimes, it may also eliminate mental states that require less than intent. Alaska’s
defense is well structured in this regard, as it requires fact finders to consider the spectrum
of offenses the defendant may be guilty of based on his culpable mental state at the time of
the offense.43
RECOMMENDATIONS: We do not recommend any changes to AS § 12.47.020.

See AS § 12.47.020(c) and AS § 12.47.090.
See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (contrasting the NGRI affirmative defense
(12.47.010) with diminished capacity (12.47.020)).
43 “If a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is reached under (b) of this section, the trier of fact shall also
consider whether the defendant is guilty of any lesser included offense.” AS § 12.47.020(c).
41
42
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4. Amendments to AS § 12.47.130(5) – Intellectual and Developmental Disability
Definitions
Current Law: For purposes of insanity and incompetency, AS § 12.47.130(5) defines “mental
disease or defect” as:
A disorder of thought or mood that substantially impairs judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life; “mental disease or defect” also includes intellectual and developmental
disabilities that result in significantly below average general intellectual
functioning that impairs a person’s ability to adapt to or cope with the
ordinary demands of life.
Furthermore, in identifying factors a court should consider when evaluating a defendant’s
competency to stand trial, 12.47.100(e) notes that:
In determining whether a person has sufficient intellectual functioning to
adapt or cope with the ordinary demands of life, the court shall consider
whether the person has obtained a driver’s license, is able to maintain
employment, or is competent to testify as a witness under the Alaska Rules of
Evidence.
Findings: Based on interviews with stakeholders, and a review of current psychiatric
literature and best practices, we found that these statutes should be updated to reflect
current terminology and understandings of intellectual and developmental disabilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. This definition should include more explicit and current definitions of intellectual
disability and developmental disability. The state should consider including a
reference in the statute to its existing definition of developmental disability found in
AS § 47.80.900.
2. AS § 12.47.130(5) should be amended to remove references to the “ability to cope with
the demands of everyday life.” This term is vague, and as defined in section 12.47.100
(e), is not indicative of either a person’s competency to stand trial or mental state at
the time of a charged crime.
3. AS § 12.47.100(e) should be removed from the statute. The ability to obtain a driver’s
license or testify as a witness is not indicative of a person’s competency to stand trial.
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5. Competency Restoration and Involuntary Medication
Current Law: The Alaska statutes do not currently include provisions regarding the use of
psychotropic medications to restore competency in criminal proceedings.
Findings: Until recently most courts held that the government could forcibly medicate a
mentally ill defendant if the purpose was to restore the individual to competency. In 2003,
however, the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Sell v. United States,
where it restricted the use of involuntary medication to restore competency. Specifically, the
Court identified four requirements that must be met before psychotropic medications may be
used to restore competency in a criminal case:
(1) administering involuntary medication to render the defendant competent
must serve an important governmental interest in the case;
(2) involuntary medication
governmental interest;

must

significantly

further

that

important

(3) involuntary medication must be necessary to further that interest; and
(4) involuntary medication must be medically appropriate for the particular
defendant.
As the Court itself noted in Sell, however, courts do not need to consider the Sell factors if
“forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in
Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness . . . .”44 Washington v. Harper held that the
“Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”45 Harper grounds for forced
medication should therefore precede Sell grounds; if a defendant is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest, then the issue of forced
medication should be considered under the less stringent Harper criteria.
Alaska statutes do not include this framework, nor do they include explicit provisions
related to Sell or Harper. Only one state—California—includes an explicit reference to Sell
in its statutes.46 The vast majority of states, including Alaska, seem to have simply relied on
United States Supreme Court precedent in Sell and Harper to guide decision-making in this
area.47 Some states simply allow an order upon a finding of incompetence to include the
administration of medication to restore competency.48

539 U.S. 166, 181–82 (2003) (emphasis in original).
494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
46 Cal. Penal Code § 1369.1(b) (“This section does not abrogate or limit any law enacted to ensure the due process
rights set forth in Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166.”). Cal. Penal Code § 1370(B)(i)(III) also lists the Sell
factors in another provision of the statute allowing for the use of medication to restore competency in criminal
defendants.
47 See, e.g., STEPHANIE RHOADES & COLLEEN RAY, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, JUDGE’S GUIDE TO HANDLING CASES
INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (Mary Greene ed., 2008).
48 See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat § 178.425 (allowing the court order on a finding of incompetence to “include the
involuntary administration of medication if appropriate for treatment to competency”).
44
45

37

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. AS § 12.47.110 should be amended to allow for the court order on a finding of
incompetency to include the involuntary administration of medication, if appropriate,
for treatment to competency.
2. AS § 12.47.110 could also be amended to include a reference to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Sell, as well as the fact that courts should first use the
Harper factors when an incompetent defendant is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in his medical interest. Alternatively, the statute could simply allow
for the involuntary administration of medication to restore competency and rely on
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Sell and Harper to guide the courts’
analysis.
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D. MISDEMEANOR STATUTES
1. Diversion Programs
Current Law: Although Alaska has not statutorily established diversion programs for
misdemeanants suffering from mental illness, it was one of the first states in the country to
implement a mental health court.49 Anchorage’s mental health court, the Coordinated
Research Project (CRP), serves to “divert people with mental disabilities charged with
criminal offenses from incarceration and into community treatment and services and to
prevent further contacts with the criminal justice system.”50 Apart from AS § 12.47.110(e),
which in its current form only applies to felonies, Alaska does not have a law that diverts
misdemeanor criminal cases to civil commitment upon a finding of incompetence to stand
trial.
Findings: Nineteen states statutorily authorize mental health courts or diversion programs
for individuals with mental illnesses relating to their criminal offenses.51 Although there is
no specific “best practices” model for states dealing with misdemeanants suffering from
mental illness, mental health diversion practices, such as crisis intervention team (CIT)
training and policing and specialized mental health courts, are routinely being utilized to
treat, rather than incarcerate, individuals. Stakeholders expressed the need for more CITs,
as a way to provide treatment and intervention to individuals before they are charged with a
crime. Stakeholders also expressed concern about the current priority for community mental
health treatment. Typically, individuals who are charged with misdemeanors and found
incompetent to stand trial are released into the community without community-based
treatment plans or a referral to a community mental health treatment facility.
Stakeholders expressed a concern that mental illness has been criminalized in the state of
Alaska. Many individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses are suffering from mental
illness and competency assessments for misdemeanants constitute approximately one-third
of all competency assessments. Stakeholders further reported that many defendants with
mental health issues who are charged with misdemeanors cycle in and out of the criminal
justice system. Because misdemeanor charges are often dismissed when competency
evaluation and restoration would take longer to accomplish than the potential sentence for a
misdemeanor offense, defendants are released into the community where they often
continue to commit misdemeanor offenses and do not receive mental health treatment.
While many of these defendants might meet civil standards for commitment, there is no
formal mechanism in the statutes to divert misdemeanor defendants into civil commitment.
Stakeholders expressed a desire for such a diversion process.
The State of Washington recently introduced a bill that would allow for the diversion of
misdemeanor defendants into inpatient or outpatient commitment when the issue of
competence to stand trial is raised. If any party raises the issue of competence to stand trial,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., SAMHSA’s GAINS Center for Behavioral
Health and Justice Transformation (last visited May 21, 2015), http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/grant_programs/ad
ultmhc.asp.
50 ALASKA COURT SYS., Anchorage Mental Health Court (last visited May 22, 2015), http://courts.alaska.gov/thera
peutic/mhct.htm.
51 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Pretrial Diversion (Jun. 10, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ci
vil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-diversion.aspx. The first mental health court was established in Florida in 1997.
Anchorage’s mental court was established in 1998.
49
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the prosecutor may “continue with the competency process or dismiss the charges without
prejudice and refer the defendant to an outpatient intensive treatment, residential
treatment, or supportive housing program.”52 Alaska could create a similar statute, one that
allows for a shorter screening exam for competency whenever the issue of competency is
raised in a misdemeanor case. Based on that screening evaluation, if the evaluator felt the
individual was likely not competent to stand trial and was likely to meet the criteria for a
full examination under AS § 47.30.710, the case could be diverted to civil commitment; the
mental health professional would petition for 72-hour hold under 47.30.700 and the full
evaluation would then be conducted by a qualified evaluator.
Under this statutory scheme, if the criminal judge were informed that the individual met
the standards for civil commitment, the criminal case would be dismissed. The prosecutor
would not be permitted to re-file charges unless the defendant were charged with a new
crime within one year or the prosecutor had reason to believe the defendant would be
competent to stand trial within one year. If the defendant were not found to meet the
criteria for civil commitment under AS § 47.30.710, they would be released and would be
given priority to receive community mental health treatment. Alternatively, if, after the
screening exam, the evaluator felt the individual was likely competent to stand trial, a full
examination under AS § 12.47.070 would be performed by a qualified evaluator to determine
whether the defendant was competent to stand trial.
Mental health professionals could be used to conduct these shorter screening exams; they
would not need to be “qualified evaluators” as required by the proposed changes to other
forensic evaluation requirements. This would allow for greater flexibility and efficiency in
conducting the screening exams. The mental health professionals could use a screening tool
to conduct this initial evaluation. The major challenge to this undertaking is finding a valid
and reliable screening tool that could be administered by mental health professionals.
Furthermore, mental health professionals would require adequate training in the
administration of the screening exam. Should Alaska adopt this approach, these screening
evaluations should not be used in place of a comprehensive competency evaluation, but only
to make a rapid assessment of the defendant’s likely competence in order to decide whether
the defendant should be diverted to civil commitment, or referred to a qualified evaluator to
conduct a full competency evaluation of the defendant’s ability to stand trial under AS §
12.47.070.53
RECOMMENDATION: Alaska should consider adopting a new statute that allows for a
screening investigation and diversion of misdemeanor defendants who are likely to be
incompetent to stand trial. This approach should only be adopted if the state is satisfied
there is a valid and reliable screening tool available. Furthermore, this diversion should only
S. 5925, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
See generally Mossman et al., supra note 2, at S42. One example of a screening assessment tool is the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA). This is a twenty-two item test
that takes thirty to forty-five minutes to administer. It has three sections: the first section assesses the
defendant’s understanding of the role of the defense attorney, elements of the offense, and the effect of a guilty
plea; the second section assesses the defendant’s reasoning, including his understanding of concepts like selfdefense and provocation; and the third section assesses the defendant’s appreciation of his personal
circumstances, including his belief about the likelihood he will be treated fairly and his rationale for those
beliefs. Research on the validity of this test suggests it “compares favorably with other measures of competence
to stand trial with regard to validity, reliability and ease of administration.” The test is not intended to be a
stand-alone assessment of competency to stand trial, but could be used as an initial screening examination
conducted by mental health professionals trained in its use. Id.
52
53
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trigger the provisions of AS § 47.30.710, at which time a complete evaluation for 30-day civil
commitment should be performed by a qualified evaluator. If the defendant meets the
criteria for civil commitment under AS § 47.30.710, the criminal charges should be
dismissed without prejudice. We have included proposed statutory language, attached as
Appendix 2.
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2. Competency Evaluations in Misdemeanor Cases
Current Law: AS § 12.47.070 allows for psychiatric examinations used to determine
competency to employ any method “which is accepted by the medical profession for the
examination of those alleged to be suffering from mental disease or defect.” AS § 12.47.070(c)
notes that the report must include a description of the nature of the examination, a
diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant, and an opinion as to the defendant’s
capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense.
Findings: Stakeholders reported that the evaluation period alone can take several weeks
and the first restoration commitment period is 90 days, with follow-up periods potentially
totaling up to one year. While AS § 12.47.110(a) creates a commitment period of “not more
than 90 days,” our interviews revealed that Alaska judges commonly set the follow-up
hearing date for 90 days. In comparison, misdemeanors never result in more than a one-year
imprisonment, and Class B misdemeanors in Alaska have a 90-day limit.54 This potential
imbalance infringes on the defendant’s liberty interest and drains public resources. Finally,
it is our understanding that API performs the same level of competency evaluation for all
defendants, irrespective of the charged offense (felony or misdemeanor) and the availability
of previous, recent competency evaluations of the same defendant.
The Competency Subcommittee generally agreed that the timeframes for misdemeanor
competency evaluations should be shortened. Some members expressed concern that a 15day time period for misdemeanor competency evaluations would be challenging due to
provider shortages, but acknowledged that if the use of telebehavioral health were permitted
in performing evaluations, this burden would be eased. Some members expressed concern
about recommendations about the use of limited competency evaluations in the case of
misdemeanor defendants and, in particular, a concern that the statutes dictate professional
practice for psychologists and psychiatrists.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. AS § 12.47.070 should be amended to require that competency evaluations for
misdemeanor charges be performed within 15 calendar days of the court order for
evaluation and this requirement should be included in the statutes. A 15-day
extension of this time period should be permitted when the defendant appears to be
under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the order for the competency
evaluation, in order to allow the defendant to withdraw or recover from the acute
effects of any substance.
2. In order to better accommodate misdemeanor competency evaluations within 15 days
of the court order for evaluation, Alaska could consider a more limited competency
evaluation procedure for misdemeanants. Because competency to stand trial is
related to the complexity of the charged offense, this more limited evaluation could be
appropriate for misdemeanor defendants. The state could also consider creating a
brief form for evaluators to complete for competency assessments in misdemeanor
cases to help streamline the process. This form could incorporate the requirements
included in AS § 12.47.070(c). This recommendation is not necessarily appropriate for
a statutory amendment, as the content and form of competency evaluations are a
54

See AS § 12.55.135.
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matter of professional judgment; this recommendation may be better implemented
outside of a statutory requirement.
3. In misdemeanor cases where a defendant has received a full competency evaluation
in the previous 12 months, the statute could allow for a more limited, follow-up
competency evaluation, which would better accommodate the 15-day requirement for
competency evaluations in misdemeanor cases. This recommendation is not
necessarily appropriate for a statutory amendment, as the content and form of
competency evaluations are a matter of professional judgment; this recommendation
may be better implemented outside of a statutory requirement.
4. AS § 12.47.070 should be amended to require that the court advance the date for the
hearing on the defendant’s competence to the day after the competency report is filed.
Alaska should include this requirement in the statutes as it would prevent the
defendant from decompensating while awaiting the hearing and reduce the length of
time the misdemeanor defendant spends in jail or the hospital while awaiting the
hearing.
5. AS § 12.47.070 should be amended to require that the court advance the date for the
plea hearing or trial to the earliest possible date if a defendant is found competent to
proceed on a misdemeanor charge. This will minimize the amount of time the
defendant must be detained awaiting trial or a plea and avoid possible
decompensation before the trial or plea hearing may begin.
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3. Competency Restoration in Misdemeanor Cases
Current Law: 12.47.110 governs commitment upon a finding that the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial. If a defendant charged with felony is found incompetent to stand
trial, the statute requires him to be committed for 90 days; if a defendant is charged with
any other crime, the statute permits him to be committed for 90 days. At the end of 90 days,
if the defendant remains incompetent, the court may commit him for another 90 days. If the
defendant is still incompetent the end of the second 90-day period, the court may extend the
commitment another six months if the charged crime involves force against another person,
the defendant poses a substantial danger to others, and there is a substantial probability he
will regain competency. At the end of that six-month period, if the defendant is still
incompetent, the statute requires that charges be dismissed without prejudice.
Findings: Apart from 12.47.110(a), which provides that the court “may commit a defendant
charged with any other crime,” the statute does not provide guidelines or procedures for
courts to follow with respect to competency restoration for misdemeanor crimes.
Stakeholders reported that the restoration of competency in mentally ill defendants charged
with misdemeanors poses unique challenges to Alaska’s criminal justice system. In many of
these circumstances, the time such a defendant spends confined during the competency
restoration process often outweighs the amount of time the defendant would have spent
criminally incarcerated had he been found guilty. Despite these issues, a defendant’s
constitutional rights related to trial competency limit a jurisdiction’s ability to alter this
situation. While a defendant may spend less time confined without the restoration process, a
jurisdiction cannot prosecute a mentally incompetent individual. Similarly, an incompetent
defendant cannot plead guilty, which eliminates a mental health court’s ability to use the
mental health care plan plea bargains.55 Due to these constraints in Alaska, stakeholders
reported that the Anchorage Prosecutor’s office dismisses as many as a third of all
misdemeanor charges.
Nationally, the vast majority of states have done little to mitigate the amount of spent
attempting to restore a defendant’s competency to stand trial. In Jackson v. Indiana, the
United States Supreme Court held that states may not indefinitely confine criminal
defendants solely on the basis of incompetence to stand trial. The court held that when
states commit defendants solely because they are incompetent to stand trial, that period of
time cannot “be more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future.”56 Jackson does not, however, define “reasonable period of time.” Moreover, the
opinion does not require that the timeframe for restoration be explicitly linked to the legal
exposure for the charged offense, or that the time period for restoration must not exceed the
time the defendant would be incarcerated for the charged offense. Notwithstanding Jackson,
many states still allow for indefinite commitment in felony cases.57 A few states do have
See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); see also MACARTHUR FOUNDATION, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A
GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY 19 (2009), available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG_MHC_Resea
rch.pdf.
56 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738–39 (1972).
57 Andrew Kaufman et al., Forty Years After Jackson v. Indiana: States’ Compliance With “Reasonable Period of
Time” Ruling, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261, 261 (2012) (“Yet, as of 2007, 30 percent of states allowed for
indefinite commitment for the purpose of restoration for felony defendants, in direct violation of Jackson.
Further, about 40 percent of the other states imposed a lengthy treatment period (1–10 years) or linked the
duration of commitment to the potential criminal sentence, which can vary from 1 year to life.”).
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statutes that distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies in the time permitted for
competency restoration.58 Nevertheless, because misdemeanor defendants often require
significantly more time to retain competency than their potential legal exposure, this issue
should be addressed statutorily.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Alaska should consider amending AS § 12.47.110 to allow for varying time periods for
competency restoration, depending on the seriousness of the charged offense. The
statutes should also specify that the time a defendant is held for restoration may not
exceed a period of time that is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that the defendant will resume competency, and in any event, the time
period may not exceed the time listed for each category of offense. A finding that
there is a substantial probability that the defendant will resume competency before
the total period of time allowed under the section should be required at each
commitment hearing. The state could consider structuring the time periods according
to the classification of offenses under AS Chapter 55, Sentencing and Probation.
A.

The state should keep its existing timeframe for felonies involving the use of
force against a person (90 days, 90 days, and six months) and felonies not
involving the use of force against a person (90 days, 90 days). The statute should
require that the time permitted for competency restoration should not be longer
than is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
the defendant will regain competency, and in any event, not longer than six
months or one year. The statute should also provide that at each commitment
hearing, the state cannot continue to hold the defendant unless there is a
substantial probability he will regain competency in the time remaining.

B.

For class A misdemeanors, which carry a sentence of imprisonment of not more
than one year,59 the statute should require that the time permitted for
competency restoration should not be longer than is necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain
competency, and in any event, not longer than 60 days. The statute should also
provide that at the 30-day commitment hearing, the state cannot continue to
hold the defendant unless there is a substantial probability he will regain
competency in the remaining 30 days.

C.

For class B misdemeanors, which carry a sentence of imprisonment of not more
than 90 days unless otherwise specified in the provision of law defining the
offense,60 the statute should require that the time permitted for competency
restoration should not be longer than is necessary to determine whether there is
a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency, and in any
event, not longer than 30 days.

See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.38 (allowing for competency restoration periods not to exceed one year for
Class A felonies; six months for Class B felonies; sixty days for first and second degree misdemeanors; thirty days
for other misdemeanors).
59 AS § 12.55.135.
60 Id.
58
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2. At any point during competency restoration, if there is not a substantial probability
that the defendant will become competent with treatment within the remaining time
allowed by each section, or if the defendant is still found incompetent to stand trial at
the expiration of the timeframe listed in each section, the statute should require that
the court dismiss the charges against the defendant without prejudice and the
provisions of AS § 12.47.110(e) should require the Department of Health and Social
Services to initiate inpatient or outpatient civil commitment proceedings or create a
discharge plan for the defendant.
3. The statutes should be amended to require mental health professionals to notify the
court as soon as they believe the defendant to be competent, even if that period is less
than the total amount of time allowed for restoration. Alaska should consider
including this requirement in the statutes as it would prevent the defendant from
decompensating while awaiting trial and reduce the length of time misdemeanor
defendants spend in jail while awaiting trial.
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E. JUVENILE STATUTES
1. Civil Commitment of Juveniles and Placement in a Psychiatric Facility
Current law: AS § 47.12 governs juvenile delinquency in the state of Alaska. AS § 47.12.255
allows for the placement of minors who are already in the custody of the state by virtue of a
criminal judgment or court order, and requires notice to the minor’s parents or guardian,
and the minor’s guardian ad litem when a juvenile is placed in a facility. Furthermore, AS §
47.30.690 governs commitment of minors who are not already in the custody of the state.
AS § 47.30.690(b) requires that a guardian ad litem for a minor admitted under this section
be appointed as soon as possible after the minor’s admission. Moreover, the state recently
published a document entitled “Alaska Court System’s Uniform Administrative Order
Establishing Procedures for Mental Commitment Cases.”61 Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this
Order automatically close a case upon the court’s receipt of a Notice of Voluntary Admission
(MC-415) for a minor.
Findings: According to stakeholders, the procedures in the Uniform Order work for the
majority of civil cases involving adults. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Uniform Order, however,
do not distinguish between procedures for minors and adults. Once the case is closed, the
appointment of counsel for the minor ends and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) is supposed to
be appointed under AS § 47.30.690(b). Because there are no court rules and the Uniform
Order does not address this issue, it remains unresolved. Furthermore, while the Attorney
General’s office has filed motions to re-open minors’ cases and appoint GALs after a Notice
of Voluntary Admission, stakeholders report that these appointments are not being made
and the Office of Public Advocacy has declined the appointments as outside of its authority.
Furthermore, AS § 47.30.690 is silent about what should happen after 30 days of treatment.
If a minor is not ready for discharge or an appropriate less restrictive placement is not
available or acceptable to the parent or legal guardian at the end of 30 days, the
appointment of a GAL is particularly important to protect the best interests of the minor
and address discharge planning.
RECOMMENDATION: AS § 47.30.690 should be amended to require the court to appoint a
Guardian Ad Litem for all juveniles subject to treatment in a secure psychiatric facility,
and this appointment should continue until the minor is discharged and reintegrated into
the community.

Alaska Uniform Administrative Order Establishing Procedures for Mental Commitment Cases (2012),
available at http://courts.alaska.gov/judorders.htm.
61
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2. Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
Current Law: Apart from the above provisions governing the commitment and placement of
juveniles in secure psychiatric facilities, Alaska statutes are otherwise silent as to the
treatment of minors with mental health issues within Alaska in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Alaska’s definition of competency in adult criminal cases refers to two broad
capacities: the defendant’s ability to assist her attorney in a defense, and the ability to
understand and appreciate the nature of the proceedings. Specifically, AS § 12.47.100 (a)
provides that:
A defendant who, as a result of mental disease or defect, is incompetent because the
defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against the defendant or to assist
in the defendant’s own defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the
commission of a crime so long as the incompetency exists
Furthermore, in identifying factors a court should consider when evaluating a defendant’s
competency to stand trial, 12.47.100 (f)–(g) outlines additional specific functional abilities:
(f) In determining if the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against
the defendant, the court shall consider, among other factors considered relevant by
the court, whether the defendant understands that the defendant has been charged
with a criminal offense and that penalties can be imposed; whether the defendant
understands what criminal conduct is being alleged; whether the defendant
understands the roles of the judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel; whether
the defendant understands that the defendant will be expected to tell defense
counsel the circumstances, to the best of the defendant’s ability, surrounding the
defendant’s activities at the time of the alleged criminal conduct; and whether the
defendant can distinguish between a guilty and not guilty plea.
(g) In determining if the defendant is unable to assist in the defendant’s own
defense, the court shall consider, among other factors considered relevant by the
court, whether the defendant’s mental disease or defect affects the defendant’s
ability to recall and relate facts pertaining to the defendant’s actions at times
relevant to the charges and whether the defendant can respond coherently to
counsel’s questions. A defendant is able to assist in the defense even though the
defendant’s memory may be impaired, the defendant refuses to accept a course of
action that counsel or the court believes is in the defendant’s best interest, or the
defendant is unable to suggest a particular strategy or to choose among alternative
defenses.
Unlike the adult competency statutes, however, the Alaska juvenile delinquency statutes do
not contain any such additional guidance for courts. If a juvenile defendant is tried in adult
criminal court, he will receive all of the due process protections provided to adult
defendants and be evaluated under the same competence standard as adult defendants. If
however, a juvenile is tried under juvenile delinquency standards, Alaska statutes do not
address competency. Specifically, Alaska’s juvenile delinquency statutes do not address
whether juvenile defendants should be required to be as competent as adults, or if there is a
lesser degree of ability required for a finding of competency in juvenile trials.
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Competency to stand trial and restoration in juvenile delinquency cases raises special
challenges not found in the adult system because juvenile defendants have a less developed
capacity for decisionmaking and are more likely to have impaired legal capacities than
older adolescents and adults.62 Notwithstanding this difference between juvenile and adult
defendants, many states do not have statutes that specifically address juvenile
competency.63 Recognizing a need to help states draft legislation to address juvenile
competency, the National Youth Screening & Assessment Project prepared Developing
Statutes for Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: A Guide for
Lawmakers.64 We have used this report to develop specific recommendations for statutory
provisions Alaska might adopt in the area of juvenile competency and restoration.
Findings: Stakeholders expressed concern and frustration that the Alaska statutes provide
little direction to courts, lawyers, or mental health professionals as to how juveniles should
be treated, and that stakeholders are being forced to resort to application of adult
standards to juveniles. Specifically, AS § 47.12 does not provide guidelines or directions to
courts as to how to determine competency for juveniles in delinquency proceedings.
Although AS § 47.30.775 directs courts to apply adult standards to juveniles in the context
of civil commitment proceedings, and AS § 47.12.255 and 47.30.690 govern civil
commitment of minors, AS § 47.12 lacks similar guidance as to which standards should be
applied to juveniles in criminal cases, specifically with regards to competency and
restoration.
Beginning with In re Gault,65 the United States Supreme Court recognized that juvenile
courts often serve a punitive function and has required that minors in juvenile delinquency
proceedings receive due process protection. While the Court has never explicitly required
that juveniles must be competent to be adjudicated in juvenile courts, most state courts
require that juveniles be competent to proceed in delinquency proceedings and most apply
the Dusky standard to juvenile competence.66 Some require that the juvenile’s incompetence
originate in a mental illness or intellectual disability, and not from developmental
immaturity.
As of 2011, no state statute has addressed whether or if there is a lesser degree of ability
required for a finding of competency in juvenile trials. Furthermore, there are difficulties in
diagnosing mental illness in minors because symptoms of mental illness can vary with the
age of the individual. For example, behavior that might not be considered normal for an
adult may be considered normal for a child, such as temper tantrums or mood swings. For
this reason, juvenile civil commitment evaluations should be performed by examiners with
training and experience in child psychology or psychiatry.
Finally, high rates of fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) in Alaska pose special
Jodi L. Viljoen & Ronald Roesch, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights and Adjudicative Competence in
Adolescent Defendants: Cognitive Development, Attorney Contact, and Psychological Symptoms, 29 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 723, 736 (2005).
63 KIMBERLY A. LARSON & THOMAS GRISSO, NAT’L YOUTH SCREENING & ASSESSMENT PROJECT, DEVELOPING
STATUTES FOR COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS: A GUIDE FOR LAWMAKERS 1
(2011), available at http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/330 (noting that, as of 2011, thirty-three
states did not have juvenile specific statutes on competency to stand trial).
64 Id. at 2.
65 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
66 Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 353, 354-55 (2001); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
62
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challenges to juvenile competency evaluations. One study of children born between 1995
and 1997 found that “[FASD] rates in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and New York ranged
from 0.3 to 1.5 per 1,000 live-born infants and were highest for black and American
Indian/Alaska Native populations.”67 Alaska’s Division of Public Health estimates that the
rate of FASD in Alaska is 1.5 per 1,000 live births, “or that approximately 15 children are
born with [FASD] every year in Alaska.”68 Children with FASD “experience a range of
physical, cognitive, and behavioral deficits thought to interfere with their ability to
competently navigate the arrest, interrogation, and trial process.”69 For this reason, Alaska
juvenile delinquency statutes should include guidelines for courts and evaluators to follow
in juvenile defendants diagnosed with FASD.
R ECOMMENDATIONS :
1. Developmental immaturity should be included as a cause of a defendant’s
incompetence to stand trial in juvenile court. Even in the absence of an intellectual
disability or mental illness, some juveniles still do not meet Dusky’s competency
requirements due to developmentally related deficits. However, incapacities in
understanding and reasoning due to developmental immaturity are no less
significant than those due to mental illness. Furthermore, Alaska should consider
developing a multi-tiered system, distinguishing levels of protection for juveniles in
competency hearings based on age and developmental status.
2. The juvenile delinquency statutes should be amended to include cognitive concepts
like a juvenile defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and assist counsel.
The statutes should not include additional specific functional abilities, which have
the potential to become outdated as the law’s understanding of juvenile intellectual
development evolves.
3. In terms of whether the juvenile delinquency statutes should address the degree of
ability required for competence, and whether this degree of ability should be the
same or different than for adult defendants, we recommend that the statutes avoid
specifying a degree of competence. The level of competence required is a matter best
left to judges, and the new statutory scheme will allow judges to consider the
defendant’s developmental immaturity in assessing the totality of the
circumstances. Furthermore, judges who work with juveniles on a daily basis are
best able to determine what level of competence in an individual juvenile defendant
will ensure fairness. Finally, a lack of specificity about the degree of ability required
for juvenile competence will give judges more flexibility in individual cases, which is
consistent with the ideals of the juvenile court.
5. Alaska should consider providing a separate definition for childhood mental illness,
which specifically notes what is included and excluded from the definition of mental
illness.

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome—Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and New York, 1995–
1997 (May 24, 2002), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5120a2.htm.
68 ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Alaska
Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome (FAS) Surveillance Project, http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/mchepi/fas/default.aspx.
69 Kaitlyn McLachlan et al., Evaluating the Psycholegal Abilities of Young Offenders with Fetal Alcohol
Spectrum Disorder, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 10, 10 (2014).
67
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6. The statutes should include a requirement that competency evaluations for juveniles
be performed within 30 calendar days of the court order for evaluation.
7. Juvenile competency evaluations should be performed by qualified and neutral
evaluators with training and experience in child psychology or psychiatry.
Based on these recommendations and the Competency Subcommittee’s feedback, we have
drafted a model juvenile competency statutory scheme for the state of Alaska, which is
attached as Appendix 3.
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3. Restoration of Incompetent Juvenile Defendants
Current law: AS § 47.12 governs juvenile delinquency in the state of Alaska. This code does
not include provisions related to competency restoration for juveniles.
Findings: Competency restoration in juvenile delinquency proceedings requires
consideration of several factors unique to juvenile intellectual development. Specifically,
some juvenile defendants may be incompetent due to developmental immaturity, and not
due to a mental illness. While adult competency restoration statutes can provide guidance
in the case of juveniles who are incompetent due to mental illness, they are less helpful
when a juvenile defendant is incompetent due to developmental immaturity. Furthermore,
there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding whether juveniles require longer or shorter
periods of remediation than adults.
R ECOMMENDATIONS :
1. Alaska should consider amending its juvenile delinquency statutes to provide for
placements and services that will accomplish competency restoration in juveniles
and should work with the Department of Juvenile Justice to identify and implement
these placements. These services will necessarily differ depending on why the
juvenile has been found incompetent. If a juvenile is incompetent due to mental
illness, hospitalization is appropriate.
2. Statutes regarding competence restoration for juveniles should provide for
appropriate periodic review and designate different amounts of time for inpatient
versus outpatient restoration.
3. In cases where a juvenile is incompetent due to developmental immaturity or
intellectual disability and restoration is inappropriate, Alaska could consider a
compromise position, where cases involving less serious offenses are dismissed with
prejudice; cases involving more serious offenses could be dismissed without
prejudice.
4. In cases where a juvenile is incompetent due to developmental immaturity or
intellectual disability and restoration is inappropriate, Alaska statutes should give
juvenile courts the discretion to direct the juvenile into the appropriate social and
clinical services to provide for follow-up care.
Based on these recommendations and the Juvenile Subcommittee’s feedback, we have
drafted a model juvenile competency statutory scheme for the state of Alaska, which is
attached as Appendix 3.
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CONCLUSION
Alaska’s mental health statutes, like most states, contain some inconsistencies, gaps and
areas in need of revision to better reflect evolving case law and emerging trends. The
language and provisions for competency, commitments, and insanity are intertwined with
the state’s unique culture and history. The UNLV Team recognizes these important
considerations and frames our recommendations with this awareness. In areas where
research has pointed the way for best practices, we have summarized the research findings
and incorporated them in the recommendations. Although our recommendations are limited
to the text of the statutes themselves, it is important to note that proper implementation of
many of the suggested reforms will require significant allocation of resources and
development of infrastructures throughout the state and within local communities.
Throughout the research, site visit, and development of this report, we have been struck by
the tremendous commitment of all stakeholders to the well-being of Alaskans and the needs
of the mentally ill. This was particularly evident in the creative approaches to using limited
resources when facing great needs. We hope that the recommendations in this report
support the interests of mentally ill Alaskans, their families, and their communities. We
also hope that some of the suggestions, such as telemedicine for forensic evaluations and
changes to the evaluations for defendants with lower level charges, will reflect our
awareness of Alaska’s needs and resources.
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SECTION A: PETITION FOR OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT
In the course of the 72-hour evaluation period, a petition for an outpatient commitment
order may be filed in court. The petition must be signed by a neutral and qualified
evaluator who has examined the respondent. A copy of the petition shall be served on the
respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the respondent’s guardian, if any, before the 30day outpatient commitment hearing.
SECTION B: CONTENTS OF PETITION
1. The petition must allege the respondent meets the following criteria:
a. The respondent is over the age of 18; and
b. The respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or
others or is gravely disabled; and
c. In view of the respondent’s treatment history, the respondent now needs
treatment to prevent a relapse or severe deterioration that would predictably
result in the respondent causing harm to himself or others or becoming gravely
disabled; and
d. As a result of the respondent’s mental illness, he or she is unlikely to comply
with the needed treatment unless the court enters an order for mandatory
outpatient treatment; and
e. There is a reasonable prospect that the respondent’s mental illness will respond
to the treatment proposed in the treatment plan if the respondent complies with
the treatment requirements specified in the court’s order; and
f. The respondent has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental
illness that has within the last 24 months prior to the filing of the petition:
i. Required inpatient hospitalization for treatment of a mental illness; or
ii. Been a significant factor in necessitating the receipt of services in a
forensic or other mental health unit of a correctional facility; or
iii. Resulted in one or more acts, threats, or attempts of serious violent
behavior towards self or others.
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2. The petition must include a detailed treatment plan that includes specific conditions
with which the respondent is expected to comply, together with a detailed plan for
reviewing the respondent’s medical status and for monitoring his or her compliance
with the required conditions of treatment.
3. The petition must designate that the physician or treatment facility, which is to be
responsible for the respondent’s treatment under the commitment order, has agreed to
accept the respondent and has endorsed the treatment plan.
SECTION C: DETAILED TREATMENT PLAN
The detailed treatment plan must include provisions for intensive case management,
assertive community treatment, or a program for assertive community treatment. The
order may also require that the Department of Health and Social Services or its designee
supply any or all of the following categories of services to the individual:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Medication;
Periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance with treatment;
Individual or group therapy;
Day or partial day programming activities;
Educational and vocational training or activities;
Alcohol or substance abuse treatment and counseling, and periodic tests for the
presence of alcohol or illegal drugs for persons with a history of alcohol or substance
abuse;
7. Supervision of living arrangements; and
8. Any other services prescribed to treat the person’s mental illness and to assist the
person in living and functioning in the community, or to attempt to prevent a relapse or
deterioration.
SECTION D: DISPOSITION
1. If after hearing all relevant evidence, the court does not find by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent meets the criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment,
the court shall dismiss the petition.
2. If after hearing all relevant evidence, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the respondent meets the criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment, and
there is no appropriate and feasible less restrictive alternative, the court may order
involuntary outpatient treatment for an initial period not to exceed 180 days. In
fashioning the order, the court shall specifically make findings by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed treatment is the least restrictive treatment appropriate and
feasible for the respondent. The order shall include a detailed treatment plan, pursuant
to Section C.
3. If after hearing all relevant evidence, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the respondent meets the criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment, and the
court has yet to be provided with a detailed treatment plan pursuant to Section C, the
court shall order the Department of Health and Social Services or its designee to
provide the court with such plan and testimony no later than the third day, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, immediately following the date of such order. Upon
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receiving the detailed treatment plan, the court may order involuntary outpatient
commitment as provided in paragraph b of this subdivision.
4. A court may order the respondent to self-administer psychotropic drugs or accept the
administration of such drugs by authorized personnel as part of an involuntary
outpatient commitment program pursuant to AS § 47.30.772. Such order may specify
the type and dosage range of such psychotropic drugs and such order shall be effective
for the duration of such involuntary outpatient commitment.
5. The court order shall designate the Department of Health and Social Services or its
designee to provide for or coordinate all services included in the detailed treatment plan
throughout the period of the order.
6. The Department of Health and Social Services or its designee shall cause a copy of any
court order issued pursuant to this section to be served personally, or by mail, facsimile
or electronic means, upon the respondent, anyone acting on the respondent’s behalf, the
original petitioner, and identified service providers.
SECTION E: ENFORCEMENT OF INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT ORDER
An involuntary outpatient commitment order’s requirement to maintain treatment can be
enforced for non-compliance. On the signature of a supervising psychiatrist, the order may
be enforced either at the respondent’s residence or a treatment center designated by the
department of mental health or its designee, whichever the respondent chooses.
Respondents who physically resist or fail to select a treatment location shall be treated at a
designated treatment center.
SECTION F: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT
ORDER
If the respondent (a) fails or refuses to comply with the outpatient commitment; and (b)
efforts were made to solicit compliance, the Department of Health and Social Services or its
designee may petition the court to convert the outpatient commitment order to an inpatient
commitment order under AS § 47.30.800, if the respondent otherwise meets all of the
criteria of that statute. Additionally, if the respondent refuses to take medications as
required by the court order, or if the respondent refuses to take, or fails a blood test,
urinalysis, or alcohol or drug test as required by the court order, this refusal or failure may
be taken into account when determining whether the respondent’s outpatient commitment
order should be converted to an inpatient commitment order under AS § 47.30.800.
SECTION G: RENEWAL OF OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT ORDER
The process for renewing an outpatient commitment order is the same as for the petition for
an original outpatient commitment order. The first renewal for an outpatient commitment
order period may last up to 180 days and subsequent renewals up to 360 days thereafter.

56

SECTION H: EFFECT OF DETERMINATION THAT A PERSON IS IN NEED OF INVOLUNTARY
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT
The determination by a court that a person is in need of involuntary outpatient
commitment shall not be construed as or deemed to be a determination that such person is
incapacitated pursuant to AS § 13.26.150.
SECTION I: EDUCATION AND TRAINING
1. The Division of Behavioral Health shall prepare educational and training materials on
the use of this section, which shall be made available to local governmental units,
providers of services, judges, court personnel, law enforcement officials, and the general
public.
2. The Division of Behavioral Health shall establish a mental health training program for
supreme and county court judges and court personnel. Such training shall focus on the
use of this section and generally address issues relating to mental illness and mental
health treatment.
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APPENDIX 2
Proposed Statute Regarding Disposition of Misdemeanor Charges
1. If the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor offense, and the issue of incompetence
to stand trial is raised by the court or a party pursuant to AS § 12.47.100, the
Commissioner of Health and Social Services shall designate a mental health
professional as defined in AS § 47.30.915(13) or evaluation personnel as defined in AS §
47.30.915(8) who has also received training in how to perform competency screening
evaluations for purposes of determining whether a full competency examination should
be performed. The mental health professional or evaluation personnel do not need to be
a qualified evaluator as defined in AS § 12.47.070, but shall be trained by the Division
of Behavioral Health providing education and training to evaluators defined in AS §
12.47.070.
a. The mental health professional or evaluation personnel shall, within five days,
examine the defendant and perform the screening using a competency screening
instrument accepted in the field of forensic psychology and organized around the
defendant’s understanding of the nature of the proceedings, the possible
consequences of the proceedings, and the ability to communicate with counsel
and participate in a trial defense.
b. The mental health professional or evaluation personnel shall, as soon as is
practicable, provide oral testimony or a brief written report to the court in the
criminal case.
c. The oral or written screening report shall include the examiner’s qualifications,
training, and experience to conduct the screening examination; the
circumstances of the examination; the defendant’s willingness to understand
and participate in the examination; the instrument employed, and a description
of the defendant’s current mental state and functional likelihood of
understanding the criminal proceedings and assisting in their own defense.
d. The mental health professional is not required to produce a report meeting all
the requirements of AS § 12.47.070 (c)(1)–(5) and (e).
2. If the court finds that there is reason to believe the defendant is not competent to stand
trial pursuant to AS § 12.47.070(a), and the mental health professional or evaluation
personnel believes there is a substantial probability that the defendant meets the
criteria for outpatient civil commitment pursuant to AS § 47.[---], or hospitalization for
evaluation pursuant to AS § 47.30.700, the mental health professional or evaluation
personnel shall file a petition for involuntary outpatient commitment pursuant to AS §
47.[---], or hospitalization for evaluation pursuant to AS § 47.30.700. The rights of the
respondent in that case shall be governed by AS § 47.30.725.
3. If an order issues, pursuant to AS § 47.30.700 authorizing hospitalization, or pursuant
to AS § 47.[---] authorizing outpatient civil commitment, the court shall be notified of
the arrival of the defendant at the evaluation facility or outpatient commitment
placement, and the court shall, upon such notification, dismiss the charges without
prejudice. The prosecutor may not re-file charges unless the defendant is charged with
any new crime within one year of the date of the offense or the prosecutor has reason to
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believe that the defendant is competent to stand trial within one year of the date of the
offense.
4. If the court finds that there is reason to believe the defendant is competent to stand
trial pursuant to AS § 12.47.070(a), the court shall order a full competency evaluation
to be performed by a qualified evaluator. This evaluation and subsequent report shall
contain all of the requirements of AS § 12.47.070 (c)(1)–(5) and (e).
5. This section shall not apply to defendants with a current misdemeanor charge involving
substantial bodily harm against a person, use of a firearm or a sex offense or if the
defendant has a prior conviction for a violent felony or sex offense.
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SECTION A. DEFINITIONS
Childhood mental illness: Childhood mental illness means a current substantial
disturbance of thought, mood, perception, or orientation, which differs from that which is
typical of juveniles of a similar developmental stage, and which significantly impairs
judgment, behavior, or capacity to recognize reality when also compared with juveniles of a
similar developmental state. Childhood mental illness does not include a seizure disorder; a
developmental disability, including fetal alcohol spectrum disorders; organic brain
syndrome; or a physical or sensory handicap. A brief period or periods of intoxication caused
by alcohol or other substances is not sufficient by itself to meet the criteria for childhood
mental illness.
Developmental disability: Developmental disability means a severe chronic disability of
a juvenile that: (1) Is attributable to a physical or mental impairment, other than the sole
diagnosis of mental illness, or to a combination of mental and physical impairments; (2) Is
likely to continue indefinitely; (3) Results in an inability to live independently without
external support or continuing and regular assistance; and (4) Reflects the need for a
combination and sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic care, treatment, or other
services that are individually planned and coordinated for the juvenile.
Intellectual disability: Intellectual disability means a developmental disability that is
evidenced by intellectual functioning that is significantly below average and impairment in
the adaptive behavior of a juvenile.
Developmental immaturity: Developmental immaturity means the developing cognitive
and social characteristics of juveniles that might impair abilities associated with the
standard for competence, including juveniles’ understanding or decision-making.
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Qualified and Neutral Evaluator:
(a) “Qualified evaluator” includes psychiatrists and psychologists. A qualified
psychiatrist is a person who is licensed by the State Medical Board to practice in this
state or is employed by the federal government, and who is either board certified by the
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the subspecialty of child and adolescent
psychiatry or has received post-residency education and training specific to child and
adolescent psychiatry. A qualified psychologist is a person who is licensed by the state
Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners. Psychologists should
have training and/or certification in juvenile development.
(b) A neutral evaluator is a qualified psychiatrist or qualified psychologist who is not
otherwise involved in the juvenile’s clinical treatment, or any subsequent restorative
treatment. If a neutral evaluator later becomes involved in the juvenile’s clinical or
restorative treatment, any subsequent evaluation shall be conducted by an additional,
neutral evaluator.
Telebehavioral health: “Telebehavioral health” means the performance of forensic
evaluations by electronic transmission using electronic communication technology; or twoway, interactive, simultaneous audio and video. When evaluations are conducted using
telebehavioral health, all patient information, including electronic data, must be
confidentially maintained.
SECTION B. SUSPENSION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
1. If, at any time following the filing of a delinquency petition, the court, defense counsel,
department personnel, or the Department of Law has probable cause to believe that the
juvenile has committed the delinquent act and the juvenile may be incompetent to proceed,
the court shall suspend all delinquency proceedings and order that the question of the
juvenile’s competence be determined at a hearing.
2. Upon suspension of proceedings, the court shall order the Department to appoint a
neutral and qualified evaluator to assess whether the juvenile suffers from a childhood
mental illness, developmental disability, developmental immaturity, or other condition and,
if so, whether the condition or conditions impair the juvenile’s competency.
3. Evaluations under this section shall be performed within 30 calendar days of the court
order for evaluation. If the juvenile is found competent to proceed under this section, the
court shall advance the date for the delinquency proceeding to the earliest possible date, not
to exceed three calendar days after the evaluation is complete.
4. Location of the Evaluation. If the court orders a competency evaluation, the court shall
order that the competency evaluation be conducted in the least restrictive environment.
The evaluation may be conducted in a secure hospital or juvenile detention facility if
detention is necessary to protect the juvenile or the community or ensure the juvenile’s
attendance at subsequent court hearings.
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SECTION C. FACTORS AND CONTENTS OF EXAMINATION AND REPORT
1. A qualified and neutral evaluator shall examine the juvenile and prepare a report
stating whether, in the evaluator’s opinion, the juvenile is incompetent to proceed.
2. The juvenile may, at any reasonable time before the competency hearing, request that
the court appoint an additional qualified and neutral evaluator, at the juvenile’s cost. If an
additional evaluation is ordered under this section, that evaluation shall be performed
within 30 calendar days of the court order for the additional evaluation.
3. In conducting the examination, the qualified evaluator shall review all available
medical, educational, and court records concerning the juvenile and the juvenile’s case and
consult with family members, guardians, or other persons who have extensive personal
knowledge of the juvenile. Any records concerning the juvenile that are used under this
section shall be served on the juvenile’s counsel within three business days.
4. In determining whether the juvenile is incompetent to proceed, the qualified evaluator
shall consider the following factors:
a. The juvenile’s age, maturity level, developmental stage, current mental state, and
decision-making abilities;
b. The capacity of the juvenile to:
i. Appreciate the allegations against the juvenile;
ii. Appreciate the range and nature of allowable dispositions that may be imposed
in the proceedings against the juvenile;
iii. Understand the roles of all of the participants and the adversarial nature of the
legal process;
iv. Disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the allegations;
v. Maintain appropriate courtroom behavior; and
vi. Testify relevantly and provide a coherent, logical account of facts, especially as
they relate to the alleged offense; and
c. Any other factors that the qualified evaluator deems to be relevant in evaluating the
juvenile’s ability to understand the proceedings against the juvenile and to assist in the
juvenile’s own defense.
5. The written report submitted by the qualified evaluator shall:
a. Identify the specific matters referred for evaluation;
b. Describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used in the examination and the
purposes of each;
c. Describe the history and current status of any psychiatric symptoms and, if
relevant, the youth’s psychiatric diagnosis;
d. Describe the history and current status of any intellectual incapacities or
intellectual disabilities;
e. Describe the cognitive abilities of the youth associated with the youth’s history and
current level of development;
f. Describe the youth’s development of psychosocial characteristics that might be
relevant for competence to stand trial;
g. State the qualified evaluator’s clinical observations, findings, and opinions on each
factor specified in paragraph (3) of this section, and identify those factors, if any, on
which the qualified evaluator could not give an opinion; and
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h. Identify the sources of information used by the qualified evaluator and present the
factual basis for the qualified evaluator’s clinical findings and opinions.
6. Counsel for the juvenile may be present at an examination under this section.
7. Protections Against Self-Incrimination. Any statements of the juvenile related to the
alleged offense and included in the report under this section shall not be used against the
juvenile in court proceedings on the offense, in any adjudicatory hearing on a petition
alleging delinquency, or in any civil proceeding.
8. An examination under this section may be conducted by a neutral and qualified
evaluator using telebehavioral health.
SECTION D. FINDING THAT JUVENILE IS INCOMPETENT TO PROCEED
1. If the qualified evaluator believes that the juvenile is incompetent to proceed, the report
shall describe the treatment, if any, that the qualified evaluator believes is necessary for
the juvenile to attain competency to proceed.
2. In determining the treatment that is necessary for the juvenile to attain competency to
proceed, the qualified evaluator shall consider and report on the following:
a. The childhood mental illness, intellectual disability, developmental immaturity, or
other developmental disability causing the juvenile to be incompetent to proceed;
b. The treatment or education appropriate for mental illness, intellectual disability,
developmental immaturity, or other developmental disability of the juvenile, and an
explanation of each of the possible treatment or education alternatives, in order of
recommendation;
c. The likelihood of the juvenile attaining competency to proceed under the treatment
or education recommended, an assessment of the probable duration of the treatment
required to attain competency, and the probability that the juvenile will attain
competency to proceed in the foreseeable future; and
d. Whether the juvenile meets the criteria for involuntary admission under AS §
47.30.775.
SECTION E. REPORTS FILED WITH COURT AND SERVED ON JUVENILE’S COUNSEL
1. All reports required under this section shall be filed with the court and served on the
juvenile’s counsel and the State’s Attorney within 30 days after the court orders the
examination. On good cause shown, the court may extend the time period specified in this
section for an additional 15 days.
2. If a second evaluation is requested by the juvenile under Section C(2), the court may
extend the time period specified in paragraph (1) of this section for an additional 30 days
following the court’s response to the juvenile’s request for a second evaluation. On good
cause shown, the court may extend the time period specified in this section for an
additional 15 days.
3. Failure to file a complete report within the time periods specified in this section may not
be, in and of itself, grounds for dismissal of the petition alleging delinquency.
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SECTION F. COMPETENCY HEARING
1. Within three business days after receiving the report from the qualified examiner, the
court shall hold a competency hearing.
2. In adjudicating competency in juvenile proceedings, the court shall apply the following
presumptions:
a. For juveniles ages 10 and below: a non-rebuttable presumption of incompetence to
stand trial.
b. For juveniles ages 11–13, a rebuttable presumption of incompetence. The party
raising the issue of competency bears the burden of proving the juvenile is competent by
a preponderance of the evidence. When the court raises the issue of competency, the
burden of proving the juvenile is competent shall be on the party who elects to advocate
for a finding of competency. The court shall then apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard to determine whether the juvenile is competent.
c. For juveniles ages 14 and older, a rebuttable presumption of competence. The party
raising the issue of competency bears the burden of proving the juvenile is incompetent
by a preponderance of the evidence. When the court raises the issue of competency, the
burden of proving the juvenile is incompetent shall be on the party who elects to
advocate for a finding of incompetency. The court shall then apply the preponderance of
the evidence standard to determine whether the juvenile is competent.
3. At a competency hearing, if the court determines that the juvenile is competent, the
court shall enter an order to that effect, lift the stay imposed under Section B, and proceed
with the delinquency petition.
4. Subject to the time periods for dismissal of the case specified in Section H, if the court
determines that the juvenile remains incompetent to proceed, but may be able to attain
competency in the foreseeable future, the court may order that services, if deemed
necessary by the qualified and neutral evaluator, be continued in increments of not more
than 90 days.
5. Within 90 days after the court orders additional services under paragraph 4 of this
section, the qualified and neutral evaluator shall file a written report as described in
Section C.
6. At the competency hearing, if the court determines that the juvenile remains
incompetent to proceed and is unlikely to attain competency in the foreseeable future, the
court shall proceed in accordance with Section G and Section H.
SECTION G. INCOMPETENT JUVENILES UNLIKELY TO ATTAIN COMPETENCY
1. At a competency hearing, if the court determines that the juvenile is incompetent to
proceed; is unlikely to attain competency in the foreseeable future; is mentally ill, as
defined in AS § 47.30.730, and as a result (a) is likely to cause serious harm to self or
others, or (b) is gravely disabled and the juvenile’s condition could be improved by the
course of treatment sought, the court may order a petition for emergency evaluation under
AS § 47.30.705.
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2. At a competency hearing, if the court determines that the juvenile is incompetent to
proceed and is unlikely to attain competency in the foreseeable future, and has a
developmental disability or childhood mental illness, as defined in this section, the court
may order the department to evaluate the juvenile within 30 days to determine the
juvenile’s eligibility for services and to provide these services.
SECTION H. DISMISSAL OF DELINQUENCY OR VIOLATION OF PROBATION PETITIONS.
At a competency hearing, if the court determines that the juvenile is incompetent to
proceed and is unlikely to attain competency in the foreseeable future, the court:
1. May dismiss the delinquency petition; and
2. Shall dismiss the delinquency petition if the juvenile has not attained competency
within one year after the date of the finding of incompetency.
SECTION I. INCOMPETENT JUVENILES LIKELY TO ATTAIN COMPETENCY AND ORDER FOR
COMPETENCY ATTAINMENT SERVICES
1. At a competency hearing, if the court determines that the juvenile is incompetent to
proceed, but that there is a substantial probability that the juvenile may be able to attain
competency in the foreseeable future and that services are necessary to attain competency,
the court may order competency attainment services for the juvenile for an initial period of
not more than 90 days.
2. Competency attainment services shall be provided in the least restrictive environment.
3. The court may order a juvenile to be placed in a facility for juveniles if:
a. The juvenile is detained under Section B(4) at the time of the competency hearing;
and
b. The court finds, after a hearing on the issue, that placement in a facility is necessary
to protect the juvenile or the community or ensure the juvenile’s attendance at
subsequent court hearings; and
c. No less restrictive alternative placement is available that will protect the juvenile or
the community or prevent the juvenile from leaving the jurisdiction of the court.
SECTION J. SUBSEQUENT COMPETENCY HEARINGS AND OPINIONS RELATING TO
COMPETENCY OF JUVENILE AND LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINING COMPETENCY
1. If the court orders competency attainment services under this section, the treating
institution shall file a written report with the court, with notice to the juvenile’s counsel of
the submission of the report, within 90 days after the court order, stating whether, in the
opinion of a qualified examiner as described in Section C, the juvenile:
a. Has attained competency;
b. Remains incompetent to proceed, but may be able to attain competency in the
foreseeable future; or
c. Remains incompetent to proceed, and is unlikely to attain competency in the
foreseeable future.
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2. The court shall hold a subsequent competency hearing in accordance with Section F
within three business days after the court receives the report described in this section.
3. For good cause shown, the hearing date may be continued for a reasonable period of
time.
4. If at any time while receiving competency attainment services under this section, the
treating institution determines that the juvenile has regained competency, it shall notify
the court immediately, even if the time period permitted for competency attainment
services has not expired.
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EXISTING & REVISED STATUTES
TITLE 12
EXISTING AS § 12.47.010
Insanity as Affirmative Defense
(a) In a prosecution for a crime, it is an affirmative defense that when the defendant engaged in the
criminal conduct, the defendant was unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate
the nature and quality of that conduct.
(b) The affirmative defense defined in (a) of this section may not be raised at trial unless the
defendant, within 10 days of entering a plea or such later time as the court may for good cause
permit, files a written notice of intent to rely on the defense.
(c) Evidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated criminal or other
antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish the affirmative defense under (a) of this section.
(d) The affirmative defense specified in (a) of this section is the affirmative defense of insanity. A
defendant who successfully raises the affirmative defense of insanity shall be found not guilty by
reason of insanity and the verdict shall so state.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.010
Insanity as Affirmative Defense
[NO CHANGES]

67

EXISTING AS § 12.47.020
Mental Disease or Defect Negating Culpable Mental State
(a) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is
relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a culpable mental state which is an element
of the crime. However, evidence of mental disease or defect that tends to negate a culpable mental
state is not admissible unless the defendant, within 10 days of entering a plea, or at such later time
as the court may for good cause permit, files a written notice of intent to rely on that defense.
(b) When the trier of fact finds that all other elements of the crime have been proved but, as a result
of mental disease or defect, there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a culpable mental state
that is an element of the crime, it shall enter a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. A
defendant acquitted under this subsection, and not found guilty of a lesser included offense, shall
automatically be considered to have established the affirmative defense of insanity under AS §
12.47.010. The defendant is then subject to the provisions of AS § 12.47.090.
(c) If a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is reached under (b) of this section, the trier of fact
shall also consider whether the defendant is guilty of any lesser included offense. If the defendant is
convicted of a lesser included offense, the defendant shall be sentenced for that offense and shall
automatically be considered guilty but mentally ill under AS § 12.47.030 and 12.47.050. Upon
completion of a sentence for a lesser included offense, a hearing shall be held under AS § 12.47.090(c)
to determine the necessity of further commitment of the defendant, based on the acquittal for the
greater charge under (b) of this section. If the defendant is committed under AS § 12.47.090(c), the
defendant is subject to the provisions of AS § 12.47.090(d)–(i) and (k).
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.020
Mental Disease or Defect Negating Culpable Mental State
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.030
Guilty But Mentally Ill
(a) A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, when the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the
defendant lacked, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law. A
defendant found guilty but mentally ill is not relieved of criminal responsibility for criminal conduct
and is subject to the provisions of AS § 12.47.050.
(b) Evidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated criminal or antisocial
conduct is not sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty but mentally ill under (a) of this
section.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.030
Guilty But Mentally Ill
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.040
Form of Verdict in Certain Cases Involving Insanity or Mental Disease or Defect
(a) In a prosecution for a crime when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised under AS §
12.47.010, or when evidence of a mental disease or defect of the defendant is otherwise admissible at
trial under AS § 12.47.020, the trier of fact shall find, and the verdict shall state, whether the
defendant is
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty;
(3) not guilty by reason of insanity; or
(4) guilty but mentally ill.
(b) To return a verdict under (a)(4) of this section, the fact finder must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime and that, when the defendant committed the crime,
the defendant was guilty but mentally ill as defined in AS § 12.47.030.
(c) When the jury is instructed as to the verdicts under (a) of this section, it shall also be instructed
on the dispositions available under AS § 12.47.050 and 12.47.090.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.040
Form of Verdict in Certain Cases Involving Insanity or Mental Disease or Defect
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.050
Disposition of Defendant Found Guilty But Mentally Ill
(a) If the trier of fact finds that a defendant is guilty but mentally ill, the court shall sentence the
defendant as provided by law and shall enter the verdict of guilty but mentally ill as part of the
judgment.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall provide mental health treatment to a defendant found
guilty but mentally ill. The treatment must continue until the defendant no longer suffers from a
mental disease or defect that causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public peace or safety.
Subject to (c) and (d) of this section, the Department of Corrections shall determine the course of
treatment.
(c) When treatment terminates under (b) of this section, the defendant shall be required to serve the
remainder of the sentence imposed.
(d) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, a defendant receiving treatment under (b) of this
section may not be released
(1) on furlough under AS § 33.30.101–33.30.131, except for treatment in a secure setting; or
(2) on parole.
(e) Not less than 30 days before the expiration of the sentence of a defendant found guilty but
mentally ill, the commissioner of corrections shall file a petition under AS § 47.30.700 for a screening
investigation to determine the need for further treatment of the defendant if
(1) the defendant is still receiving treatment under (b) of this section; and
(2) the commissioner has good cause to believe that the defendant is suffering from a mental
illness that causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public peace or safety; in this paragraph,
“mental illness” has the meaning given in AS § 47.30.915.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.050
Disposition of Defendant Found Guilty But Mentally Ill
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.055
Treatment for Other Defendants Not Limited
Nothing in AS § 12.47.050 limits the discretion of the court to recommend, or of the Department of
Corrections to provide, psychiatrically indicated treatment for a defendant who is not adjudged
guilty but mentally ill.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.055
Treatment for Other Defendants Not Limited
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.060
Post Conviction Determination of Mental Illness
(a) In a prosecution for a crime when the affirmative defense of insanity is not raised and when
evidence of mental disease or defect of the defendant is not admitted at trial under AS § 12.47.020,
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney may raise the issue of whether the defendant is guilty but
mentally ill. A party that seeks a post-conviction determination of guilty but mentally ill must give
notice 10 days before trial of intent to do so; however, this deadline is waived if the opposing party
presents evidence or argument at trial tending to show that the defendant may be guilty but
mentally ill. A hearing must be held on this issue before the same fact finder that returned the
verdict of guilty under procedures set by the court. In cases decided by a jury, at the request of the
defendant and with the concurrence of the prosecuting attorney, the court may decide the issue. A
waiver of consideration by a jury must be in writing and in person before the court. At the hearing,
the fact finder shall determine whether the defendant has been shown to be guilty but mentally ill
beyond a reasonable doubt, considering evidence presented at the hearing and any evidence relevant
to the issue that was presented at trial.
(b) If the fact finder finds that a defendant is guilty but mentally ill, the court shall sentence the
defendant as provided by law and shall enter the finding of guilty but mentally ill as part of the
judgment.
(c) A defendant determined to be guilty but mentally ill under this section is subject to the
provisions of AS § 12.47.050.
(d) In this section, “guilty but mentally ill” has the meaning given in AS § 12.47.030.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.060
Post Conviction Determination of Mental Illness
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.070
Psychiatric Examination
(a) If a defendant has filed a notice of intention to rely on the affirmative defense of insanity under
AS § 12.47.010 or has filed notice under AS § 12.47.020(a), or there is reason to doubt the defendant’s
fitness to proceed, or there is reason to believe that a mental disease or defect of the defendant will
otherwise become an issue in the case, the court shall appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists or
two forensic psychologists certified by the American Board of Forensic Psychology to examine and
report upon the mental condition of the defendant. If the court appoints psychiatrists, the
psychiatrists may select psychologists to provide assistance. If the defendant has filed notice under
AS § 12.47.090(a), the report shall consider whether the defendant can still be committed under AS §
12.47.090(c). The court may order the defendant to be committed to a secure facility for the purpose
of the examination for not more than 60 days or such longer period as the court determines to be
necessary for the purpose and may direct that a qualified psychiatrist retained by the defendant be
permitted to witness and participate in the examination.
(b) In an examination under (a) of this section, any method may be employed which is accepted by
the medical profession for the examination of those alleged to be suffering from mental disease or
defect.
(c) The report of an examination under (a) of this section shall include the following:
(1) a description of the nature of the examination;
(2) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant;
(3) if the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, an opinion as to the defendant’s
capacity to understand the proceedings against the defendant and to assist in the defendant’s
defense;
(4) if a notice of intention to rely on the affirmative defense of insanity under AS § 12.47.010(b)
has been filed, an opinion as to the extent, if any, to which the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the nature and quality of the defendant’s conduct was impaired at the time of the crime
charged; and
(5) if notice has been filed under AS § 12.47.020(a), an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant
to have a culpable mental state which is an element of the crime charged.
(d) If the examination under (a) of this section cannot be conducted by reason of the unwillingness of
the defendant to participate in it, the report shall so state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as
to whether the unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental disease or defect.
(e) The report of the examination under (a) of this section shall be filed with the clerk of the court,
who shall cause copies to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and to counsel for the defendant.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.070
Psychiatric Examination
(a) If a defendant has filed a notice of intention to rely on the affirmative defense of insanity under
AS § 12.47.010 or has filed notice under AS § 12.47.020(a), or there is reason to doubt the defendant’s
competence to proceed under AS § 12.47.100, the court shall appoint a qualified and neutral

74

evaluator to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. If the defendant has
filed notice under AS § 12.47.090(a), the report shall consider whether the defendant can still be
committed under AS § 12.47.090(c). The court may order the defendant to be committed to a secure
facility for the purpose of the examination for not more than 60 days or such longer period as the
court determines to be necessary for the purpose and may direct that a qualified and neutral
evaluator retained by the defendant be permitted to witness and participate in the examination.
(b) In an examination under (a) of this section, any method may be employed which is accepted by
the medical profession for the examination of those alleged to be suffering from mental disease or
defect.
(ADDED) In an examination under (a) of this section of a defendant charged with a misdemeanor
where there is reason to doubt the defendant’s competence to proceed, the examination shall be
performed within 15 calendar days of the court order for evaluation. A 15-day extension of this time
period may be permitted when the defendant appears to be under the influence of intoxicating drugs
or alcohol. The court shall advance the date of the hearing under AS § 12.47.100 for defendants
charged with misdemeanors to the day after the competency report required by this section is filed. If
the defendant is found competent to proceed on misdemeanor charges, the court shall advance the
date for the plea hearing or trial to the earliest possible date.
(c) The report of an examination under (a) of this section shall include the following:
(1) a description of the nature of the examination;
(2) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant;
(3) if the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, an opinion as to the defendant’s
capacity to understand the proceedings against the defendant and to assist in the defendant’s
defense;
(4) if a notice of intention to rely on the affirmative defense of insanity under AS § 12.47.010(b)
has been filed, an opinion as to the extent, if any, to which the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the nature and quality of the defendant’s conduct was impaired at the time of the crime
charged; and
(5) if notice has been filed under AS § 12.47.020(a), an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant
to have a culpable mental state which is an element of the crime charged.
(d) If the examination under (a) of this section cannot be conducted by reason of the unwillingness of
the defendant to participate in it, the report shall so state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as
to whether the unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental disease or defect.
(e) The report of the examination under (a) of this section shall be filed with the clerk of the court,
who shall cause copies to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and to counsel for the defendant.
(f) Upon a request by the court, the Department of Health and Social Services, or its designee, shall
designate a qualified and neutral evaluator as required under these statutes. The use of
telebehavioral health is permitted under this statute. Examinations performed using telebehavioral
health must meet the other requirements for examinations as provided by this statute.
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.080
Procedure upon Verdict of Not Guilty
(a) If a defendant is found not guilty under AS § 12.47.040(a)(2), the prosecuting attorney shall,
within 24 hours, file a petition under AS § 47.30.700 for a screening investigation to determine the
need for treatment if the prosecuting attorney has good cause to believe that the defendant is
suffering from a mental illness and as a result is gravely disabled or likely to cause serious harm to
self or others.
(b) In this section, “mental illness” has the meaning given in AS § 47.30.915.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.080
Procedure upon Verdict of Not Guilty
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.090
Procedure After Raising Defense of Insanity
(a) At the time the defendant files notice to raise the affirmative defense of insanity under AS §
12.47.010 or files notice under AS § 12.47.020(a), the defendant shall also file notice as to whether, if
found not guilty by reason of insanity under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020(b), the defendant will assert
that the defendant is not presently suffering from any mental illness that causes the defendant to be
dangerous to the public peace or safety.
(b) If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020(b),
and has not filed the notice required under (a) of this section, the court shall immediately commit the
defendant to the custody of the commissioner of health and social services.
(c) If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020(b),
and has filed the notice required under (a) of this section, a hearing shall be held immediately after a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity to determine the necessity of commitment. The hearing
shall be held before the same trier of fact as heard the underlying charge. At the hearing, the
defendant has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not
presently suffering from any mental illness that causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public.
If the court or jury determines that the defendant has failed to meet the burden of proof, the court
shall order the defendant committed to the custody of the commissioner of health and social services.
If the hearing is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
(d) A defendant committed under (b) or (c) of this section shall be held in custody for a period of time
not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime for which the defendant was
acquitted under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020(b) or until the mental illness is cured or corrected as
determined at a hearing under (e) of this section.
(e) A defendant committed under (b) or (c) of this section may have the need for continuing
commitment under this section reviewed by the court sitting without a jury under a petition filed in
the superior court at intervals beginning no sooner than a year from the defendant’s initial
commitment, and yearly thereafter. The burden and standard of proof at a hearing under this
subsection are the same as at a hearing under (c) of this section. A copy of all petitions for release
shall be served on the attorney general at Juneau, Alaska. A copy shall also be served upon the
attorney of record, if the attorney of record is not the attorney general, who represented the state or
a municipality at the time the defendant was first committed.
(f) Continued commitment following expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime
for which the defendant was acquitted under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020(b) is governed by the
standards pertaining to civil commitments as set out in AS § 47.30.735.
(g) A person committed under this section may not be released during the term of commitment
except upon court order following a hearing in accordance with (e) of this section. On the grounds
that the defendant has been cured of any mental illness that would cause the defendant to be
dangerous to the public peace or safety, the state may at any time request the court to hold a hearing
to decide if the defendant should be released.
(h) The commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s authorized representative
shall submit periodic written reports to the court on the mental condition of a person committed
under this section.
(i) An order entered under (c) or (e) of this section may be reviewed by the court of appeals on
appeal brought by either the defendant or the state within 40 days from the entry of the order.
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(j) If the court finds that a defendant committed under (b) or (c) of this section can be adequately
controlled and treated in the community with proper supervision, the court may order the defendant
conditionally released from confinement under AS § 12.47.092 for a period of time not to exceed the
maximum term of imprisonment for the crime for which the defendant was acquitted under AS §
12.47.010 or 12.47.020(b) or until the mental illness is cured or corrected, whichever first occurs, as
determined at a hearing under (c) of this section.
(k) In this section,
(1) “dangerous” means a determination involving both the magnitude of the risk that the
defendant will commit an act threatening the public peace or safety, as well as the magnitude of
the harm that could be expected to result from this conduct; a finding that a defendant is
“dangerous” may result from a great risk of relatively slight harm to persons or property, or may
result from a relatively slight risk of substantial harm to persons or property;
(2) “mental illness” means any mental condition that increases the propensity of the defendant to
be dangerous to the public peace or safety; however, it is not required that the mental illness be
sufficient to exclude criminal responsibility under AS § 12.47.010, or that the mental illness
presently suffered by the defendant be the same one the defendant suffered at the time of the
criminal conduct.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.090
Procedure After Raising Defense of Insanity
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.092
Procedure for Conditional Release
(a) A defendant committed to the custody of the commissioner of health and social services under AS
§ 12.47.090(b) or (c) may be conditionally released from confinement subject to the conditions and
requirements for treatment that the court may impose, and placed under the supervision of the
Department of Health and Social Services, a local government agency, a private agency, or an adult,
who agrees to assume supervision of the defendant.
(b) The commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s authorized representative
shall submit, at a minimum, quarterly written reports to the court describing the defendant’s
progress in treatment, compliance with conditions of release, and other information required by the
court for defendants conditionally released under this section.
(c) A person or agency responsible for supervision or treatment under an order for conditional
release shall immediately notify the commissioner of health and social services upon the defendant’s
failure to appear for required medication or treatment, or for failure to comply with other conditions
imposed by the court.
(d) If the court, after petition or on its own motion, reasonably believes that a conditionally released
defendant is failing to adhere to the terms and conditions of the conditional release, the court may
order that the conditionally released defendant be apprehended and held until a hearing can be
scheduled with the court to determine the facts and whether or not the defendant’s conditional
release should be revoked or modified. Nothing in this subsection is intended to limit procedures
available for emergency situations, including emergency detention under AS § 47.30.705.
(e) The commissioner of health and social services or the conditionally released defendant may
petition the court for modification of an order of conditional release. A petition by the defendant for
modification of conditional release may not be filed more often than once every six months.
(f) A defendant conditionally released under AS § 12.47.090(j) may petition the court for discharge
in accordance with AS § 12.47.090(e).
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.092
Procedure for Conditional Release
[NO CHANGES]

79

EXISTING AS § 12.47.095
Notice to Victims
(a) If an offender has been committed to the custody of the commissioner of health and social services
under AS § 12.47.090, the victim of that crime is entitled to notice of a pending or actual change in
the status of the offender. The commissioner of health and social services shall give notice as
required by this section if
(1) the offender has been continued in commitment following expiration of the maximum term of
imprisonment under AS § 12.47.090(f) and the commissioner gives notice of release of the offender;
(2) the court is to consider modification of an order of conditional release for the offender under AS
§ 12.47.092(e);
(3) a court is to consider conditional release of the offender under AS § 12.47.090(j) and
12.47.092(a);
(4) the offender petitions for discharge under AS § 12.47.092(f); or
(5) the offender escapes, is released from custody on conditional release, furlough or authorized
absence, or is discharged or released from custody for any reason.
(b) If a victim desires notice under this section, the victim shall maintain a current, valid mailing
address on file with the commissioner of health and social services. The commissioner shall send the
notice required by this section to the victim’s last known address. The victim’s address may not be
disclosed to the offender or offender’s attorney.
(c) The commissioner of health and social services is required to give notice of a change in the status
of an offender under this section to any victim who has requested notice.
(d) If more than one person who qualifies as a victim under AS § 12.55.185 desires notice, the
commissioner of health and social services shall designate one person for purposes of receiving any
notice required and exercising the rights granted by this section.
(e) A victim who has received notice under (a) of this section that a change in the status of the
offender is pending before a court has the right to submit to the court a written statement, or to
appear personally at a hearing to present a written statement, and to give sworn testimony or an
unsworn oral presentation to the court.
(f) In this section,
(1) “offender” has the meaning given in AS § 12.61.020;
(2) “victim” has the meaning given in AS § 12.55.185.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.095
Notice to Victims
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.100
Incompetency to Proceed
(a) A defendant who, as a result of mental disease or defect, is incompetent because the defendant is
unable to understand the proceedings against the defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own
defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of a crime so long as the
incompetency exists.
(b) If, before imposition of sentence, the prosecuting attorney or the attorney for the defendant has
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
that causes the defendant to be unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in the person’s own
defense, the attorney may file a motion for a judicial determination of the competency of the
defendant. Upon that motion, or upon its own motion, the court shall have the defendant examined
by at least one qualified psychiatrist or psychologist, who shall report to the court concerning the
competency of the defendant. For the purpose of the examination, the court may order the defendant
committed for a reasonable period to a suitable hospital or other facility designated by the court. If
the report of the psychiatrist or psychologist indicates that the defendant is incompetent, the court
shall hold a hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence as to the competency of the defendant may
be submitted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist or psychologist, and make appropriate
findings. Before the hearing, the court shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney, order the
defendant to submit to an additional evaluation by a psychiatrist or psychologist designated by the
prosecuting attorney.
(c) A defendant is presumed to be competent. The party raising the issue of competency bears the
burden of proving the defendant is incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. When the court
raises the issue of competency, the burden of proving the defendant is incompetent shall be on the
party who elects to advocate for a finding of incompetency. The court shall then apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant is competent.
(d) A statement made by the defendant in the course of an examination into the person’s competency
under this section, whether the examination is with or without the consent of the defendant, may not
be admitted in evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in a criminal proceeding unless
the defendant later relies on a defense under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020. A finding by the judge
that the defendant is competent to stand trial in no way prejudices the defendant in a defense based
on insanity; the finding may not be introduced in evidence on that issue or otherwise be brought to
the notice of the jury.
(e) In determining whether a person has sufficient intellectual functioning to adapt or cope with the
ordinary demands of life, the court shall consider whether the person has obtained a driver’s license,
is able to maintain employment, or is competent to testify as a witness under the Alaska Rules of
Evidence.
(f) In determining if the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against the defendant,
the court shall consider, among other factors considered relevant by the court, whether the
defendant understands that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense and that
penalties can be imposed; whether the defendant understands what criminal conduct is being
alleged; whether the defendant understands the roles of the judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense
counsel; whether the defendant understands that the defendant will be expected to tell defense
counsel the circumstances, to the best of the defendant’s ability, surrounding the defendant’s
activities at the time of the alleged criminal conduct; and whether the defendant can distinguish
between a guilty and not guilty plea.
(g) In determining if the defendant is unable to assist in the defendant’s own defense, the court shall
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consider, among other factors considered relevant by the court, whether the defendant’s mental
disease or defect affects the defendant’s ability to recall and relate facts pertaining to the defendant’s
actions at times relevant to the charges and whether the defendant can respond coherently to
counsel’s questions. A defendant is able to assist in the defense even though the defendant’s memory
may be impaired, the defendant refuses to accept a course of action that counsel or the court believes
is in the defendant’s best interest, or the defendant is unable to suggest a particular strategy or to
choose among alternative defenses.
(h) In a hearing to determine competency under this section, the court may, at the court’s discretion,
allow a witness, including a psychiatrist or psychologist who examined the defendant, to testify
concerning the competency of the defendant by contemporaneous two-way video conference if the
witness is in a place from which people customarily travel by air to the court, and the procedure
allows the parties a fair opportunity to examine the witness. The video conference technician shall be
the only person in the presence of the witness unless the court, at the court’s discretion, determines
that another person may be present. Any person present with the witness must be identified on the
record. In this subsection, “contemporaneous two-way video conference”
(1) means a conference among people at different places by means of transmitted audio and video
signals;
(2) includes all communication technologies that allow people at two or more places to interact by
two-way video and audio transmissions simultaneously.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.100
Incompetency to Proceed
(a) A defendant who, as a result of mental disease or defect, is incompetent because the defendant is
unable to understand the proceedings against the defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own
defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of a crime so long as the
incompetency exists.
(b) If, before imposition of sentence, the prosecuting attorney or the attorney for the defendant has
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
that causes the defendant to be unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in the person’s own
defense, the attorney may file a motion for a judicial determination of the competency of the
defendant. Upon that motion, or upon its own motion, the court shall have the defendant examined
by a qualified and neutral evaluator, who shall report to the court concerning the competency of the
defendant. For the purpose of the examination, the court may order the defendant committed for a
reasonable period to a suitable hospital or other facility designated by the court. If the report of the
qualified and neutral evaluator indicates that the defendant is incompetent, the court shall hold a
hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence as to the competency of the defendant may be submitted,
including that of the qualified and neutral evaluator, and make appropriate findings.
(c) A defendant is presumed to be competent. The party raising the issue of competency bears the
burden of proving the defendant is incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. When the court
raises the issue of competency, the burden of proving the defendant is incompetent shall be on the
party who elects to advocate for a finding of incompetency. The court shall then apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant is competent.
(d) A statement made by the defendant in the course of an examination into the person’s competency
under this section, whether the examination is with or without the consent of the defendant, may not
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be admitted in evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in a criminal proceeding unless
the defendant later relies on a defense under AS § 12.47.010 or 12.47.020. A finding by the judge
that the defendant is competent to stand trial in no way prejudices the defendant in a defense based
on insanity; the finding may not be introduced in evidence on that issue or otherwise be brought to
the notice of the jury.
(f) In determining if the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against the defendant,
the court shall consider, among other factors considered relevant by the court, whether the
defendant understands that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense and that
penalties can be imposed; whether the defendant understands what criminal conduct is being
alleged; whether the defendant understands the roles of the judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense
counsel; whether the defendant understands that the defendant will be expected to tell defense
counsel the circumstances, to the best of the defendant’s ability, surrounding the defendant’s
activities at the time of the alleged criminal conduct; and whether the defendant can distinguish
between a guilty and not guilty plea.
(g) In determining if the defendant is unable to assist in the defendant’s own defense, the court shall
consider, among other factors considered relevant by the court, whether the defendant’s mental
disease or defect affects the defendant’s ability to recall and relate facts pertaining to the defendant’s
actions at times relevant to the charges and whether the defendant can respond coherently to
counsel’s questions. A defendant is able to assist in the defense even though the defendant’s memory
may be impaired, the defendant refuses to accept a course of action that counsel or the court believes
is in the defendant’s best interest, or the defendant is unable to suggest a particular strategy or to
choose among alternative defenses.
(h) In a hearing to determine competency under this section, the court may, at the court’s discretion,
allow a witness, including the qualified and neutral evaluator who examined the defendant, to
testify concerning the competency of the defendant by contemporaneous two-way video conference if
the witness is in a place from which people customarily travel by air to the court, and the procedure
allows the parties a fair opportunity to examine the witness. The video conference technician shall be
the only person in the presence of the witness unless the court, at the court’s discretion, determines
that another person may be present. Any person present with the witness must be identified on the
record. In this subsection, “contemporaneous two-way video conference”
(1) means a conference among people at different places by means of transmitted audio and video
signals;
(2) includes all communication technologies that allow people at two or more places to interact by
two-way video and audio transmissions simultaneously.
(i) Upon a request by the court, the Department of Health and Social Services, or its designee, shall
designate a qualified and neutral evaluator as required under these statutes.
(j) The use of telebehavioral health is permitted under this statute. Examinations performed using
telebehavioral health must meet the other requirements for examinations as provided by this
statute.
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.110
Commitment on Finding of Incompetency
(a) When the trial court determines by a preponderance of the evidence, in accordance with AS §
12.47.100, that a defendant is so incompetent that the defendant is unable to understand the
proceedings against the defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own defense, the court shall order
the proceedings stayed, except as provided in (d) of this section, and shall commit a defendant
charged with a felony, and may commit a defendant charged with any other crime, to the custody of
the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s authorized representative for
further evaluation and treatment until the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, or until
the pending charges against the defendant are disposed of according to law, but in no event longer
than 90 days.
(b) On or before the expiration of the initial 90-day period of commitment, the court shall conduct a
hearing to determine whether or not the defendant remains incompetent. If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant remains incompetent, the court may recommit the
defendant for a second period of 90 days. The court shall determine at the expiration of the second
90-day period whether the defendant has become competent. If, at the expiration of the second 90day period, the court determines that the defendant continues to be incompetent to stand trial, the
charges against the defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice, and continued commitment of
the defendant shall be governed by the provisions relating to civil commitments under AS §
47.30.700--47.30.915 unless the defendant is charged with a crime involving force against a person
and the court finds that the defendant presents a substantial danger of physical injury to other
persons and that there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within
a reasonable period of time, in which case the court may extend the period of commitment for an
additional six months. If the defendant remains incompetent at the expiration of the additional sixmonth period, the charges shall be dismissed without prejudice, and continued commitment
proceedings shall be governed by the provisions relating to civil commitment under AS § 47.30.700-47.30.915. If the defendant remains incompetent for five years after the charges have been dismissed
under this subsection, the defendant may not be charged again for an offense arising out of the facts
alleged in the original charges, except if the original charge is a class A felony or unclassified felony.
(c) The defendant is not responsible for the expenses of hospitalization or transportation incurred as
a result of the defendant’s commitment under this section. Liability for payment under AS §
47.30.910 does not apply to commitments under this section.
(d) A defendant receiving medication for either a physical or a mental condition may not be
prohibited from standing trial, if the medication either enables the defendant to understand the
proceedings and to properly assist in the defendant’s defense or does not disable the defendant from
understanding the proceedings and assisting in the defendant’s own defense.
(e) A defendant charged with a felony and found to be incompetent to proceed under this section is
rebuttably presumed to be mentally ill and to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others in
proceedings under AS § 47.30.700--47.30.915. In evaluating whether a defendant is likely to cause
serious harm, the court may consider as recent behavior the conduct with which the defendant was
originally charged.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.110
Commitment on Finding of Incompetency
(a) When the trial court determines by a preponderance of the evidence, in accordance with AS §
12.47.100, that a defendant is incompetent and unable to understand the proceedings against the
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defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own defense, the court shall order the proceedings stayed,
except as provided in (d) of this section. The court shall commit a defendant charged with a felony,
and may commit a defendant charged with any other crime, to the custody of the commissioner of
health and social services or the commissioner’s authorized representative for further evaluation and
treatment, including the use of medication when appropriate. This commitment may continue until
the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, or until the pending charges against the
defendant are disposed of according to law. This commitment shall not continue for a time period
that is longer than necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that the
defendant will regain competency, and in no event longer than the time period based on the
classification of offense listed in this section:
(1) For felonies that involve the use of force against a person, defendants shall be committed for a
time that is not longer than necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
the defendant will regain competency within 365 days, and not longer than an initial commitment
of 90 days. On or before the expiration of the initial 90-day period of commitment, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant remains incompetent. If the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant remains incompetent and that there is
a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within the next 270 days, the
court may recommit the defendant for a second period of 90 days. If, at the expiration of the second
90-day period, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant remains
incompetent, and that there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency
within the next 180 days, and that the defendant presents a substantial danger of physical injury
to other persons, the court may extend the period of commitment for an additional 180 days. If the
defendant remains incompetent at the expiration of the additional 180-day period, the charges
shall be dismissed without prejudice. If the defendant remains incompetent for five years after the
charges have been dismissed under this subsection, the defendant may not be charged again for an
offense arising out of the facts alleged in the original charges, except if the original charge is a
class A felony or unclassified felony.
(2) For felonies that do not involve the use of force against a person, defendants shall be
committed for a time that is not longer than necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that the defendant will regain competency within 180 days, and not longer than an
initial commitment of 90 days. On or before the expiration of the initial 90-day period of
commitment, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant remains
incompetent. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant remains
incompetent and that there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency
within the next 90 days, the court may recommit the defendant for a second period of 90 days. If
the defendant remains incompetent at the expiration of the additional 90-day period, the charges
shall be dismissed without prejudice. If the defendant remains incompetent for five years after the
charges have been dismissed under this subsection, the defendant may not be charged again for an
offense arising out of the facts alleged in the original charges, except if the original charge is a
class A felony or unclassified felony.
(3) For class A misdemeanors that carry a sentence of imprisonment of not more than one year,
defendants may be committed for a time that is not longer than necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within 60 days, and
not longer than an initial commitment of 30 days. On or before the expiration of the initial 30-day
period of commitment, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant
remains incompetent. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
remains incompetent and that there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain
competency within the next 30 days, the court may recommit the defendant for a second period of
30 days. If the defendant remains incompetent at the expiration of the second 30-day period, the
charges against the defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice.
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(4) For class B misdemeanors that carry a sentence of imprisonment of not more than 90 days,
defendants may be committed for a time that is not longer than necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within 30 days, and
not longer than 30 days of total commitment. On or before the expiration of the 30-day period of
commitment, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant remains
incompetent. If the defendant remains incompetent at the expiration of the 30-day period, the
charges against the defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice.
(b) If at any time during the commitment of any defendant under subsection (a) the qualified and
neutral evaluator determines that the defendant has regained competency, the evaluator shall notify
the court immediately, even if the time period permitted for commitment has not expired.
(c) The defendant is not responsible for the expenses of hospitalization or transportation incurred as
a result of the defendant’s commitment under this section. Liability for payment under AS §
47.30.910 does not apply to commitments under this section.
(d) A defendant receiving medication for either a physical or a mental condition may not be
prohibited from standing trial, if the medication either enables the defendant to understand the
proceedings and to properly assist in the defendant’s defense or does not disable the defendant from
understanding the proceedings and assisting in the defendant’s own defense.
(e) Before dismissing charges pursuant to subsection (a) against a defendant charged with a felony
or misdemeanor, the court shall provide a notice of intent to dismiss the charge to the Department of
Health and Social Services. Within 24 hours of receipt of that notice, the Department of Health and
Social Services or its designee shall, if indicated, initiate inpatient civil commitment proceedings
under AS § 47.30.700 or outpatient civil commitment proceedings under [---] or create a discharge
plan for the defendant. In evaluating whether a defendant meets the criteria for inpatient or
outpatient civil commitment, the court may consider as recent behavior the conduct with which the
defendant was originally charged.
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.120
§ 12.47.120. Determination of sanity after commitment
(a) When, in the medical judgment of the custodian of an accused person committed under AS §
12.47.110, the accused is considered to be mentally competent to stand trial, the committing court
shall hold a hearing, after due notice, as soon as conveniently possible. At the hearing, evidence as to
the mental condition of the accused may be submitted including reports by the custodian to whom
the accused was committed for care.
(b) If at the hearing the court determines that the accused is presently mentally competent to
understand the nature of the proceedings against the accused and to assist in the accused’s own
defense, appropriate criminal proceedings may be commenced against the accused.
(c) If at the hearing the court determines that the accused is still presently mentally incompetent,
the court shall recommit the accused in accordance with AS § 12.47.110.
(d) A finding by the court that the accused is mentally competent to stand trial in no way prejudices
the accused in a defense based on mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. This finding may
not be introduced in evidence on that issue or otherwise brought to the notice of the jury.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.120
Determination of Competence After Commitment
(a) When, in the medical judgment of the qualified and neutral evaluator, the accused is considered
to be mentally competent to stand trial, the committing court shall hold a hearing, after due notice,
as soon as conveniently possible. At the hearing, evidence as to the mental condition of the accused
may be submitted including reports by the custodian to whom the accused was committed for care.
(b) If at the hearing the court determines that the accused is presently mentally competent to
understand the nature of the proceedings against the accused and to assist in the accused’s own
defense, appropriate criminal proceedings may be commenced against the accused.
(c) If at the hearing the court determines that the accused is still presently mentally incompetent,
the court shall recommit the accused in accordance with AS § 12.47.110.
(d) A finding by the court that the accused is mentally competent to stand trial in no way prejudices
the accused in a defense based on mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. This finding may
not be introduced in evidence on that issue or otherwise brought to the notice of the jury.
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EXISTING AS § 12.47.130
Definitions
In this chapter,
(1) “affirmative defense” has the meaning given in AS § 11.81.900(b);
(2) “assist in the defendant’s own defense” means to consult with a lawyer while exercising a
reasonable degree of rational functioning;
(3) “culpable mental state” has the meaning given in AS § 11.81.900(b);
(4) “incompetent” means a defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against the
defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own defense;
(5) “mental disease or defect” means a disorder of thought or mood that substantially impairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life; “mental disease or defect” also includes intellectual and developmental disabilities that result
in significantly below average general intellectual functioning that impairs a person’s ability to
adapt to or cope with the ordinary demands of life;
(6) “understand the proceedings against the defendant” means that the defendant’s elementary
mental process is such that the defendant has a reasonably rational comprehension of the
proceedings.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 12.47.130
Definitions
In this chapter,
(1) “affirmative defense” has the meaning given in AS § 11.81.900(b);
(2) “assist in the defendant’s own defense” means to consult with a lawyer while exercising a
reasonable degree of rational functioning;
(3) “culpable mental state” has the meaning given in AS § 11.81.900(b);
(ADDED) “developmental disability” has the meaning given in AS § 47.30.915 and AS § 47.80.900;
(4) “incompetent” means a defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against the
defendant or to assist in the defendant’s own defense;
(ADDED) “intellectual disability” means a disability that is characterized by significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and
practical adaptive skills. The condition is manifested prior to age eighteen (18). In this definition,
“adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the
standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural
group, and community.
(5) “mental disease or defect” means a disorder of thought or mood that substantially impairs
judgment, behavior, or capacity to recognize reality; “mental disease or defect” also includes
intellectual and developmental disabilities that result in significantly below average general
intellectual functioning;
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(ADDED) “qualified and neutral evaluator”
(a) A qualified evaluator includes psychiatrists and psychologists. A qualified psychiatrist is a
person who is licensed by the State Medical Board to practice in this state or is employed by the
federal government, who has received additional training or certification in forensic psychiatry,
and who is board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the
subspecialty of forensic psychiatry. A qualified psychologist is a person who is licensed by the
state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners. Psychologists should have
forensic training and/or certification in performing competency evaluations, including continuing
education in forensic evaluations.
(b) A neutral evaluator is a qualified psychiatrist or qualified psychologist who is not otherwise
involved in the defendant’s clinical treatment, or any subsequent restorative treatment. If a
neutral evaluator later becomes involved in the individual’s clinical or restorative treatment, any
subsequent evaluation shall be conducted by an additional, neutral evaluator.
(c) The Division of Behavioral Health shall coordinate continuing education in forensic
evaluations that will be available to psychiatrists and psychologists located in the State of
Alaska.
(ADDED) “telebehavioral health” includes “the performance of forensic evaluations by secure
electronic transmission using electronic communication technology, including two-way, interactive,
simultaneous audio and video.”
(6) “understand the proceedings against the defendant” means that the defendant’s elementary
mental process is such that the defendant has a reasonably rational comprehension of the
proceedings.
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TITLE 47
EXISTING AS § 47.30.655
Purpose and Principles of Major Revision
The purpose of the 1981 major revision of Alaska civil commitment statutes (AS § 47.30.660 and
47.30.670 - 47.30.915) is to more adequately protect the legal rights of persons suffering from mental
illness. The legislature has attempted to balance the individual’s constitutional right to physical
liberty and the state’s interest in protecting society from persons who are dangerous to others and
protecting persons who are dangerous to themselves by providing due process safeguards at all
stages of commitment proceedings. In addition, the following principles of modern mental health
care have guided this revision:
(1) that persons be given every reasonable opportunity to accept voluntary treatment before
involvement with the judicial system;
(2) that persons be treated in the least restrictive alternative environment consistent with their
treatment needs;
(3) that treatment occur as promptly as possible and as close to the individual’s home as possible;
(4) that a system of mental health community facilities and supports be available;
(5) that patients be informed of their rights and be informed of and allowed to participate in their
treatment program as much as possible;
(6) that persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to others be committed only if there is a
reasonable expectation of improving their mental condition.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.655
Purpose and Principles of Major Revision
The purpose of the 1981 major revision of Alaska civil commitment statutes (AS §§ 47.30.660 and
47.30.670–47.30.915) is to more adequately protect the legal rights of persons suffering from mental
illness. The legislature has attempted to balance the individual’s constitutional right to physical
liberty and the state’s interest in protecting society from persons who are dangerous to others and
protecting persons who are dangerous to themselves by providing due process safeguards at all
stages of commitment proceedings. In addition, the following principles of modern mental health
care have guided this revision:
(1) that persons be given every reasonable opportunity to accept voluntary treatment before
involvement with the judicial system;
(2) that persons be treated in the least restrictive alternative environment consistent with their
treatment needs;
(3) that treatment occur as promptly as possible and as close to the individual’s home as possible;
(4) that a system of mental health community facilities and supports be available;
(5) that patients be informed of their rights and be informed of and allowed to participate in their
treatment program as much as possible;
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.690
Admission of minors under 18 years of age
(a) A minor under the age of 18 may be admitted for 30 days of evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment
at a designated treatment facility if the minor’s parent or guardian signs the admission papers and
if, in the opinion of the professional person in charge,
(1) the minor is gravely disabled or is suffering from mental illness and as a result is likely to
cause serious harm to the minor or others;
(2) there is no less restrictive alternative available for the minor’s treatment; and
(3) there is reason to believe that the minor’s mental condition could be improved by the course of
treatment or would deteriorate further if untreated.
(b) A guardian ad litem for a minor admitted under this section shall be appointed under AS
25.24.310 to monitor the best interests of the minor as soon as possible after the minor’s admission.
If the guardian ad litem finds that placement is not appropriate, the guardian ad litem may request
that an attorney be appointed under AS 25.24.310 to represent the minor. The attorney may request
a hearing on behalf of the minor during the 30-day admittance.
(c) The minor may be released by the treatment facility at any time if the professional person in
charge or the minor’s designated mental health professional determines the minor would no longer
benefit from continued treatment and the minor is not dangerous. The minor’s parents or guardian
must be notified by the facility of the contemplated release.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.690
Admission of minors under 18 years of age
(a) A minor under the age of 18 may be admitted for 30 days of evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment
at a designated treatment facility if the minor’s parent or guardian signs the admission papers and
if, in the opinion of the professional person in charge, the minor is mentally ill, and as a result, is
reasonably believed (1) to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others, or (2) to be gravely
disabled and that the minor’s condition could be improved by treatment; and there is no less
restrictive alternative available for the minor’s treatment.
(b) As soon as possible after the minor’s admission under this section, the court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem to monitor the best interests of the minor. If the guardian ad litem finds that
placement is not appropriate, the guardian ad litem may request that an attorney be appointed
under AS § 25.24.310 to represent the minor. The attorney may request a hearing on behalf of the
minor during the 30-day admittance.
(c) The minor may be released by the treatment facility at any time if the professional person in
charge or the minor’s designated mental health professional determines the minor (1) no longer
presents a likelihood of serious harm to self or others or (2) is no longer gravely disabled and the
minor’s condition could be improved by treatment. The minor’s parents or guardian must be notified
by the facility of the contemplated release.

91

EXISTING AS § 47.30.700
§ 47.30.700. Initial Involuntary Commitment Procedures
(a) Upon petition of any adult, a judge shall immediately conduct a screening investigation or direct
a local mental health professional employed by the department or by a local mental health program
that receives money from the department under AS 47.30.520 - 47.30.620 or another mental health
professional designated by the judge, to conduct a screening investigation of the person alleged to be
mentally ill and, as a result of that condition, alleged to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood
of serious harm to self or others. Within 48 hours after the completion of the screening investigation,
a judge may issue an ex parte order orally or in writing, stating that there is probable cause to
believe the respondent is mentally ill and that condition causes the respondent to be gravely disabled
or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others. The court shall provide findings on which
the conclusion is based, appoint an attorney to represent the respondent, and may direct that a peace
officer take the respondent into custody and deliver the respondent to the nearest appropriate
facility for emergency examination or treatment. The ex parte order shall be provided to the
respondent and made a part of the respondent’s clinical record. The court shall confirm an oral order
in writing within 24 hours after it is issued.
(b) The petition required in (a) of this section must allege that the respondent is reasonably believed
to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others or is gravely disabled as a result of mental
illness and must specify the factual information on which that belief is based including the names
and addresses of all persons known to the petitioner who have knowledge of those facts through
personal observation.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.700
Petition for Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour Period
(a) Any adult may petition the court for the hospitalization and evaluation and of an individual. The
petition must allege that the individual is mentally ill, and as a result, is reasonably believed (1) to
present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others, or (2) to be gravely disabled and that the
individual’s condition could be improved by treatment. The petition must specify the factual
information on which that belief is based, including the names and addresses of all persons known to
the petitioner who have knowledge of those facts through personal observation.
(b) Upon receipt of a petition, a judge may (1) issue a ruling based upon the allegations in the
petition; (2) hold an ex parte hearing on the petition; or (3) order a mental health professional to
conduct a screening investigation of the allegations contained in the petition. The judge shall rule
upon the petition within 24 hours of filing, or if a screening investigation is ordered, within 48 hours
of filing.
(c) A judge may grant an ex parte order for the hospitalization and evaluation of the
respondent for a period not to exceed 72 hours upon finding that there is probable cause to
believe the respondent is mentally ill and that condition causes the respondent (1) to present a
likelihood of serious harm to self or others, or (2) to be gravely disabled and that the respondent’s
condition could be improved with treatment. The court shall provide written findings on which the
conclusion is based.
(d) If the judge grants an ex parte order for the involuntary hospitalization and evaluation of a
respondent who is not already in custody or otherwise detained, the court may direct that a peace
officer take the respondent into custody and deliver the respondent to the nearest appropriate
evaluation facility. If the judge grants an ex parte order for the involuntary hospitalization and
evaluation of a respondent who is in custody or otherwise detained, but is not already at an
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evaluation facility, the court shall direct that the Department of Health and Social Services or its
designee deliver the respondent to the nearest appropriate evaluation facility for hospitalization and
evaluation.
(e) When granting an ex parte order for involuntary hospitalization and evaluation, the judge shall
appoint an attorney to represent the respondent and shall direct that the respondent be given
written copies of all orders together with a notice of the rights contained in AS § 47.30.725.
(f) If, within 72 hours after the issuance of the ex parte order under this section, the respondent is
not taken into custody and transferred to an evaluation facility for hospitalization and evaluation,
the ex parte order shall expire. Nothing in this subsection prevents the petition for and issuance of
an additional ex parte order for the individual’s hospitalization and evaluation under AS § 47.30.700.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.705
§ 47.30.705. Emergency detention for evaluation
(a) A peace officer, a psychiatrist or physician who is licensed to practice in this state or employed by
the federal government, or a clinical psychologist licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and
Psychological Associate Examiners who has probable cause to believe that a person is gravely
disabled or is suffering from mental illness and is likely to cause serious harm to self or others of
such immediate nature that considerations of safety do not allow initiation of involuntary
commitment procedures set out in AS § 47.30.700, may cause the person to be taken into custody and
delivered to the nearest evaluation facility. A person taken into custody for emergency evaluation
may not be placed in a jail or other correctional facility except for protective custody purposes and
only while awaiting transportation to a treatment facility. However, emergency protective custody
under this section may not include placement of a minor in a jail or secure facility. The peace officer
or mental health professional shall complete an application for examination of the person in custody
and be interviewed by a mental health professional at the facility.
(b) In this section, “minor” means an individual who is under 18 years of age.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.705
Emergency Protective Custody
(a) A person who presents an immediate risk of serious harm to self or others such that
considerations of safety do not provide time to obtain an ex parte involuntary hospitalization order
under AS § 47.30.700 may be placed in emergency protective custody.
(b) A person may only be placed in emergency protective custody by a peace officer, a psychiatrist or
physician who is licensed to practice in this state or employed by the federal government, or a
clinical psychologist licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate
Examiners.
(c) To place a person in emergency protective custody, there must be probable cause to believe that
the detained person is mentally ill and, as a result of the mental illness is gravely disabled or is
likely to cause serious injury to self or others if the person is not immediately detained.
(d) When a person is taken into emergency protective custody, the facility detaining the person shall
immediately notify the Department of Health and Social Service or its designee, which shall be the
custodial agent for the detained person. Within 24 hours of detention under this section, the
Department of Health and Social Services or its designee shall file a petition for hospitalization and
evaluation under AS § 47.30.700, or release the detained person.
(e) When a person is taken into emergency protective custody, the detained person must
immediately be delivered to the nearest facility where the person can be examined by a mental
health professional who will determine whether a petition for hospitalization and evaluation under
AS § 47.30.700 is appropriate.
(f) Once a petition is filed, the person may be detained until the petition is adjudicated. If the
petition is denied, the person shall immediately be released. If the petition is granted, the provisions
of AS § 47.30.700(d) through (f) shall apply.
(g) A person taken into emergency protective custody may not be placed in a jail or other
correctional facility except for protective custody purposes and only while awaiting transportation to
the evaluation facility ordered by the court.
(h) In no event may a minor in emergency protective custody under this section be placed in a jail or
correctional facility. In this section, “minor” means an individual who is under 18 years of age.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.710
§ 47.30.710. Examination; hospitalization
(a) A respondent who is delivered under AS § 47.30.700-47.30.705 to an evaluation facility for
emergency examination and treatment shall be examined and evaluated as to mental and physical
condition by a mental health professional and by a physician within 24 hours after arrival at the
facility.
(b) If the mental health professional who performs the emergency examination has reason to believe
that the respondent is (1) mentally ill and that condition causes the respondent to be gravely
disabled or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others, and (2) is in need of care or
treatment, the mental health professional may hospitalize the respondent, or arrange for
hospitalization, on an emergency basis. If a judicial order has not been obtained under AS §
47.30.700, the mental health professional shall apply for an ex parte order authorizing
hospitalization for evaluation.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.710
Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour period
(a) When an ex parte order for hospitalization and evaluation is issued pursuant to AS § 47.30.700,
the respondent shall be delivered to an evaluation facility or designated treatment facility ordered by
the court and the facility shall promptly notify the court of the date and time of the respondent’s
arrival. Evaluation personnel, when used pursuant to AS § 47.30.915(8), shall similarly notify the
court of the date and time when they first met with the respondent.
(b) A respondent who is delivered under AS § 47.30.700 to an evaluation facility or designated
treatment facility shall receive a physical examination by a physician no later than 24 hours
after arrival at the facility.
(c) A respondent who is delivered under AS § 47.30.700 to an evaluation facility or designated
treatment facility shall be evaluated by a mental health professional for the purpose of
determining whether the respondent meets the criteria for a 30-day commitment under AS §
47.30.730 and whether it is necessary and appropriate to file a petition for 30-day commitment
under AS § 47.30.730. An evaluation by a mental health professional under this section must occur
no later than 24 hours after the respondent arrives at the facility.
(d) The respondent may be held at the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility for further
evaluation as long as the respondent appears to meet the criteria for civil commitment under AS §
47.30.700(a), but in no event may the period of hospitalization and evaluation exceed 72 hours
following the respondent’s arrival at the facility, or upon meeting with evaluation personnel, when
used. If the respondent agrees to voluntarily remain at the facility, the court shall immediately be
notified and the ex parte order shall be dismissed.
(e) If at any time in the course of the 72-hour period the mental health professionals conducting the
evaluation determine that the respondent does not meet the criteria for civil commitment specified in
AS § 47.30.700(a), the respondent shall be discharged from the facility or the place of evaluation by
evaluation personnel and a notice of release shall be filed with the court and the ex parte order shall
be dismissed.
(f) The respondent has the right to refuse medication or other forms of treatment during the 72hour period except as provided by AS § 47.30.725(e).
(g) If the respondent is already in custody or otherwise detained under AS § 47.30.705, the total
period of detention for hospitalization and evaluation under this section shall not exceed five days
(120 total hours) after the issuance of the ex parte order under AS § 47.30.700. If the respondent is
not already in custody or otherwise detained, the total period of detention for hospitalization and
evaluation under this section shall not exceed five days (120 total hours) after the execution of the ex
parte order under AS § 47.30.700.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.715
§ 47.30.715. Procedure after order
When a facility receives a proper order for evaluation, it shall accept the order and the respondent
for an evaluation period not to exceed 72 hours. The facility shall promptly notify the court of the
date and time of the respondent’s arrival. The court shall set a date, time, and place for a 30-day
commitment hearing, to be held if needed within 72 hours after the respondent’s arrival, and the
court shall notify the facility, the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the prosecuting
attorney of the hearing arrangements. Evaluation personnel, when used, shall similarly notify the
court of the date and time when they first met with the respondent.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.715
Procedure after Notice of Hospitalization and Evaluation for 72-hour Period
(a) When the court receives notice that a respondent has been delivered to an evaluation facility or
designated treatment facility for hospitalization and evaluation under AS § 47.30.710, the court shall
set a date, time, and place for a 30-day commitment hearing to be held, if needed, within 72 hours
after the respondent’s arrival at the facility or within 72 hours after the respondent meets with
evaluation personnel, when used pursuant to AS § 47.30.915(8).
(b) The court shall notify the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility, the respondent, the
respondent’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney of the hearing arrangements.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.720
Release Before Expiration of 72-Hour Period
If at any time in the course of the 72-hour period the mental health professionals conducting the
evaluation determine that the respondent does not meet the standards for commitment specified in
AS § 47.30.700, the respondent shall be discharged from the facility or the place of evaluation by
evaluation personnel and the petitioner and the court so notified.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.720
Release Before Expiration of 72-Hour Period
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.725
Rights; notification
(a) When a respondent is detained for evaluation under AS § 47.30.660 - 47.30.915, the respondent
shall be immediately notified orally and in writing of the rights under this section. Notification must
be in a language understood by the respondent. The respondent’s guardian, if any, and if the
respondent requests, an adult designated by the respondent, shall also be notified of the respondent’s
rights under this section.
(b) Unless a respondent is released or voluntarily admitted for treatment within 72 hours of arrival
at the facility or, if the respondent is evaluated by evaluation personnel, within 72 hours from the
beginning of the respondent’s meeting with evaluation personnel, the respondent is entitled to a
court hearing to be set for not later than the end of that 72-hour period to determine whether there
is cause for detention after the 72 hours have expired for up to an additional 30 days on the grounds
that the respondent is mentally ill, and as a result presents a likelihood of serious harm to the
respondent or others, or is gravely disabled. The facility or evaluation personnel shall give notice to
the court of the releases and voluntary admissions under AS § 47.30.700 - 47.30.815.
(c) The respondent has a right to communicate immediately, at the department’s expense, with the
respondent’s guardian, if any, or an adult designated by the respondent and the attorney designated
in the ex parte order, or an attorney of the respondent’s choice.
(d) The respondent has the right to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence, and to crossexamine witnesses who testify against the respondent at the hearing.
(e) The respondent has the right to be free of the effects of medication and other forms of treatment
to the maximum extent possible before the 30-day commitment hearing; however, the facility or
evaluation personnel may treat the respondent with medication under prescription by a licensed
physician or by a less restrictive alternative of the respondent’s preference if, in the opinion of a
licensed physician in the case of medication, or of a mental health professional in the case of
alternative treatment, the treatment is necessary to
(1) prevent bodily harm to the respondent or others;
(2) prevent such deterioration of the respondent’s mental condition that subsequent treatment
might not enable the respondent to recover; or
(3) allow the respondent to prepare for and participate in the proceedings.
(f) A respondent, if represented by counsel, may waive, orally or in writing, the 72-hour time limit
on the 30-day commitment hearing and have the hearing set for a date no more than seven calendar
days after arrival at the facility. The respondent’s counsel shall immediately notify the court of the
waiver.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.725
Rights and Notification Under this Title
(a) When a respondent is detained for evaluation under AS §§ 47.30.660–47.30.915, the respondent
shall be immediately notified orally and in writing of the rights under this section. Notification must
be in a language understood by the respondent. The respondent’s guardian, if any, and if the
respondent requests, an adult designated by the respondent, shall also be notified of the respondent’s
rights under this section.
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(b) If a respondent arrives at an evaluation facility or designated treatment facility pursuant to an
ex parte order under AS § 47.30.700 and is then voluntarily admitted under AS § 47.30.803, the
designated treatment facility shall give notice to the court of such admission.
(c) The respondent has a right to communicate immediately, at the department’s expense, with the
respondent’s guardian, if any, or an adult designated by the respondent and the attorney designated
in the ex parte order, or an attorney of the respondent’s choice.
(d) The respondent has the right to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence, and to crossexamine witnesses who testify against the respondent at the hearing.
(e) The respondent has the right to be free of the effects of medication and other forms of treatment
to the maximum extent possible before the 30-day commitment hearing; however, the evaluation
facility, designated treatment facility, or evaluation personnel may treat the respondent with
medication under prescription by a licensed physician or by a less restrictive alternative of the
respondent’s preference if, in the opinion of a licensed physician in the case of medication, or of a
mental health professional in the case of alternative treatment, the treatment is necessary to:
(1) prevent bodily harm to the respondent or others;
(2) prevent such deterioration of the respondent’s mental condition that subsequent treatment
might not enable the respondent to recover; or
(3) allow the respondent to prepare for and participate in the proceedings.
(f) A respondent, if represented by counsel, may waive, orally or in writing, the 72-hour time limit
on the 30-day commitment hearing and have the hearing set for a date no more than seven calendar
days after arrival at the facility. The respondent’s counsel shall immediately notify the court of the
waiver.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.730
Petition for 30-day commitment
(a) In the course of the 72-hour evaluation period, a petition for commitment to a treatment facility
may be filed in court. The petition must be signed by two mental health professionals who have
examined the respondent, one of whom is a physician. The petition must
(1) allege that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or
others or is gravely disabled;
(2) allege that the evaluation staff has considered but has not found that there are any less
restrictive alternatives available that would adequately protect the respondent or others; or, if a
less restrictive involuntary form of treatment is sought, specify the treatment and the basis for
supporting it;
(3) allege with respect to a gravely disabled respondent that there is reason to believe that the
respondent’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought;
(4) allege that a specified treatment facility or less restrictive alternative that is appropriate to the
respondent’s condition has agreed to accept the respondent;
(5) allege that the respondent has been advised of the need for, but has not accepted, voluntary
treatment, and request that the court commit the respondent to the specified treatment facility or
less restrictive alternative for a period not to exceed 30 days;
(6) list the prospective witnesses who will testify in support of commitment or involuntary
treatment; and
(7) list the facts and specific behavior of the respondent supporting the allegation in (1) of this
subsection.
(b) A copy of the petition shall be served on the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the
respondent’s guardian, if any, before the 30-day commitment hearing.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.730
Petition for 30-day Inpatient Commitment
(a) In the course of the 72-hour hospitalization and evaluation period, a petition for commitment to a
designated treatment facility may be filed in court. The petition must be signed by a qualified
evaluator. The petition must:
(1) allege that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result (a) is likely to cause serious harm to
self or others, or (b) is gravely disabled and the respondent’s condition could be improved by the
course of treatment sought;
(2) allege that the qualified evaluator has considered but has not found that outpatient
commitment or another less restrictive alternative would adequately protect the respondent or
others; or, if outpatient commitment or another less restrictive involuntary form of treatment is
sought, specify the basis for supporting it;
(3) allege that a designated treatment facility or less restrictive alternative that is appropriate to
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the respondent’s condition has agreed to accept the respondent;
(4) allege that the respondent has been advised of the need for, but has not accepted, voluntary
treatment, and request that the court commit the respondent to the designated treatment facility
or less restrictive alternative for a period not to exceed 30 days;
(5) list the prospective witnesses who will testify in support of commitment or involuntary
treatment; and
(6) list the facts and specific behavior of the respondent supporting the allegation in (1) of this
subsection.
(b) A copy of the petition shall be served on the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the
respondent’s guardian, if any, before the 30-day commitment hearing.
(c) Upon a request by the court, the Department of Health and Social Services or its designee shall
designate a qualified evaluator.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.735
30-day commitment; hearing
(a) Upon receipt of a proper petition for commitment, the court shall hold a hearing at the date and
time previously specified according to procedures set out in AS § 47.30.715.
(b) The hearing shall be conducted in a physical setting least likely to have a harmful effect on the
mental or physical health of the respondent, within practical limits. At the hearing, in addition to
other rights specified in AS § 47.30.660 - 47.30.915, the respondent has the right
(1) to be present at the hearing; this right may be waived only with the respondent’s informed
consent; if the respondent is incapable of giving informed consent, the respondent may be excluded
from the hearing only if the court, after hearing, finds that the incapacity exists and that there is a
substantial likelihood that the respondent’s presence at the hearing would be severely injurious to
the respondent’s mental or physical health;
(2) to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file of the respondent’s case;
(3) to have the hearing open or closed to the public as the respondent elects;
(4) to have the rules of evidence and civil procedure applied so as to provide for the informal but
efficient presentation of evidence;
(5) to have an interpreter if the respondent does not understand English;
(6) to present evidence on the respondent’s behalf;
(7) to cross-examine witnesses who testify against the respondent;
(8) to remain silent;
(9) to call experts and other witnesses to testify on the respondent’s behalf.
(c) At the conclusion of the hearing the court may commit the respondent to a treatment facility for
not more than 30 days if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally
ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to the respondent or others or is gravely disabled.
(d) If the court finds that there is a viable less restrictive alternative available and that the
respondent has been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court
may order the less restrictive alternative treatment for not more than 30 days if the program accepts
the respondent.
(e) The court shall specifically state to the respondent, and give the respondent written notice, that
if commitment or other involuntary treatment beyond the 30 days is to be sought, the respondent
has the right to a full hearing or jury trial.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.735
30-day Inpatient Commitment Hearing
(a) Upon receipt of a proper petition for inpatient commitment, the court shall hold a hearing at the
date and time previously specified according to procedures set out in AS § 47.30.715.
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(b) The hearing shall be conducted in a physical setting least likely to have a harmful effect on the
mental or physical health of the respondent, within practical limits. At the hearing, in addition to
other rights specified in AS §§ 47.30.660–47.30.915, the respondent has the right
(1) to be present at the hearing; this right may be waived only with the respondent’s informed
consent; if the respondent is incapable of giving informed consent, the respondent may be excluded
from the hearing only if the court, after hearing, finds that the incapacity exists and that there is a
substantial likelihood that the respondent’s presence at the hearing would be severely injurious to
the respondent’s mental or physical health;
(2) to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file of the respondent’s case;
(3) to have the hearing open or closed to the public as the respondent elects;
(4) to have the rules of evidence and civil procedure applied so as to provide for the informal but
efficient presentation of evidence;
(5) to have an interpreter if the respondent does not understand English;
(6) to present evidence on the respondent’s behalf;
(7) to cross-examine witnesses who testify against the respondent;
(8) to remain silent;
(9) to call experts and other witnesses to testify on the respondent’s behalf.
(c) At the conclusion of the hearing the court may commit the respondent to a designated treatment
facility for not more than 30 days if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent is
mentally ill and as a result (a) is likely to cause serious harm to the respondent or others, or (b) is
gravely disabled and the respondent’s condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought.
(d) If the court finds that there is a viable less restrictive alternative available and that the
respondent has been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court
may order the less restrictive alternative treatment for not more than 30 days if the program accepts
the respondent.
(ADDED) If the court finds that the respondent meets the criteria for involuntary outpatient
commitment, the court may order that commitment under AS § 47.30.[---].
(e) The court shall specifically state to the respondent, and give the respondent written notice, that
if commitment or other involuntary treatment beyond the 30 days is to be sought, the respondent
has the right to a full hearing or jury trial.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.740
Procedure for 90-day commitment following 30-day commitment
(a) At any time during the respondent’s 30-day commitment, the professional person in charge, or
that person’s professional designee, may file with the court a petition for a 90-day commitment of
that respondent. The petition must include all material required under AS § 47.30.730(a) except that
references to “30 days” shall be read as “90 days”; and
(1) allege that the respondent has attempted to inflict or has inflicted serious bodily harm upon
the respondent or another since the respondent’s acceptance for evaluation, or that the respondent
was committed initially as a result of conduct in which the respondent attempted or inflicted
serious bodily harm upon the respondent or another, or that the respondent continues to be
gravely disabled, or that the respondent demonstrates a current intent to carry out plans of serious
harm to the respondent or another;
(2) allege that the respondent has received appropriate and adequate care and treatment during
the respondent’s 30-day commitment;
(3) be verified by the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, during
the 30-day commitment.
(b) The court shall have copies of the petition for 90-day commitment served upon the respondent,
the respondent’s attorney, and the respondent’s guardian, if any. The petition for 90-day
commitment and proofs of service shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and a date for hearing
shall be set, by the end of the next judicial day, for not later than five judicial days from the date of
filing of the petition. The clerk shall notify the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the
petitioner of the hearing date at least three judicial days in advance of the hearing.
(c) Findings of fact relating to the respondent’s behavior made at a 30-day commitment hearing
under AS § 47.30.735 shall be admitted as evidence and may not be rebutted except that newly
discovered evidence may be used for the purpose of rebutting the findings.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.740
Procedure for 90-day Inpatient Commitment Petition Following 30-day Inpatient
Commitment
(a) At any time during the respondent’s 30-day inpatient commitment, the professional person in
charge, or that person’s professional designee, may request that a qualified evaluator file with the
court a petition for a 90-day inpatient commitment of that respondent. The 90-day petition must
include all material required under AS § 47.30.730(a) except that references to “30 days” shall be
read as “90 days”; and
(1) allege that the respondent has attempted to inflict or has inflicted serious bodily harm upon
the respondent or another since the respondent’s acceptance for evaluation, or that the respondent
was committed initially as a result of conduct in which the respondent attempted or inflicted
serious bodily harm upon the respondent or another, or that the respondent continues to be
gravely disabled, or that the respondent demonstrates a current intent to carry out plans of
serious harm to the respondent or another;
(2) allege that the respondent has received appropriate and adequate care and treatment during
the respondent’s 30-day commitment;
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(3) be verified by the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, during
the 30-day commitment.
(b) The court shall have copies of the 90-day commitment petition served upon the respondent, the
respondent’s attorney, and the respondent’s guardian, if any. The 90-day commitment petition and
proofs of service shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and a date for hearing shall be set, by the
end of the next judicial day, for not later than five judicial days from the date of filing of the petition.
The clerk shall notify the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the petitioner of the hearing
date at least three judicial days in advance of the hearing.
(c) Findings of fact relating to the respondent’s behavior made at a 30-day commitment hearing
under AS § 47.30.735 shall be admitted as evidence and may not be rebutted except that newly
discovered evidence may be used for the purpose of rebutting the findings.
(d) Upon a request by the court, the Department of Health and Social Services or its designee shall
designate a qualified evaluator.

105

EXISTING AS § 47.30.745
§ 47.30.745. 90-day commitment hearing rights; continued commitment
(a) A respondent subject to a petition for 90-day commitment has, in addition to the rights specified
elsewhere in this chapter, or otherwise applicable, the rights enumerated in this section. Written
notice of these rights shall be served on the respondent and the respondent’s attorney and guardian,
if any, and may be served on an adult designated by the respondent at the time the petition for 90day commitment is served. An attempt shall be made by oral explanation to ensure that the
respondent understands the rights enumerated in the notice. If the respondent does not understand
English, the explanation shall be given in a language the respondent understands.
(b) Unless the respondent is released or is admitted voluntarily following the filing of a petition and
before the hearing, the respondent is entitled to a judicial hearing within five judicial days of the
filing of the petition as set out in AS § 47.30.740(b) to determine if the respondent is mentally ill and
as a result is likely to cause harm to self or others, or if the respondent is gravely disabled. If the
respondent is admitted voluntarily following the filing of the petition, the voluntary admission
constitutes a waiver of any hearing rights under AS § 47.30.740 or under AS § 47.30.685. If at any
time during the respondent’s voluntary admission under this subsection, the respondent submits to
the facility a written request to leave, the professional person in charge may file with the court a
petition for a 180-day commitment of the respondent under AS § 47.30.770. The 180-day
commitment hearing shall be scheduled for a date not later than 90 days after the respondent’s
voluntary admission.
(c) The respondent is entitled to a jury trial upon request filed with the court if the request is made
at least two judicial days before the hearing. If the respondent requests a jury trial, the hearing may
be continued for no more than 10 calendar days. The jury shall consist of six persons.
(d) If a jury trial is not requested, the court may still continue the hearing at the respondent’s
request for no more than 10 calendar days.
(e) The respondent has a right to retain an independent licensed physician or other mental health
professional to examine the respondent and to testify on the respondent’s behalf. Upon request by an
indigent respondent, the court shall appoint an independent licensed physician or other mental
health professional to examine the respondent and testify on the respondent’s behalf. The court shall
consider an indigent respondent’s request for a specific physician or mental health professional. A
motion for the appointment may be filed in court at any reasonable time before the hearing and shall
be acted upon promptly. Reasonable fees and expenses for expert examiners shall be determined by
the rules of court.
(f) The proceeding shall in all respects be in accord with constitutional guarantees of due process
and, except as otherwise specifically provided in AS § 47.30.700 - 47.30.915, the rules of evidence and
procedure in civil proceedings.
(g) Until the court issues a final decision, the respondent shall continue to be treated at the
treatment facility unless the petition for 90-day commitment is withdrawn. If a decision has not been
made within 20 days of filing of the petition, not including extensions of time due to jury trial or
other requests by the respondent, the respondent shall be released.
___________________________

106

REVISED AS § 47.30.745
90-day Commitment Hearing Rights; Continued Commitment
(a) A respondent subject to a 90-day commitment petition has, in addition to the rights specified
elsewhere in this chapter, or otherwise applicable, the rights enumerated in this section. Written
notice of these rights shall be served on the respondent and the respondent’s attorney and guardian,
if any, and may be served on an adult designated by the respondent at the time the 90-day
commitment petition is served. An attempt shall be made by oral explanation to ensure that the
respondent understands the rights enumerated in the notice. If the respondent does not understand
English, the explanation shall be given in a language the respondent understands.
(b) Unless the respondent is released or is admitted voluntarily following the filing of a 90-day
petition and before the hearing, the respondent is entitled to a judicial hearing within five judicial
days of the filing of the 90-day petition as set out in AS § 47.30.740(b) to determine if the respondent
is mentally ill and as a result (1) is likely to cause serious harm to the respondent or others, or (2) is
gravely disabled and the respondent’s condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought.
If the respondent is admitted voluntarily following the filing of the 90-day petition, the voluntary
admission constitutes a waiver of any hearing rights under AS § 47.30.740 or under AS § 47.30.685.
If at any time during the respondent’s voluntary admission under this subsection, the respondent
submits to the facility a written request to leave, the professional person in charge may request that
the qualified evaluator file with the court a petition for a 180-day commitment of the respondent
under AS § 47.30.770. The 180-day commitment hearing shall be scheduled for a date not later than
90 days after the respondent’s voluntary admission.
(c) The respondent is entitled to a jury trial upon request filed with the court if the request is made
at least two judicial days before the hearing. If the respondent requests a jury trial, the hearing may
be continued for no more than 10 calendar days. The jury shall consist of six persons.
(d) If a jury trial is not requested, the court may still continue the hearing at the respondent’s
request for no more than 10 calendar days.
(e) The respondent has a right to retain an additional qualified evaluator to examine the respondent
and to testify on the respondent’s behalf. A motion by the respondent for the appointment of an
additional qualified evaluator, at respondent’s cost, may be filed in court at any reasonable time
before the hearing and shall be acted upon promptly.
(f) The proceeding shall in all respects be in accord with constitutional guarantees of due process
and, except as otherwise specifically provided in AS §§ 47.30.700–47.30.915, the rules of evidence
and procedure in civil proceedings.
(g) Until the court issues a final decision, the respondent shall continue to be treated at the
designated treatment facility unless the 90-day commitment petition is withdrawn. If a decision has
not been made within 20 days of filing of the petition, not including extensions of time due to jury
trial or other requests by the respondent, the respondent shall be released.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.750
Conduct of hearing
The hearing under AS § 47.30.745 shall be conducted in the same manner, and with the same rights
for the respondent, as set out in AS § 47.30.735(b).
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.750
90-day Inpatient Commitment Hearing
The hearing under AS § 47.30.745 shall be conducted in the same manner, and with the same rights
for the respondent, as set out in AS § 47.30.735(b).
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.755
Court order
(a) After the hearing and within the time limit specified in AS § 47.30.745, the court may commit
the respondent to a treatment facility for no more than 90 days if the court or jury finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to self
or others, or is gravely disabled.
(b) If the court finds that there is a less restrictive alternative available and that the respondent has
been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court may order the
less restrictive alternative treatment after acceptance by the program of the respondent for a period
not to exceed 90 days.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.755
Court Order Following 90-day Inpatient Commitment Hearing
(a) After the hearing and within the time limit specified in AS § 47.30.745, the court may commit
the respondent to a designated treatment facility for no more than 90 days if the court or jury finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result (1) is likely to
cause serious harm to the respondent or others, or (2) is gravely disabled and the respondent’s
condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought.
(b) If the court finds that there is a less restrictive alternative available and that the respondent has
been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court may order the
less restrictive alternative treatment after acceptance by the program of the respondent for a period
not to exceed 90 days.
(c) If the court finds that the respondent meets the criteria for outpatient commitment under
Section [---], the court may order outpatient commitment.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.760
Placement at Closest Facility
Treatment shall always be available at a state-operated hospital; however, if space is available and
upon acceptance by another treatment facility, a respondent who is committed by the court shall be
placed by the department at the designated treatment facility closest to the respondent’s home
unless the court finds that
(1) another treatment facility in the state has a program more suited to the respondent’s
condition, and this interest outweighs the desirability of the respondent being closer to home;
(2) another treatment facility in the state is closer to the respondent’s friends or relatives who
could benefit the respondent through their visits and communications; or
(3) the respondent wants to be further removed from home, and the mental health professionals
who sought the respondent’s commitment concur in the desirability of removed placement.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.760
Placement at Closest Facility
Treatment shall always be available at a state-operated hospital; however, if space is available and
upon acceptance by another designated treatment facility, a respondent who is committed by the
court shall be placed by the department at the designated treatment facility closest to the
respondent’s home unless the court finds that:
(1) another designated treatment facility in the state has a program more suited to the
respondent’s condition, and this interest outweighs the desirability of the respondent being closer
to home;
(2) another designated treatment facility in the state is closer to the respondent’s friends or
relatives who could benefit the respondent through their visits and communications; or
(3) the respondent wants to be further removed from home, and the qualified evaluator who
testified in the respondent’s commitment hearing agrees with the desirability of removed
placement.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.765
Appeal
The respondent has the right to an appeal from an order of involuntary commitment. The court shall
inform the respondent of this right.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.765
Appeal
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.770
Additional 180-day Commitment
(a) The respondent shall be released from involuntary treatment at the expiration of 90 days unless
the professional person in charge files a petition for a 180-day commitment conforming to the
requirements of AS § 47.30.740(a) except that all references to “30-day commitment” shall be read as
“the previous 90-day commitment” and all references to “90-day commitment” shall be read as “180day commitment”.
(b) The procedures for service of the petition, notification of rights, and judicial hearing shall be as
set out in AS § 47.30.740 - 47.30.750. If the court or jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the grounds for 90-day commitment as set out in AS § 47.30.755 are present, the court may order the
respondent committed for an additional treatment period not to exceed 180 days from the date on
which the first 90-day treatment period would have expired.
(c) Successive 180-day commitments are permissible on the same ground and under the same
procedures as the original 180-day commitment. An order of commitment may not exceed 180 days.
(d) Findings of fact relating to the respondent’s behavior made at a 30-day commitment hearing
under AS § 47.30.735, a 90-day commitment hearing under AS § 47.30.750, or a previous 180-day
commitment hearing under this section shall be admitted as evidence and may not be rebutted
except that newly discovered evidence may be used for the purpose of rebutting the findings.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.770
Additional 180-day Commitment
(a) The respondent shall be released from involuntary commitment at the expiration of 90 days
unless the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, requests that a
qualified evaluator file a petition for a 180-day commitment conforming to the requirements of AS §
47.30.740(a) except that all references to “30-day commitment” shall be read as “the previous 90-day
commitment” and all references to “90-day commitment” shall be read as “180-day commitment.”
(b) The procedures for service of the petition, notification of rights, and judicial hearing shall be as
set out in AS §§ 47.30.740–47.30.750. If the court or jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the grounds for 90-day commitment as set out in AS § 47.30.755 are present, the court may order the
respondent committed for an additional treatment period not to exceed 180 days from the date on
which the first 90-day treatment period would have expired.
(c) Successive 180-day commitments are permissible on the same ground and under the same
procedures as the original 180-day commitment. An order of commitment may not exceed 180 days.
(d) Findings of fact relating to the respondent’s behavior made at a 30-day commitment hearing
under AS § 47.30.735, a 90-day commitment hearing under AS § 47.30.750, or a previous 180-day
commitment hearing under this section shall be admitted as evidence and may not be rebutted
except that newly discovered evidence may be used for the purpose of rebutting the findings.
(e) Upon a request by the court, the Department of Health and Social Services, or its designee, shall
designate a qualified evaluator.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.772
Medication and Treatment
An evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may administer medication or other treatment
to an involuntarily committed patient only in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of AS
47.30.817–47.30.865.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.772
Medication and Treatment
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.775
Commitment of Minors
The provisions of AS 47.30.700–47.30.815 apply to minors. However, all notices required to be served
on the respondent in AS 47.30.700–47.30.815 shall also be served on the parent or guardian of a
respondent who is a minor, and parents or guardians of a minor respondent shall be notified that
they may appear as parties in any commitment proceeding concerning the minor and that as parties
they are entitled to retain their own attorney or have the office of public advocacy appointed for them
by the court. A minor respondent has the same rights to waiver and informed consent as an adult
respondent under AS 47.30.660–47.30.915; however, the minor shall be represented by counsel in
waiver and consent proceedings.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.775
Commitment of Minors
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.780
Early discharge
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, the professional person in charge shall at any time
discharge a respondent on the ground that the respondent is no longer gravely disabled or likely to
cause serious harm as a result of mental illness. A certificate to this effect shall be sent to the court,
which shall enter an order officially terminating the involuntary commitment.
(b) The professional person in charge shall give the prosecuting authority 10 days’ notice before
discharging a respondent who was committed after having been found incompetent to proceed under
AS § 12.47.110.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.780
Early Discharge Following Involuntary Inpatient Commitment
The professional person in charge shall at any time discharge a respondent on the ground that the
respondent is no longer (1) likely to cause serious harm to the respondent or others, or (2) gravely
disabled and the respondent’s condition could be improved by the course of the treatment sought. A
certificate to this effect shall be sent to the court, which shall enter an order officially terminating
the involuntary inpatient commitment.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.785
Authorized Absences
A respondent undergoing involuntary treatment on an inpatient basis under AS § 47.30.700 47.30.815 may be authorized to be absent from the treatment facility during times specified by the
professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, when an authorization to be
absent is in the best interests of the respondent and the respondent
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.785
Authorized Absences
A respondent undergoing involuntary inpatient commitment under AS §§ 47.30.700–47.30.815 may
be authorized to be absent from the designated treatment facility during times specified by the
professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, when an authorization to be
absent is in the best interests of the respondent and the respondent is not likely to cause serious
harm to self or others.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.790
Unauthorized Absences: Return to Facility; Required Notice
When a respondent undergoing involuntary treatment on an inpatient basis is absent from the
treatment facility without, or in excess of, authorization under AS § 47.30.785, the professional
person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, may contact the appropriate peace officers
who shall take the respondent into custody and return the respondent to the treatment facility. If it
is determined by the professional person in charge to be necessary, a member of the treatment
facility staff shall accompany the peace officers when they take the respondent into custody. In
addition, the family or guardian of the patient and any person known to have been threatened by the
patient shall be notified of the patient’s unauthorized absence immediately upon its discovery.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.790
Unauthorized Absences: Return to Facility; Required Notice
When a respondent undergoing involuntary inpatient commitment is absent from the designated
treatment facility without, or in excess of, authorization under AS § 47.30.785, the professional
person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, may contact the appropriate peace officers
who shall take the respondent into custody and return the respondent to the designated treatment
facility. If it is determined by the professional person in charge to be necessary, a member of the
designated treatment facility staff shall accompany the peace officers when they take the respondent
into custody. In addition, the family or guardian of the patient and any person known to have been
threatened by the patient shall be notified of the patient’s unauthorized absence immediately upon
its discovery.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.795
Involuntary Outpatient Care for Committed Persons
(a) A respondent who was originally committed to involuntary inpatient care under AS 47.30.700–
47.30.915 may be released before the expiration of the commitment period if a provider of outpatient
care accepts the respondent for specified outpatient treatment for a period of time not to exceed the
duration of the commitment, and if the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional
designee, finds that
(1) it is not necessary to treat the respondent as an inpatient to prevent the respondent from
harming self or others; and
(2) there is reason to believe that the respondent’s mental condition would improve as a result of
the outpatient treatment.
(b) A copy of the conditions for early release shall be given to the respondent and the respondent’s
attorney and guardian, if any, the provider of outpatient care, and the court.
(c) If during the commitment period the provider of outpatient care determines that the respondent
can no longer be treated on an outpatient basis because the respondent is likely to cause harm to self
or others or is gravely disabled, the provider shall give the respondent oral and written notice that
the respondent must return to the treatment facility within 24 hours, with copies to the respondent’s
attorney and guardian, if any, the court, and the inpatient treatment facility. If the respondent fails
to arrive at the treatment facility within 24 hours after receiving the notice, the professional person
in charge may contact the appropriate peace officers who shall take the respondent into custody and
transport the respondent to the facility. If it is determined by the professional person in charge to be
necessary, a member of the treatment facility staff shall accompany the peace officers when they
take the respondent into custody.
(d) If the provider of outpatient care determines that the respondent will require continued
outpatient care after the expiration of the commitment period, the provider may initiate further
commitment proceedings as if the provider were the professional person in charge, and the
provisions of AS 47.30.660–47.30.915 apply, except that provisions relating to inpatient treatment
shall be read as applicable to outpatient treatment.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.795
Involuntary Outpatient Care for Committed Persons
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.800
Conversion of Involuntary Outpatient Treatment to Inpatient Commitment
(a) A respondent ordered by the court under the provisions of AS § 47.30.700 - 47.30.915 to receive
involuntary outpatient treatment may be required to undergo inpatient treatment when the provider
of outpatient care finds that (1) the respondent is mentally ill and is likely to cause serious harm to
self or others or is still gravely disabled; (2) the respondent’s behavior since the hearing resulting in
court-ordered treatment indicates that the respondent now needs inpatient treatment to protect self
or others; (3) there is reason to believe that the respondent’s mental condition will improve as a
result of inpatient treatment; and (4) there is an inpatient facility appropriate to the respondent’s
need that will accept the respondent as a patient. Treatment for these respondents shall be available
at state-operated hospitals at all times.
(b) Upon making the findings specified in (a) of this section, the provisions of AS § 47.30.795(c)
relating to notice and AS § 47.30.745 relating to hearings apply.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.800
Conversion of Involuntary Outpatient Treatment to Inpatient Commitment
(a) A respondent ordered by the court under the provisions of AS §§ 47.30.700–47.30.915 to receive
involuntary outpatient treatment may be required to undergo inpatient treatment when the provider
of outpatient care finds that (1) the respondent is mentally ill and is likely to cause serious harm to
self or others or is still gravely disabled; (2) the respondent’s behavior since the hearing resulting in
court-ordered treatment indicates that the respondent now needs inpatient treatment to prevent
serious harm to the respondent or others; (3) there is reason to believe that the respondent’s mental
condition will improve as a result of inpatient treatment; and (4) there is an inpatient facility
appropriate to the respondent’s need that will accept the respondent as a patient. Treatment for
these respondents shall be available at state-operated hospitals at all times.
(b) Upon making the findings specified in (a) of this section, the provisions of AS § 47.30.795(c)
relating to notice and AS § 47.30.745 relating to hearings apply.

119

EXISTING AS § 47.30.803
Conversion from Involuntary to Voluntary Status
A patient subject to involuntary hospitalization under AS 47.30.705, 47.30.735, or AS 47.30.755 may
at any time convert to voluntary status if the responsible physician agrees that
(1) the patient is an appropriate patient for voluntary hospitalization; and
(2) the conversion is made in good faith.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.803
Conversion from Involuntary to Voluntary Status
A patient subject to involuntary hospitalization under AS § 47.30.700, AS § 47.30.705, AS §
47.30.735, or AS § 47.30.755 may at any time convert to voluntary status if the responsible physician
agrees that
(1) the patient is an appropriate patient for voluntary hospitalization; and
(2) the conversion is made in good faith.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.805
Computation, Extension, and Expiration of Periods of Time
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section,
(1) computations of a 72-hour evaluation period under AS 47.30.715 or a 48-hour detention period
under AS 47.30.685 do not include Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, or any period of time
necessary to transport the respondent to the treatment facility;
(2) a 30-day commitment period expires at the end of the 30th day after the 72 hours following
initial acceptance;
(3) a 90-day commitment period expires at the end of the 90th day after the expiration of a 30-day
period of treatment;
(4) a 180-day commitment period expires at the end of the 180th day, after the expiration of a 90day period of treatment or previous 180-day period, whichever is applicable.
(b) When a respondent has failed to appear or been absent through the respondent’s own actions
contrary to any order properly made or entered under AS 47.30.660–47.30.915, the relevant
commitment period shall be extended for a period of time equal to the respondent’s absence if written
notice of absence is promptly provided to the respondent’s attorney and guardian, if there is one, and
if, within 24 hours after the respondent has returned to the evaluation or treatment facility, written
notice of the corresponding extension and the reason for it is given to the respondent and the
respondent’s attorney and guardian, if any, and to the court.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.805
Computation, Extension, and Expiration of Periods of Time
[NO CHANGES]
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.810
Habeas Corpus not Limited
Nothing in AS 47.30.660–47.30.915 may be construed as limiting a person’s right to a writ of habeas
corpus.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.810
Habeas Corpus not Limited
[NO CHANGES]

122

EXISTING AS § 47.30.815
Limitation of Liability; Bad Faith Application a Felony
(a) A person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information who makes
application for evaluation or treatment of another person under AS § 47.30.700 - 47.30.915 is not
subject to civil or criminal liability.
(b) The following persons may not be held civilly or criminally liable for detaining a person under AS
§ 47.30.700 - 47.30.915 or for releasing a person under AS § 47.30.700 - 47.30.915 at or before the
end of the period for which the person was admitted or committed for evaluation or treatment if the
persons have performed their duties in good faith and without gross negligence:
(1) an officer of a public or private agency;
(2) the superintendent, the professional person in charge, the professional designee of the
professional person in charge, and the attending staff of a public or private agency;
(3) a public official performing functions necessary to the administration of AS § 47.30.700 47.30.915;
(4) a peace officer or mental health professional responsible for detaining or transporting a person
under AS § 47.30.700 - 47.30.915.
(c) A person who willfully initiates an involuntary commitment procedure under AS § 47.30.700
without having good cause to believe that the other person is suffering from a mental illness and as a
result is gravely disabled or likely to cause serious harm to self or others, is guilty of a felony.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.815
Limitation of Liability; Bad Faith Application a Felony
(a) A person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information who makes
application for evaluation or treatment of another person under AS §§ 47.30.700–47.30.915 is not
subject to civil or criminal liability.
(b) The following persons may not be held civilly or criminally liable for detaining a person under AS
§§ 47.30.700–47.30.915 or for releasing a person under AS §§ 47.30.700–47.30.915 at or before the
end of the period for which the person was admitted or committed for evaluation or treatment if the
persons have performed their duties in good faith and without gross negligence:
(1) an officer of a public or private agency;
(2) the superintendent, the professional person in charge, the professional designee of the
professional person in charge, and the attending staff of a public or private agency;
(3) a public official performing functions necessary to the administration of AS §§ 47.30.700–
47.30.915;
(4) any individual responsible for detaining or transporting a person under AS §§ 47.30.700–
47.30.915.
(c) A person who willfully initiates an involuntary commitment procedure under AS § 47.30.700
without having good cause to believe that the other person is suffering from a mental illness and as a
result is likely to cause serious harm to self or others, or is gravely disabled, is guilty of a felony.
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EXISTING AS § 47.30.915
Definitions
In AS § 47.30.660 - 47.30.915,
(1) “adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence” means a court order finding that a person
is
(A) not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill under AS § 12.47.040;
(B) incompetent to stand trial for a criminal offense under AS § 12.47.100--12.47.120; or
(C) a danger to self or others, or is gravely disabled because of incapacity, incompetence, mental
illness, dementia, or some other cause;
(2) “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
(3) “court” means a superior court of the state;
(4) “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
(5) “designated treatment facility” or “treatment facility” means a hospital, clinic, institution, center,
or other health care facility that has been designated by the department for the treatment or
rehabilitation of mentally ill persons under AS § 47.30.670--47.30.915 but does not include
correctional institutions;
(6) “disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or
mental incompetence” means the prohibition against the possession of a firearm or ammunition
under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) that results from an involuntary commitment or adjudication of mental
illness or mental incompetence.
(7) “evaluation facility” means a health care facility that has been designated or is operated by the
department to perform the evaluations described in AS § 47.30.660--47.30.915, or a medical facility
licensed under AS § 47.32 or operated by the federal government;
(8) “evaluation personnel” means mental health professionals designated by the department to
conduct evaluations as prescribed in AS § 47.30.660 - 47.30.915 who conduct evaluations in places in
which no staffed evaluation facility exists;
(9) “gravely disabled” means a condition in which a person as a result of mental illness
(A) is in danger of physical harm arising from such complete neglect of basic needs for food,
clothing, shelter, or personal safety as to render serious accident, illness, or death highly
probable if care by another is not taken; or
(B) will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or
physical distress, and this distress is associated with significant impairment of judgment,
reason, or behavior causing a substantial deterioration of the person’s previous ability to
function independently;
(10) “inpatient treatment” means care and treatment rendered inside or on the premises of a
treatment facility, or a part or unit of a treatment facility, for a continual period of 24 hours or
longer;
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(11) “least restrictive alternative” means mental health treatment facilities and conditions of
treatment that
(A) are no more harsh, hazardous, or intrusive than necessary to achieve the treatment
objectives of the patient; and
(B) involve no restrictions on physical movement nor supervised residence or inpatient care
except as reasonably necessary for the administration of treatment or the protection of the
patient or others from physical injury;
(12) “likely to cause serious harm” means a person who
(A) poses a substantial risk of bodily harm to that person’s self, as manifested by recent behavior
causing, attempting, or threatening that harm;
(B) poses a substantial risk of harm to others as manifested by recent behavior causing,
attempting, or threatening harm, and is likely in the near future to cause physical injury,
physical abuse, or substantial property damage to another person; or
(C) manifests a current intent to carry out plans of serious harm to that person’s self or another;
(13) “mental health professional” means a psychiatrist or physician who is licensed by the State
Medical Board to practice in this state or is employed by the federal government; a clinical
psychologist licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners; a
psychological associate trained in clinical psychology and licensed by the Board of Psychologist and
Psychological Associate Examiners; a registered nurse with a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing,
licensed by the State Board of Nursing; a marital and family therapist licensed by the Board of
Marital and Family Therapy; a professional counselor licensed by the Board of Professional
Counselors; a clinical social worker licensed by the Board of Social Work Examiners; and a person
who
(A) has a master’s degree in the field of mental health;
(B) has at least 12 months of post-masters working experience in the field of mental illness; and
(C) is working under the supervision of a type of licensee listed in this paragraph;
(14) “mental illness” means an organic, mental, or emotional impairment that has substantial
adverse effects on an individual’s ability to exercise conscious control of the individual’s actions or
ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand; intellectual disability, developmental disability,
or both, epilepsy, drug addiction, and alcoholism do not per se constitute mental illness, although
persons suffering from these conditions may also be suffering from mental illness;
(15) “peace officer” includes a state police officer, municipal or other local police officer, state,
municipal, or other local health officer, public health nurse, United States marshal or deputy United
States marshal, or a person authorized by the court;
(16) “persons with mental disorders” has the meaning given in AS § 47.30.610;
(17) “professional person in charge” means the senior mental health professional at a facility or that
person’s designee; in the absence of a mental health professional it means the chief of staff or a
physician designated by the chief of staff;
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(18) “provider of outpatient care” means a mental health professional or hospital, clinic, institution,
center, or other health care facility designated by the department to accept for treatment patients
who are ordered to undergo involuntary outpatient treatment by the court or who are released early
from inpatient commitments on condition that they undergo outpatient treatment;
(19) “screening investigation” means the investigation and review of facts that have been alleged to
warrant emergency examination or treatment, including interviews with the persons making the
allegations, any other significant witnesses who can readily be contacted for interviews, and, if
possible, the respondent, and an investigation and evaluation of the reliability and credibility of
persons providing information or making allegations;
(20) “state” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the territories and
possessions of the United States, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the approval of
the United States Congress, Canada.
___________________________
REVISED AS § 47.30.915
Definitions
In AS §§ 47.30.660–47.30.915,
(1) “adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence” means a court order finding that a
person is
(a) not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill under AS § 12.47.040;
(b) incompetent to stand trial for a criminal offense under AS §§ 12.47.100 – 12.47.120; or
(c) a danger to self or others, or is gravely disabled because of incapacity, incompetence, mental
illness, dementia, or some other cause;
(2) “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
(3) “court” means a superior court of the state;
(4) “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
(5) “designated treatment facility” or “treatment facility” means a hospital, clinic, institution, center,
or other health care facility that has been designated by the department for the treatment or
rehabilitation of mentally ill persons under AS §§ 47.30.670–47.30.915 but does not include
correctional institutions;
(6) “disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or
mental incompetence” means the prohibition against the possession of a firearm or ammunition
under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) that results from an involuntary commitment or adjudication of mental
illness or mental incompetence.
(ADDED) “developmental disability” means a severe, chronic disability that
(a) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical
impairments;
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(b) is manifested before the person attains age 22;
(c) is likely to continue indefinitely;
(d) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major
life activity: self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility, self-direction,
capacity for independent living, and economic self-sufficiency; and
(e) reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or
generic care, treatment, or other services that are of lifelong or extended duration and are
individually planned and coordinated;
(7) “evaluation facility” means a health care facility that has been designated or is operated by the
department to perform the evaluations described in AS §§ 47.30.660–47.30.915, or a medical facility
licensed under AS § 47.32 or operated by the federal government;
(8) “evaluation personnel” means a qualified evaluator designated by the department to conduct
evaluations as prescribed in AS §§ 47.30.660–47.30.915 who conduct evaluations in places in which
no staffed evaluation facility exists;
(9) “gravely disabled” means a condition in which a person as a result of mental illness
(a) is in danger of physical harm arising from such complete neglect of basic needs for food,
clothing, shelter, or personal safety as to render serious accident, illness, or death highly
probable if care by another is not taken; or
(b) will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or
physical distress, and this distress is of such intensity that the individual is unable to life safely
outside of a controlled environment;
(10) “inpatient treatment” means care and treatment rendered inside or on the premises of a
treatment facility, or a part or unit of a treatment facility, for a continual period of 24 hours or
longer;
(ADDED) “intellectual disability” means a disability that is characterized by significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and
practical adaptive skills. The condition is manifested prior to age eighteen (18). In this definition,
“adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards
of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and
community;
(11) “least restrictive alternative” means mental health treatment facilities and conditions of
treatment that
(a) are no more harsh, hazardous, or intrusive than necessary to achieve the treatment
objectives of the patient; and
(b) involve no restrictions on physical movement nor supervised residence or inpatient care
except as reasonably necessary for the administration of treatment or the protection of the
patient or others from physical injury;
(12) “likely to cause serious harm” means a person who
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(a) poses a substantial risk of bodily harm to that person’s self, as manifested by behavior in the
previous 30 days where the person caused, attempted, or threatened that harm;
(b) poses a substantial risk of harm to others as manifested by behavior in the previous three
months where the person caused, attempted, or threatened harm to another person, and is likely
to cause physical injury, physical abuse, or substantial property damage to another person in the
next 30 days; or
(c) manifests a current intent, as evidenced by present statements or behavior, or by statements
or behavior in the previous 30 days, to carry out plans of serious harm to that person’s self or
another;
(13) “mental health professional” means a psychiatrist or physician who is licensed by the State
Medical Board to practice in this state or is employed by the federal government; a psychologist
licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners; a psychological
associate licensed by the Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners; a registered
nurse with a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing, licensed by the State Board of Nursing; a
marital and family therapist licensed by the Board of Marital and Family Therapy; a professional
counselor licensed by the Board of Professional Counselors; a clinical social worker licensed by the
Board of Social Work Examiners; or a person who
(a) has a master’s degree in the field of mental health;
(b) has at least 12 months of post-masters working experience in the field of mental illness; and
(c) is working under the supervision of a type of licensee listed in this paragraph;
(14) “mental illness” means an organic, mental, or emotional impairment that has substantial
adverse effects on an individual’s ability to exercise conscious control of the individual’s actions or
ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand; intellectual disability, developmental disability,
epilepsy, drug addiction, and alcoholism are not mental illnesses, although persons suffering from
these conditions may also be suffering from mental illness;
(15) “peace officer” includes a state police officer, municipal or other local police officer, state,
municipal, or other local health officer, public health nurse, United States marshal or deputy United
States marshal, or a person authorized by the court;
(16) “persons with mental disorders” has the meaning given in AS § 47.30.610;
(17) “professional person in charge” means the senior mental health professional at a facility or that
person’s designee; in the absence of a mental health professional it means the chief of staff or a
physician designated by the chief of staff;
(18) “provider of outpatient care” means a mental health professional or hospital, clinic, institution,
center, or other health care facility designated by the department to accept for treatment patients
who are ordered to undergo involuntary outpatient commitment by the court or who are released
early from inpatient commitments on condition that they undergo outpatient commitment;
(ADDED) “qualified and neutral evaluator”
(a) A qualified evaluator includes psychiatrists and psychologists. A qualified psychiatrist is a
person who is licensed by the State Medical Board to practice in this state or is employed by the
federal government, who has received additional training or certification in forensic psychiatry,
and who is board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the
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subspecialty of forensic psychiatry. A qualified psychologist is a person who is licensed by the
state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners. Psychologists should have
training and/or certification in performing civil commitment evaluations, including continuing
education in civil commitment evaluations. The Division of Behavioral Health shall coordinate
continuing education in civil commitment evaluations that will be available to psychiatrists and
psychologists located in the State of Alaska.
(b) A neutral evaluator is a qualified psychiatrist or qualified psychologist who is not otherwise
involved in the defendant’s clinical treatment. If a neutral evaluator later becomes involved in
the individual’s clinical treatment, any subsequent evaluation shall be conducted by an
additional, neutral evaluator.
(c) The Division of Behavioral Health shall coordinate continuing education in civil commitment
evaluations that will be available to psychiatrists and psychologists located in the State of
Alaska.
(19) “screening investigation” means the investigation and review of facts that have been alleged to
warrant emergency examination or treatment, including interviews with the persons making the
allegations, any other significant witnesses who can readily be contacted for interviews, and, if
possible, the respondent, and an investigation and evaluation of the reliability and credibility of
persons providing information or making allegations;
(20) “state” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the territories and
possessions of the United States, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the approval of
the United States Congress, Canada.
(ADDED) “telebehavioral health” means the performance of forensic evaluations by electronic
transmission using electronic communication technology; or two-way, interactive, simultaneous
audio and video. When evaluations are conducted using telebehavioral health, all patient
information, including electronic data, must be confidentially maintained.
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